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“I have a deep and abiding admiration for the legal profession
and the tremendous role it has played in the service of the cause with
which I have been identified. The road to freedom is now a highway
because lawyers throughout the land, yesterday and today, have
helped clear the obstructions, have helped eliminate roadblocks, by
their selfless, courageous espousal of difficult and unpopular
causes.”—Martin Luther King, Jr.1
INTRODUCTION
When Martin Luther King, Jr. started college, he considered becoming a
lawyer.2 When he abandoned that idea in favor of the ministry, he could not have
imagined the central role that lawyers would play in his life.
A decade into his career, Dr. King observed: “It is common knowledge that I
have had a little something to do with lawyers since the 1955 Montgomery bus
boycott.”3 He then described himself as a “notorious litigant” and a “frequenter of
jails.”4 Notwithstanding his core philosophical, moral, and strategic commitment
to nonviolent direct action, Dr. King had an extraordinary amount of interaction
with lawyers and with the legal system, though often not by choice.
Dr. King’s activism began and ended with lawyers and the courts. From the
1955 arrest and prosecution of Rosa Parks in Montgomery that jump-started his
career,5 to the 1968 court victory in the Memphis Sanitation Workers Strike on the
day of his death,6 lawyers served as a nearly constant companion—a fact of his
activist life. The lawyers’ roles depended on the activists’ and their opponents’
strategies and tactics, as well as on the lawyers’ own creativity and innovation.

1

Martin Luther King, Jr., Foreword to WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER, DEEP IN MY HEART, at xxi (1966).
DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 37 (1st Perennial Classics ed. 2004). The intellectual challenge,
the chance to serve, and the opportunity to get out from under his father’s large shadow drew Dr. King
to the law. See id. When asked what he would have done if he had not entered the ministry, Dr. King
said, “I started out as a pre-law student. I was interested in going into law . . . . At one time I thought
about medicine . . . but then after entering college I felt that I wanted to go into law.” Interview by
Eleanor Fischer with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in Atlanta, Ga. (Nov. 22, 1961), http://www.wnyc.org
/story/261384-previously-unreleased-interviews-reverend-dr-martin-luther-king-jr/.
3
King, supra note 1, at xxi.
4
See id.
5
See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.
6
See discussion infra Section III.B.3.v.
2

496

Vol. 10:3]

Leonard S. Rubinowitz

The lawyers remained largely behind the scenes. Nonetheless, they were
almost always present and contributed in many important ways. Here, in this
Article, the lawyers take center stage. This Article examines Dr. King’s and his
colleagues’ processes, criteria, and decisions in enlisting and deploying lawyers
during the Civil Rights Movement.7
The literature by and about Dr. King pays little attention to legal proceedings.
In light of the gap between the literature and Dr. King’s recognition of lawyers’
importance to the Civil Rights Movement, 8 the lawyers warrant an in-depth
examination.
More than seventy lawyers, and several legal organizations, represented Dr.
King, his colleagues, and the thousands of protesters involved in the movements
with which he was associated.9
The lawyers’ roles fell into two broad categories. First, they provided support
to enable the civil rights activists to carry out their core strategy of nonviolent direct
action—referred to within the Article as the “support” role. Dr. King’s nonviolent
direct action encompassed both direct action, such as boycotts, marches, and
demonstrations, and a philosophy of nonviolence, a “willingness to accept suffering
without retaliation, to accept blows from the opponent without striking back.”10
Since public officials often used the law and the courts to prevent protest activities
and resist change, much of the lawyers’ support work was reactive. It included
7

For ease of expression, this Article will refer to Dr. King’s choices even when others were involved
in the decision-making process. The Article will also try to clarify whether it was “he” or “they,” when
relevant. This approach stems from Dr. King’s caveat in Stride Toward Freedom, his book about the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, where he writes that he sometimes means “we” when he says “I.” MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY, at ix (1st Perennial Library
ed. 1964). Others involved include those within his organizations—the Montgomery Improvement
Association (MIA) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)—and activists with
whom they worked. At the same time, Dr. King had the final say much of the time, even when his
colleagues or lawyers disagreed with him. See, e.g., LERONE BENNETT, JR., WHAT MANNER OF MAN: A
BIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 186 (8th rev. ed. 1992) (“Although King’s decision-making
methods have proved apt to his purposes, they have not contributed to the peace of mind of associates
who live in a somewhat more distant relation to divinity.”); FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE 65
(rev. ed. 2013) (“There were times when Dr. King said, ‘Fred, I understand what you say the law is, but
our conscience says that the law is unjust and we cannot obey it. However, there is a higher law. So, if
we are arrested we will be calling on you to defend us.’ ”).
8
John Lewis, fellow civil rights activist and later long-term congressman from Atlanta, held a
similar view about the importance of lawyers to the Civil Rights Movement. See, e.g., JOHN LEWIS
WITH MICHAEL D'ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT 256 (Harcourt Brace
& Co. 1999) (1998) (“[W]e knew we would have many arrests and trials ahead of us, and we would
need all the legal representation we could get.”); id. at 494–95 (“Without the years of struggle of the
civil rights movement, without people like Dr. King, without the unsung heroes of the movement,
without the people who came before them and the people who came after, we would not be where we
are today.”).
9
This figure is not limited to the lawyers who literally represented Dr. King. Rather, it encompasses
those who worked on matters related to movements, events, and litigation in which Dr. King, his
colleagues, or fellow protesters were involved. Thus, it is a quite inclusive definition of the relevant
lawyers. For a complete list of the lawyers, including their characteristics, affiliations, and participation,
see infra Appendix.
At the same time, more than seventy is likely a conservative estimate. It comes from accounts and
court documents. Other lawyers volunteered for less visible roles, such as defending the thousands of
protesters arrested in the various campaigns, which makes identifying them difficult.
10
KING, supra note 7, at 85.
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defending against criminal prosecutions and civil suits, and challenging injunctions
designed to prevent marches and demonstrations.11 But some support work was
proactive, such as seeking permissions or injunctions that would allow planned
direct action to proceed legally.12
The second major role of the lawyers was to rely on the strategy of
constitutional challenges to segregation laws and policies. That strategy was not
new. For example, in the first half of the twentieth century, a small cadre of lawyers,
led by Charles Houston and his protégé Thurgood Marshall, used the courts to
attack segregation laws. 13 They proceeded independently of any broader social
movement. 14 The paradigm example is the school desegregation litigation
campaign that culminated in 1954 with Brown v. Board of Education.15
Starting with the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the lawyers played both roles.16
Movement leaders turned to litigation—referred to here as “complementary
desegregation litigation”—in conjunction with direct action, seeking synergy
between the two strategies.17 In these movements, however, the choice of whether
to pursue desegregation through the courts rested with Martin Luther King, Jr. and
other protest leaders, rather than with the lawyers.18
Timing is also important in this analysis. In the early years, from 1955 to 1962,
Dr. King’s overall strategy included both nonviolent direct action and
complementary desegregation litigation. 19 It was partly a period of “persuasive
nonviolence,” based on the assumption that protests could enlighten and change
minds and policies and practices.20
The 1963 Birmingham Movement marked a strategic turning point. Starting
with that movement, Dr. King and his organization, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC),21 turned to more aggressive forms of nonviolent
direct action—moving entirely from persuasion to coercion.22 In his “Letter from a
Birmingham Jail,” Dr. King wrote that the goal was “to create such a crisis and
11

See discussion infra Section II.A.
See discussion infra Section II.A.2.i.
13
See CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 62–68, 148
(1998); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME
COURT, 1936–61, at 6, 10–12, 70–72 (1996). See generally MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 162–67, 239–42 (2004)
(discussing litigation strategy); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 185–98 (1st Vintage Books ed.
2004) (discussing Marshall’s early work with NAACP’s legal efforts).
14
See sources cited supra note 13.
15
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16
See discussion infra Sections II.A.1.i.a, II.A.2.i, II.B.1.
17
See discussion infra Section II.B.
18
See infra notes 574–578, 616 and accompanying text.
19
See discussion infra Section II.B.
20
See generally KING, supra note 7, at 83–88 (discussing nonviolence philosophy).
21
SCLC was a faith-based organization formed by a group of southern Black ministers and other
supporters to challenge segregation and racial discrimination throughout the South. See ADAM
FAIRCLOUGH, TO REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 13 (1987).
22
See DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT OF 1965, at 221 (1978); MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 156–57. SCLC leaders gave the Birmingham
movement the name “Project C,” for “confrontation,” to symbolize the new level of aggressiveness. See
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 47 (1964).
12
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foster such a tension that a community which has consistently refused to negotiate
is forced to confront the issue.”23 “Nonviolent direct action,” Dr. King explained,
“seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored.”24
This shift meant an increase in the number, size, and length of marches and
demonstrations. On one occasion, it even meant violating a federal court’s
injunction.25 Every movement and event from 1963 to 1968 reflected some aspect
of the escalation. Ratcheting up the level of direct action elicited mass arrests, as
well as violence by local police (Birmingham), state troopers (Selma), and private
citizens (Chicago).26
A second major strategic change also marked the later years. Activists
eliminated complementary desegregation litigation from their arsenal.27 With the
evolution of the movement’s strategies, the lawyers’ responsibilities and challenges
similarly changed. 28 While some tasks continued throughout Dr. King’s career,
new ones also emerged, and others disappeared. Just as the activists had no
instruction manual to follow, the lawyers had to adjust and come up with creative
approaches to support the activists in carrying out their continually evolving direct
action tactics.29
Noting the changing roles of lawyers in the Civil Rights Movement generally,
activist lawyer Arthur Kinoy captured the shift from the early years to the later
years of Dr. King’s career:
In a fundamental way, the traditional role of the lawyer in the civil
rights movement was changing in order to meet the new need. It was
shifting away from the older, relatively independent role of seeking
to attain the goals of the movement through developing key test
cases, to a role of a very different character, that of defending the
ability of the people themselves to attain the goals of their movement
through their own strength and power.30

23

KING, supra note 22, at 81.
Id. See generally infra note 659 (discussing Dr. King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”).
25
See discussion infra Section III.B.3.i.
26
See infra Sections III.B.1.i, III.B.3.iii, III.B.3.iv.
27
See, e.g., J. MILLS THORNTON III, DIVIDING LINES: MUNICIPAL POLITICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS IN MONTGOMERY, BIRMINGHAM, AND SELMA 282 (2002) (“[Dr. King] was eager to find a
venue in which he could prove that direct action could produce real results”); id. at 299 (“King found
himself opposed . . . by black activists previously associated with the NAACP, who emphasized legal
attacks on segregation’s statutory and constitutional foundations.”). At the same time, the activists
shifted from using the federal courts proactively to aggressively pursuing federal legislation. See id. at
371; see also CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S
91–92 (1981).
28
See infra Section III.B.
29
See discussion infra Section III.B.
30
ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE’S LAWYER 158 (1983). Kinoy
emphasized that the shift in the movement “would have sweeping implications for the functioning of
people’s lawyers but which at the time very few of us outside the movement understood.” Id. at 156;
accord KLARMAN, supra note 13, at 467 (explaining that litigation competed with direct action for
scarce resources, and that civil rights leaders eventually came to realize its limited capacity for
producing social change). Professor Klarman observed:
24

499

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2016

MOVEMENT AND EVENT DESCRIPTIONS
This Article focuses on the movements and events in Dr. King’s career where
lawyers played a significant role. The following is a brief description of each of
them to provide context for discussions later in the Article.31
The Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955)
When Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a segregated Montgomery,
Alabama bus on December 1, 1955, it triggered a yearlong boycott of the city’s
buses by the Black community. 32 Local leaders formed the Montgomery
Improvement Association (MIA) to coordinate the movement, and they elected
Martin Luther King, Jr. president. 33 Due to a synergy of the bus boycott and
complementary desegregation litigation by the MIA, Montgomery eventually
desegregated the bus system.34 When Blacks returned to the buses in December
1956, the bus company ceased the long-standing enforced segregation and
humiliating treatment that had brought about the movement.35
In the aftermath of the bus boycott, the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference was formed to continue fighting segregation in the South. 36 The
organizers selected Martin Luther King, Jr. as president, an office he occupied until
his death in 1968.37

Though litigation had performed valuable service in mobilizing racial protest and
securing Court victories, . . . it could not fulfill all of the functions of direct action. Sitins, Freedom Rides, and street demonstrations fostered black agency much better than did
litigation, which encouraged blacks to place faith in elite black lawyers and white judges
rather than in themselves. . . . In addition, direct-action protest more reliably created
conflict and incited opponents’ violence, which ultimately proved critical to transforming
national opinion on race.
Id. at 467.
31
The Article does not purport to cover every campaign or movement in which Dr. King
participated, but only those where attorneys played an important role.
32
Useful overviews of the Montgomery Bus Boycott include TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE
WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63, at 131–207 (1988); DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM: THE
MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT (Stewart Burns ed., 1997); FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 15–18, 23–35,
53–54 (1987); GARROW, supra note 2, at 11–32, 57–89; KING, supra note 7; THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 50–99 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1998) [hereinafter MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY];
THORNTON, supra note 27, at 20–140.
“Black” is capitalized wherever it refers to Black people, to indicate that Blacks, or African
Americans, are a specific cultural group with its own history, traditions, experience, and identity—not
just people of a particular color. Using the uppercase letter signifies recognition of the culture, as it does
with Latinos, Asian Americans, or Native Americans. See generally MARTHA BIONDI, TO STAND AND
FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY (2003); Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
33
KING, supra note 7, at 41–42; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 16–17.
34
Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Social Movements and SocialChange Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 663, 684 (2005).
35
See KING, supra note 7, at 150–51, 157; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 697–98.
36
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 12–13, 23, 29.
37
See id. at 37.
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Dr. King’s Alabama Perjury Trial (1960)

In 1960, the State of Alabama tried Dr. King for perjury, alleging that he
falsified his 1956 and 1958 state income tax returns.38 The prosecutors accused Dr.
King of under-reporting his income in those years.39 An all-white jury acquitted
Martin Luther King, Jr. of the charges, enabling him to avoid a potentially lengthy
prison sentence.40
Dr. King’s Incarceration in Georgia (1960)
In early 1960, Dr. King moved back to Atlanta from Montgomery.41 A police
officer ticketed him for not having obtained a Georgia driver’s license within ninety
days, as was required of new residents under Georgia law.42 He received a fine and
a suspended sentence, with a year’s probation. 43 The local judge revoked his
probation when he was arrested during a demonstration in an Atlanta department
store. 44 He was sent to a maximum-security prison. 45 His lawyers secured his
release and persuaded the appellate court that the original sentence was beyond the
trial judge’s authority.46
The Albany (Georgia) Movement (1961–1962)
In 1961, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and local
activists initiated the Albany Movement to challenge all forms of segregation and
discrimination in the city.47 Local leaders invited Dr. King and SCLC to the city to
help revitalize the stalled movement. 48 The movement failed on many levels,
providing important lessons for later campaigns.49

38

See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 276–311; GARROW, supra note 2, at 129–37; Edgar Dyer, A
“Triumph of Justice” in Alabama: The 1960 Perjury Trial of Martin Luther King, Jr., 88 J. AFR. AM.
HIST. 245, 248 (2003).
39
See Dyer, supra note 38, at 254.
40
See id. at 258.
41
MAURICE C. DANIELS, SAVING THE SOUL OF GEORGIA: DONALD L. HOLLOWELL AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 114 (2013).
42
GARROW, supra note 2, at 135–36.
43
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 114–15; GARROW, supra note 2, at 143.
44
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 114–15.
45
Id. at 116.
46
See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.c.
47
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 529; CARSON, supra note 27, at 58. See generally BRANCH, supra note
32, at 529–58, 602–39; GARROW, supra note 2, at 173–230; DAVID L. LEWIS, KING: A BIOGRAPHY 143–
45 (Univ. of Ill. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1970).
48
GARROW, supra note 2, at 180–81. This was the first of a number of occasions in which local
leaders requested SCLC’s involvement to bolster a locally initiated movement. See, e.g., KING, supra
note 22, at 65 (discussing Fred Shuttlesworth’s request for SCLC to “come to Birmingham” to help the
Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights); see also discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–ii,
III.B.2, III.B.3.i–v.
49
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 217–19, 225–29, 235, 290, 326, 456; KING, supra note 22, at 34–35.
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The Birmingham Movement (1963)
In April 1963, SCLC joined a local Birmingham movement in a mass direct
action campaign largely targeting the local business community. 50 Local police
used fire hoses and police dogs to disrupt the marches, bringing national attention
to the movement and building momentum for the passage of federal civil rights
legislation.51 Dr. King violated an injunction, was jailed for contempt, and wrote
his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.”52
The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (1963)
On August 28, 1963, more than 200,000 people assembled in a mass protest
at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.53 The purpose of the event was to
lobby Congress for the passage of civil rights legislation and the creation of jobs
programs for the unemployed.54 The signature moment was Dr. King’s “I Have a
Dream” speech.55
St. Augustine, Florida (1964)
In May 1964, Dr. King and SCLC joined the St. Augustine movement with
hopes of ending the city’s segregation and winning support for the stalled Civil
Rights Act of 1964.56 They engaged in a series of night marches in the town square
where slaves were once bought and sold.57 The marches were plagued with violence
from Ku Klux Klan members, and while the police were not the source of the
violence, they did not provide sufficient protection from the Klansmen.58
50

Biographical and scholarly accounts of the Birmingham Movement include THORNTON, supra note
27, at 141–379; BRANCH, supra note 32, at 688–810; TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN
THE KING YEARS 1963–65, at 76–89 (1998); GLENN T. ESKEW, BUT FOR BIRMINGHAM: THE LOCAL AND
NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE (1997); GARROW, supra note 2, at 220–74;
KING, supra note 22, at 43–57; DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA: THE
CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS EVOLUTION (1st Touchstone ed. 2002); MLK
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 170–217.
51
See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL BATTLES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 360 (Twelve Tables Press, Anniversary ed. 2004) (1994); see also sources cited supra note
50.
52
Birmingham Campaign (1963), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu
/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_birmingham_campaign/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2015).
53
March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia
.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_march_on_washington_for_jobs_and_freedom/ (last
visited Sept. 23, 2015); see also CLARENCE B. JONES & STUART CONNELLY, BEHIND THE DREAM: THE
MAKING OF THE SPEECH THAT TRANSFORMED A NATION 95–96 (2011). See generally BRANCH, supra
note 32, at 833–87; GARROW, supra note 2, at 265–88.
54
See CARSON, supra note 27, at 91–95; GARROW, supra note 2, at 266–67.
55
See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at xiii-xiv. For an illuminating discussion of events
surrounding the March on Washington and Dr. King’s “I Have a Dream” speech, see GARY YOUNGE,
THE SPEECH: THE STORY BEHIND DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.’S DREAM (2013).
56
See generally FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 180–91; GARROW, supra note 2, at 316–44.
57
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 182–83; GARROW, supra note 2, at 325–26; St. Augustine
Movement, KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia
/encyclopedia/enc_st_augustine_movement/index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
58
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 183–86; see also Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at
12–13, Young v. Davis, No. 64-133-Civ-J (M.D. Fla. June 9, 1964) [hereinafter Young Findings &
Conclusions], http://civilrights.flagler.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16000coll4/id/1174/rec/9.
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The Selma, Alabama Voting Rights Movement (1965)

In early 1965, SCLC joined voting rights activists protesting the exclusion of
Blacks from the electoral process in Alabama and seeking massive registration of
Black voters.59 State troopers attacked marchers with clubs and tear gas as they left
Selma on their way to the state capitol in Montgomery, fifty miles away. 60
Ultimately, a five-day march to Montgomery culminated in a demonstration on the
steps of the state capitol building.61
The Chicago Freedom Movement (1965–1966)
Later in 1965, Martin Luther King, Jr. and SCLC began planning their first
foray into a northern city, and in January 1966 joined forces with a local coalition
to form the Chicago Freedom Movement.62 The movement focused primarily on
housing practices and problems, with two strands: (1) open housing marches
through all-white neighborhoods to address the city’s extreme segregation; and
(2) a movement to end the slums by challenging landlords who owned extremely
substandard housing in low-income Black neighborhoods. 63 The movement
resulted in a quite general “Summit Agreement” to address housing discrimination
in the city.64
The Memphis Sanitation Workers Strike (1968)
In March 1968, Dr. King accepted an invitation to lead a march in support of
Memphis’s sanitation workers’ strike for better wages and working conditions.65
59

Selma to Montgomery March (1965), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford
.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_selma_to_montgomery_march/index.html (last visited Sept. 23,
2015). See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965–68, at
137–85 (2006); GARROW, supra note 22, at 39–48 (1978); THORNTON, supra note 27, at 380–499.
60
See GARROW, supra note 22, at 73–77, 96; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 488; Selma to
Montgomery March (1965), supra note 59.
61
See GARROW, supra note 22, at 115–17; Selma to Montgomery March (1965), supra note 59.
62
See Chicago Campaign (1966), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu
/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_chicago_campaign/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). See generally ALAN
B. ANDERSON & GEORGE W. PICKERING, CONFRONTING THE COLOR LINE: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN CHICAGO 153, 160–64, 172–78, 188–94 (1986); BRANCH, supra note 59, at
501–22; JAMES R. RALPH, JR., NORTHERN PROTEST: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CHICAGO, AND THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1, 7, 28–91 (1993); David J. Garrow, Preface to CHICAGO 1966: OPEN
HOUSING MARCHES, SUMMIT NEGOTIATIONS, AND OPERATION BREADBASKET, at ix–x (David J. Garrow
ed., 1989); Alvin Pitcher, The Chicago Freedom Movement: What Is It? (Nov. 1966), in CHICAGO
1966, supra, at 155, 155–57; Program of the Chicago Freedom Movement (July 1966), in CHICAGO
1966, supra, at 97, 100.
63
See RALPH, supra note 62, at 58–65, 92–130.
64
See generally THOMAS G. AYERS, SUBCOMM. TO THE CONF. ON FAIR HOUS. CONVENED BY THE CHI.
CONF. ON RELIGION & RACE, THE ‘SUMMIT AGREEMENT’ (Aug. 26, 1966), reprinted in CHICAGO 1966,
supra note 62, at 147, 147–54.
65
See JOAN TURNER BEIFUSS, AT THE RIVER I STAND: MEMPHIS, THE 1968 STRIKE, AND MARTIN
LUTHER KING 156, 190–91 (Carlson Publ’g 1989) (1985); Memphis Sanitation Workers Strike (1968),
KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc
_memphis_sanitation_workers_strike_1968/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2015) [hereinafter
Memphis Strike]. See generally BRANCH, supra note 59, at 683–766; GARROW, supra note 2, at 604–24;
MICHAEL K. HONEY, GOING DOWN JERICHO ROAD: THE MEMPHIS STRIKE, MARTIN LUTHER KING’S
LAST CAMPAIGN (2007).
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An assassin took Dr. King’s life on April 4, 1968, just four days before he was
planning to lead another march in downtown Memphis.66
The Poor People’s Campaign for Jobs and Income (1968)
At the time of Dr. King’s death, he was in the midst of planning a
demonstration in Washington, D.C. to press Congress to address the problem of
poverty. 67 The campaign involved constructing a tent city on the Washington
Mall.68 After Dr. King’s death, poor people came from all over the country to set
up “Resurrection City” and seek legislative relief.69
***
This Article highlights how Dr. King and other leaders selected and deployed
lawyers. It also examines how those lawyers’ roles changed as strategies shifted
between the early years and the later years.
Part I, “Choosing the Lawyers,” introduces the many lawyers who represented
Dr. King, his colleagues, and fellow protesters. Section A examines the processes
of selecting the lawyers and legal organizations. Dr. King made some of those
choices himself, while delegating others to decision-makers he trusted. 70 Both
enlisted specific lawyers on a largely ad hoc basis in the early years, but then began
to rely increasingly on a set group of lawyers by the early 1960s.71
Section B examines the factors that did and did not seem to matter in enlisting
individual lawyers and legal organizations. These factors include: (1) location (both
local and northern lawyers participated in significant numbers); (2) identity factors
(race, gender, religion, and age); (3) strategic commitments (consistent or not with
the movements); (4) the types of organizations involved; and (5) the lawyers who
became members of Dr. King’s inner circle.
After discussing the lawyers’ selection, the rest of the Article examines their
roles in the various movements and events. As suggested earlier, both continuity
and important changes in the lawyers’ tasks occurred during Dr. King’s career.
In Part II, “Deploying the Lawyers: The Early Years (1955–1962),” Section
A examines the lawyers’ support efforts, including (1) defense work, both criminal
and civil; (2) efforts to secure permissions and to challenge injunctions; and
(3) initiatives to secure funding to facilitate chosen strategies. Section B analyzes
the use of complementary desegregation litigation. It explains the decisions to
initiate desegregation litigation designed to complement and supplement the
66

See BEIFUSS, supra note 65, at 283–85, 292–93, 299; Memphis Strike, supra note 65.
See Poor People’s Campaign, KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu
/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_poor_peoples_campaign/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). See
generally BRANCH, supra note 59, at 670–91, 754–65; GARROW, supra note 2, at 575–624; GERALD D.
MCKNIGHT, THE LAST CRUSADE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE FBI, AND THE POOR PEOPLE’S
CAMPAIGN (1998); MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 346–55.
68
See BEIFUSS, supra note 65, at 15; Poor People’s Campaign, supra note 67.
69
See John Kelly, Before Occupy D.C., There Was Resurrection City, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2011, at
C3; Poor People’s Campaign, supra note 67.
70
See discussion infra Section I.A.
71
See discussion infra Section I.B.4.i.
67
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nonviolent direct action, and provides context by recounting the history of
desegregation litigation campaigns and Dr. King’s views about such litigation. The
Section examines the federal desegregation lawsuits in Montgomery, Alabama and
Albany, Georgia, including the reasons Dr. King and his colleagues pursued a
multi-pronged strategy in each instance.
Part III, “Deploying the Lawyers: The Later Years (1963–1968),” explores
the changes, as well as the continuity, in the lawyers’ roles as the movements
escalated their nonviolent direct action and abandoned complementary
desegregation litigation. Section A examines the abandonment of the use of
complementary desegregation litigation following the Albany, Georgia campaign
and why the leaders turned, instead, to more aggressive nonviolent direct action
strategies and tactics. Section B discusses lawyers’ efforts to support activists who
were using more coercive and expansive nonviolent direct action strategies. A
conclusion follows.
I. CHOOSING THE LAWYERS
As his self-description suggests, Martin Luther King, Jr. turned to lawyers on
a regular basis.72 As previously discussed, more than seventy lawyers represented
Dr. King, his colleagues, his organizations, and the thousands of protesters in the
campaigns and events in which he was involved.73 They drew from three sources:
(1) the small number of civil rights lawyers practicing at mid-century; (2) other
established lawyers who began to take up the civil rights cause; and (3) newcomers
to the profession who shared the commitment. 74 Their numbers grew with the
emergence of the modern Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s.75
Martin Luther King, Jr. sometimes selected the lawyers himself, though he
often delegated that task.76 Some of the lawyers provided representation only once,
while others played recurring roles. 77 Dr. King also developed long-term, close
professional and personal relationships with several lawyers who became part of
his inner circle.78
Dr. King and his organizations relied almost entirely on outside counsel, rather
than assembling their own legal staff for the many occasions when they needed
72

See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
74
See discussion infra Section I.B.2.iv. Constance Baker Motley, a leading civil rights lawyer,
recalls that no one was talking about civil rights law in the late 1940s, when she was in law school. See
MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 59. Jack Greenberg, another leading civil rights lawyer, said there were very
few civil rights lawyers at mid-century. He identified half a dozen organizations, none of which had
more than three lawyers on staff. Beyond that, there were some individual lawyers who handled civil
rights cases as part of their private practice. Jewish Lawyers in the Civil Rights Movement, CTR. FOR
JEWISH HIST. (Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.cjh.org/videoplayer.php?vfile=091907JEWSANDJUSTICE
.flv.
75
See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 153–55; Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives
on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 216–17 (1976).
76
See discussion infra Section I.A.
77
See, e.g., discussion infra Section II.B (discussing Fred Gray’s extensive involvement in the Civil
Rights Movement).
78
They ranged from mentor (Stanley Levison) to “disciple” (Clarence Jones). See discussion infra
Section I.B.5.
73
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representation. 79 With any selection process, the lawyers’ competence and
commitment to the cause mattered. And in light of the ongoing financial challenges
Dr. King’s organizations faced, their cost mattered, too.
A. The Process of Enlisting Lawyers
Lawyers entered Martin Luther King, Jr.’s orbit in a number of different
ways.80 When Dr. King enlisted lawyers himself, it was usually a matter of a simple
request to join the struggle. 81 For example, Fred Gray’s representation of Rosa
Parks led to Dr. King and other leaders tapping him as counsel for the MIA.82 In
1961, Dr. King issued another invitation when he met William Kunstler.83 Based
on Kunstler’s reputation as a civil rights lawyer, Dr. King asked him to serve as
SCLC “special trial counsel,” which meant being available when needed.84 That
request began a relationship spanning several years and movements.85

79

Fred Gray became an exception as MIA’s counsel. See discussion infra Section I.A.
As Dr. King’s reputation grew, many lawyers sought to represent him or his movement. See infra
note 154 and accompanying text.
81
See, e.g., Kunstler, William Moses (1919–1995), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http: //
kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_kunstler_william_moses_1919_1995/
(last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (explaining how Dr. King met William Kunstler “during the 1961 Freedom
Rides . . . [and] asked Kunstler to take on several cases throughout the 1960s”).
82
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 50–54; KING, supra note 7, at 41. See generally supra notes 32–33 and
accompanying text. The only other Black lawyer in Montgomery at the time, Charles Langford, later
assisted Gray in working with the MIA. GRAY, supra note 7, at 26, 28. Dr. King emphasized that Gray
was his choice by referring to him as “my attorney.” See id. at 65.
83
See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 74–76.
84
See WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER WITH SHEILA ISENBERG, MY LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER 109–12
(1994); DAVID J. LANGUM, WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED LAWYER IN AMERICA 62–63
(1999) (conveying Kunstler’s account of meeting Dr. King in late September 1961 and Dr. King asking
him “to serve as his special counsel on matters unsuited for his regular attorneys” at LDF, and stating
that Kunstler subsequently “undert[ook] specifically commissioned assignments from the SCLC and
King, representing specific clients in specific situations”); Kunstler, William Moses (1919–1995), supra
note 81 (“King asked Kunstler to take on several cases throughout the 1960s and praised him for the
‘magnificent job’ he had done as a civil rights attorney.”).
85
See LANGUM, supra note 84, at 65–66 (“Kunstler participated in the campaigns in Albany, Georgia
(1962–63), Danville, Virginia (1963), Birmingham, Alabama (1963), and St. Augustine, Florida
(1964).”). Kunstler describes his work in these campaigns in his 1966 memoir Deep in My Heart,
though the nature and scope of his involvement is a matter of some dispute. Compare, e.g., KUNSTLER,
supra note 1, at 173–200, 211–32, 271–304 (recounting the work Kunstler did for SCLC in
Birmingham, Danville, and St. Augustine), and LANGUM, supra note 84, at 65–66 (discussing how Dr.
King occasionally “called upon Kunstler” as “an outside attorney” to help with his major campaigns
and pointing out other matters Kunstler worked on “[a]t King’s request”), with MOTLEY, supra note 13,
at 139–40 (rejecting Kunstler’s assertion that “he was Martin Luther King’s lawyer”). Motley says she
“never saw Kunstler . . . representing King or anybody else,” and that he simply “flew to whatever spot
appeared in newspaper headlines.” Id. at 140.
Over time, Kunstler’s relationship with SCLC suffered, and his role declined, ending by 1964. See
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 98, 178. There were claims that Kunstler alienated colleagues with his
“penchant for self-advertisement, [his] manner of exploiting his relationship with King, and [his] habit
of making commitments in SCLC’s name on his own initiative.” Id. at 178. Also, financial tensions
arose when the Gandhi Society failed to raise enough money to cover Kunstler’s fees. Id. Though
Kunstler sometimes claimed that his civil rights work was all pro bono, he often received fees for his
work. Compare LANGUM, supra note 84, at 67 (quoting from an interview in which Kunstler stated he
had never taken fees), and KUNSTLER WITH ISENBERG, supra note 84, at 110 (saying he never expected
80
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But it was not always so easy to sign up lawyers for the cause. For example,
Dr. King had to carry out an aggressive recruiting effort to secure Black lawyer
Clarence Jones’s services for his 1960 perjury trial defense team. At the time, Jones
was just getting settled into his private practice in Los Angeles.86 He resisted Dr.
King’s entreaties mightily until the minister shamed him, without naming him, in a
sermon he attended (at Dr. King’s request) on the obligations of Black professionals
to serve the Civil Rights Movement. 87 After the perjury trial, their relationship
flourished, and Jones soon became a highly valued member of Dr. King’s inner
circle.88
fees from civil rights cases), with LANGUM, supra note 84, at 67–68 (listing fees Kunstler accepted from
CORE and SCLC).
Further, SCLC turned increasingly to the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) for its
representation, making continued participation of individual lawyers like Kunstler less important. See
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 98, 178; see also discussion infra Section I.B.4.i.
Kunstler also engaged in extensive civil rights representation unrelated to Dr. King or the SCLC, as a
member of NLG, CORE, and the ACLU. See LANGUM, supra note 84, at 64, 67–68. After working on
civil rights issues, Kunstler made a career out of representing unpopular clients and causes. See
generally id. at 77–128.
86
See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 37; CLARENCE B. JONES & JOEL ENGEL, WHAT WOULD
MARTIN SAY? 2 (2008).
87
Dr. King’s efforts to persuade Clarence Jones to join him in the Civil Rights Movement had
something of the sense of a prophet seeking to enlist a disciple. See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53,
at 37–38. As Jones tells the story, Dr. King first had Hubert Delany, co-lead counsel in the perjury case,
contact him in Los Angeles to ask him, on Dr. King’s behalf, to join them in Alabama. Id. at 37. Delany
had been a mentor to the young lawyer while he was in law school. See Clarence B. Jones, First
Diversity Visiting Professor, Univ. of S.F.; Scholar Writer in Residence, the Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Research & Educ. Inst., Stanford Univ.; Political Advisor, Counsel & Draft Speechwriter for Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., Keynote Address at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth
Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington
to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 688, 691 (2016). Jones had just recently
graduated from Boston University Law School in 1959, and he was settling into his new career as an
entertainment lawyer in Los Angeles. See JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 2, 5. He had little sense of
the importance of the perjury trial and no plans to be a civil rights lawyer. See id. at 3–4, 6. He declined
Delany’s invitation. Id. at 3. Dr. King then had his secretary arrange a personal meeting at Jones’s home
in Los Angeles when Dr. King was in town for a speech. Id. at 4.
That visit led to another polite rejection. Id. at 7. But Dr. King invited Jones to attend his sermon in
the affluent Black Baldwin Hills section of Los Angeles, and Jones obliged. Id. at 10–11. Dr. King
spoke in his sermon, as he had done during the visit at Jones’s home, about the need for Black
professionals to join the Civil Rights Movement, and he then referred to a “highly gifted [unnamed
Black] attorney” who had resisted his overtures. Id. at 7, 12–13. After a pause, that elicited a “for
shame” kind of response from the congregation. See id. at 13.
Dr. King greeted Jones after the service and said, “I hope that you didn’t mind me using you to make
a point in my sermon. There were a lot of people here in this church I needed to reach today, and I
always use whatever I think is going to be most effective. No offense, Mr. Jones.” Id. at 16. In
response, Jones said, “Dr. King, the only thing I need to know is when you and Judge Delaney want me
to leave [for Alabama].” Id.
Jones later recalled, “And from that point on, I was a Martin Luther King, Jr. disciple.” JONES &
CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 44.
88
See infra Section I.B.5. Colleagues Bayard Rustin and Ella Baker introduced Dr. King to Stanley
Levison, a lawyer who became one of his closest confidants. See David J. Garrow, The FBI and Martin
Luther King, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July-Aug. 2002, at 80, 85. Levison in turn encouraged Harry
Wachtel, a well-connected, tax-savvy New York lawyer, to contribute to SCLC. See FAIRCLOUGH,
supra note 21, at 97. In early 1963, Clarence Jones introduced Dr. King to Wachtel, who offered to
assist SCLC in an advisory role and later joined the inner circle as well. See JONES & CONNELLY, supra
note 53, at 194 n.1. Dr. King’s decision to add Levison and Wachtel to his inner circle was based on his
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When Dr. King delegated the lawyers’ selection, the lawyers he selected
sometimes enlisted other lawyers because of a need for additional legal manpower,
or to join forces with lawyers with greater experience and expertise.89 For example,
when Fred Gray became the attorney for the MIA, he brought in Charles Langford,
the only other Black lawyer in Montgomery, to share the workload.90 Gray relied
on experienced local lawyer Clifford Durr as a mentor, as well.91 He also turned to
Robert Carter of the NAACP and Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund (LDF), the leading civil rights lawyers of the day, for the
expertise and experience needed to challenge bus segregation in court.92
Similarly, working with an organization like LDF meant that its head made
the decisions about assigning staff and volunteer lawyers to particular matters.93 As
Dr. King turned increasingly to LDF for assistance in the 1960s, Director-Counsel
Jack Greenberg (Thurgood Marshall’s successor) assigned the lawyers to the tasks
at hand.94
Also, a selection committee of Dr. King’s trusted advisors assembled a
defense team for his Alabama perjury trial.95 A conviction could have resulted in a
lengthy prison sentence, as well as a devastating impact on his stature and

extensive interaction with them. See generally BRANCH, supra note 32, at 225–27, 581–82;
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 98; Garrow, supra.
89
Even when he was not directly involved, his priorities and his past experience typically carried the
day. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 171. See generally Mary Lou Finley, The Open Housing
Marches: Chicago, Summer ’66, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 62, at 1, 36–37.
90
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 26, 28, 72, 88.
91
Id. at 17, 43–44.
92
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 158; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 682. LDF was
more commonly known as the “Inc. Fund.” LANGUM, supra note 84, at 62; see also Gilbert A.
Cornfield, Cornfield & Feldman, LLP, Remarks at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social
Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on
Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 667, 674 (2016) [hereinafter
Cornfield Remarks].
93
See discussion infra Section I.B.4.i. The leaders of some ongoing movements or efforts that were
floundering called on Martin Luther King to join forces with them. See infra Sections II.A.1.i.d
(Albany, Georgia), III.B.3.iv–v (Chicago & Memphis). Dr. King sometimes referred to himself as a
“fireman” in those situations. See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 632. Even when a movement was well
underway, with its lawyers in place, Dr. King sometimes brought additional lawyers into the fray as the
movement expanded in scale, scope, or its strategies, once he had allied himself with local activists.
See, e.g., infra Sections II.A.1.i.d (Constance Baker Motley in Albany, Georgia Movement), III.B.3.iv
(LDF in Chicago), III.B.3.v (Chauncey Eskridge in Memphis).
94
See discussion infra Section I.B.4.i; see also, e.g., GARROW, supra note 2, at 386 (“[King]
instructed [SCLC staff member Andrew] Young to call Jack Greenberg of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund, which had been coordinating the Selma movement’s courtroom efforts . . . .”); GREENBERG,
supra note 51, at 465 (stating Greenberg dispatched several LDF staff lawyers to Washington, D.C. to
meet with the city’s attorneys and lawyers who had offered to help with legal matters in the Poor
People’s Campaign). See generally MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 152, 154–55 (assessing Greenberg’s
appointment as Marshall’s successor). That included LDF staff, consultants, and local LDF cooperating
lawyers in the South. See generally GREENBERG, supra note 51, passim. For more on the development
of LDF’s “extensive network of cooperating attorneys,” see Rabin, supra note 75, at 216–18.
95
GRAY, supra note 7, at 148–49; Dyer, supra note 38, at 251.
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reputation.96 With such high stakes, Dr. King’s advisors went through a systematic
vetting process to assemble a high-powered defense team.97
It is understandable that Dr. King left most of the choices of individual
lawyers to others. He faced extraordinary demands on his time, energy, and
emotions. Leadership required that Dr. King carry the burden of continually making
difficult strategic decisions. Dr. King’s legal team was also in a better position to
evaluate the fit of individual lawyers with the specific needs of the occasion.98
Whether Dr. King or others made the selection, many similar factors were
considered in making the decisions.
B. Selection Factors
The choice of lawyers and legal organizations was based on a mix of principle,
pragmatism, and personal considerations. As far as the lawyers’ locations were
concerned, Dr. King found advantages in having both local and northern lawyers.99
Identity factors—including race, gender, religion, and age—also played a part in
Dr. King’s choices.100 He very much wanted to involve Black lawyers.101 But Dr.
King did not seem focused on including women lawyers.102 While SCLC was faithbased and Christian, the lawyers’ religion did not seem to matter.103 Age similarly
did not seem to be part of the selection criteria; a number of very young lawyers
served the movements alongside older and more experienced ones.104
In light of his core strategic commitment to nonviolent direct action, Dr. King
might have insisted that the lawyers share that commitment. And while many of
them did, some viewed the courts as the primary venue for seeking social change
and expressed great skepticism about direct action.105 That strategic disconnect did
not seem to matter to Dr. King.
In the 1960s, Dr. King also relied heavily on an inner circle of advisors, which
included several lawyers who served as counselors and confidants.106

96

GRAY, supra note 7, at 147–48; Dyer, supra note 38, at 246, 249.
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 149; Dyer, supra note 38, at 251. See also discussion infra Section
II.A.1.i.b. At the same time, Dr. King played a direct role in enlisting Clarence Jones for the defense
team, after the committee had assembled the rest of the team. See supra note 87.
98
For the perjury trial, the needs included criminal defense experience, tax expertise, knowledge of
Alabama criminal procedure, and an understanding of how Black lawyers could navigate a whitedominated state judicial system. See Dyer, supra note 38, at 245–61.
99
See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
100
The intersectionality of aspects of identity, such as race and gender, complicated those selections.
See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139,
149 (1989).
101
See JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 12.
102
See discussion infra Section I.B.2.ii.
103
See discussion infra Section I.B.2.iii.
104
See discussion infra Section I.B.2.iv.
105
See discussion infra Section I.B.3.
106
See discussion infra Section I.B.5.
97
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1. The Lawyers’ Locations: Local and Northern Lawyers
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s legal representation began with local lawyers in
Montgomery in 1955 and ended with local lawyers in Memphis in 1968. Inbetween, he relied on an ever-changing mix of local and northern counsel.107 Those
lawyers often worked together in teams that drew upon their complementary
knowledge and experience.
i. Local Lawyers
Enlisting local lawyers took advantage of their knowledge of state and local
law and procedure, as well as the local courts.108 Also, movement leaders often
knew and trusted them.109 Their continuing presence on-site mattered, especially at
a time of limited technology and mobility. Using local lawyers also had political
benefits. For example, it helped to blunt opponents’ claims that the protests were
the work of “outside agitators,” a potentially powerful rallying cry.110 Moreover, it
avoided the risk of trial judges excluding or restricting the participation of a lawyer
because he was not licensed to practice in the state.111
While the advantages of using local lawyers seemed apparent, the question of
their availability and willingness to serve remained. Most lawyers in the South were
white, and most white lawyers were segregationists with little sympathy for civil
rights. 112 Even the few white lawyers who shared the movements’ views were
rarely willing to risk the severe professional and personal consequences likely to

107

See infra Parts II, III. Of course, lawyers in the Chicago Freedom Movement of the mid-1960s
were both local and northern. See infra Sections III.B.2, III.B.3.iv.
108
LDF litigated in many states and had long recognized the value of local counsel. See GREENBERG,
supra note 51, at 375. LDF had assembled a network of local cooperating attorneys, especially in the
South. See id.; see also discussion infra Section I.B.4.i.
109
See infra notes 130–132 and accompanying text.
110
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 67.
111
See, e.g., KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 216–17 (describing a contempt trial for a demonstrator in
Danville, Virginia, where Kunstler was not allowed to participate because the judge would not take his
word that he was an attorney); THORNTON, supra note 27, at 223 (“Federal court rules in Birmingham
forbade an out-of-town lawyer to file suit unless he associated a local attorney with him.”). Federal
judges in Mississippi required out-of-state lawyers to appear with local counsel, which required
cooperation that white Mississippi lawyers would not give. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 375. Outof-state lawyers largely relied on the three Black lawyers in the state, to the extent their time permitted.
Id.
112
See, e.g., KING, supra note 7, at 92 (calling the white lawyer for the bus company in Montgomery
“our most stubborn opponent”); KINOY, supra note 30, at 166 (“Only a tiny handful of Black lawyers
were practicing in the South, because Black people had been almost totally excluded from the
profession . . . . Therefore, Black people were almost always represented by white lawyers.”); Randall
Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott,
98 YALE L.J. 999, 1009 (1989) (noting that Montgomery, Alabama had 189 white lawyers and judges
in 1950 but only two Black lawyers, while its population was forty percent Black); J. Mills Thornton
III, Challenge and Response in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955–1956, 33 ALA. REV. 163, 226
(1980) (“[T]he most inflexible of the whites were lawyers.”).
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result from assisting activists like Dr. King.113 Threats of violence made matters
even worse.114
Among the few participating local white lawyers was Clifford Durr, an
experienced Montgomery attorney from a prominent, upper middle-class Alabama
family.115 Durr served as a mentor and colleague for the inexperienced Fred Gray
even before the bus boycott.116
By the mid-1960s, some white local lawyers outside the Deep South were
willing to represent Dr. King and his supporters. For example, Gilbert Cornfield
and Gilbert Feldman, among others, represented activists in the Chicago Freedom
Movement pro bono.117
In 1968, several white lawyers in two mainstream Memphis law firms
provided pro bono representation related to a planned march during the sanitation
workers’ strike.118 Dr. King persuaded them of the importance of the demonstration
113
See, e.g., KINOY, supra note 30, at 165–66 (“No white lawyer could survive in the South who, in
the defense of a Black client, raised any . . . controversy-laden constitutional questions which went to
the heart of the legitimacy of a segregated society.”). See generally VIRGINIA FOSTER DURR, OUTSIDE
THE MAGIC CIRCLE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF VIRGINIA FOSTER DURR 269–70, 276–77, 288 (Hollinger
F. Barnard ed., 1985). White Mississippi lawyer William Higgs accepted racial cases. See KINOY, supra
note 30, at 191. As a result, he was falsely accused of sexual misconduct with a minor and run out of
town. See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 167–69. Higgs was convicted in absentia and disbarred, though it
was clear that the police and the accuser had created the story. Id. at 168. Edward Lynch, a white
Tennessee lawyer, similarly lost his practice and was forced to leave town after defending members of
an interracial group charged with petty crimes. Id. at 242.
114
Len Rosenthal, a Mississippi attorney associated with the National Lawyers Guild, was evicted
from his office building and chased with a shotgun by a relative after taking civil rights cases in 1964.
SARAH HART BROWN, STANDING AGAINST DRAGONS: THREE SOUTHERN LAWYERS IN AN ERA OF FEAR
232, 236 (1998). Charles Morgan Jr., a white lawyer in Birmingham, was forced to leave Alabama after
speaking out against the 1963 bombing of a Baptist church that killed four young girls. See KUNSTLER,
supra note 1, at 242–43.
115
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 43–44; JOHN A. SALMOND, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER: CLIFFORD
J. DURR AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1899–1975, at 2 (1990); Clifford Durr, MONTGOMERY BUS
BOYCOTT, http://www.montgomeryboycott.com/clifford-durr/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). See generally
THORNTON, supra note 27, at 54–55, 60–61, 71 (discussing Durr’s background and legal work in
Montgomery). By accepting Gray’s 1955 request to help represent the family of a Black boy against a
white man who killed their son while driving 100 miles per hour, Durr became alienated from his
family, friends, and the white community. See SALMOND, supra, at 171. In the same year, Durr and
Gray represented Black teenager Claudette Colvin for refusing to give up her seat on a bus. Id. at 172.
Durr assisted Gray in defending her at trial and on appeal. Id. at 173.
116
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 17, 24; SALMOND, supra note 115, at 171.
117
See discussion infra Section III.B.2 (discussing Cornfield’s and Feldman’s work in Chicago); see
also BILL AYERS & BERNARDINE DOHRN, RACE COURSE: AGAINST WHITE SUPREMACY 25 (2009). See
generally Leonard S. Rubinowitz, The Chicago Freedom Movement and the Federal Fair Housing Act,
in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVISM IN THE
NORTH 115 (Mary Lou Finley et al. eds., 2016).
In Chicago, some Black lawyers were beholden to Mayor Richard J. Daley and the Democratic
machine, so they were not in a position to assist the Chicago Freedom Movement. See infra Section
III.A (discussing the interaction between Dr. King and William Ming, who had been Dr. King’s defense
counsel in Alabama in 1960 but was aligned with Mayor Daley in Chicago six years later). See
generally RALPH, supra note 62, at 230–31 (observing decline in “the machine’s stranglehold on
Chicago’s Negro population”).
118
See infra Section III.B.3.v (discussing the lifting of the injunction against marching). See
generally W.J. Michael Cody, King at the Mountain Top: The Representation of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., Memphis, April 3–4 1968, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 701 (2011). All but one of the half-dozen
Memphis lawyers involved from the Burch, Porter & Johnson and Ratner, Sugarmon firms were white.
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to show that they could have a nonviolent march and that nonviolence remained a
viable strategy.119 As a result, they joined as counsel even though they were well
aware that their “representation would not be popular in Memphis and that the firm
might expect to lose substantial business if the engagement was undertaken.”120
Most of the participating local lawyers were Black.121 They faced greater risks
than local white lawyers, especially the risk of becoming victims of physical
violence.122 They were not exempt from the bombings that so often struck Black
churches, and ministers’ and other activists’ homes during this period. 123 For
example, Birmingham lawyer Arthur Shores endured repeated bombings of his
home during the 1950s and 1960s. 124 Racists in North Carolina burned down
attorney Julius Chambers’ office in 1971 and bombed his home because of his civil
rights work.125 A county sheriff caned Albany, Georgia civil rights lawyer C.B.
King in 1962.126 In short, it took great courage for local Black lawyers to join the
Civil Rights Movement.
Montgomery’s Fred Gray, Rosa Parks’ lawyer and Dr. King’s first lawyer,
epitomized this important group. He was intimately acquainted with the city’s Jim
Crow regime, having ridden the local buses regularly.127 Gray would have attended
law school in Alabama, but the University of Alabama did not admit Blacks in the
early 1950s.128 When Gray left to attend law school at Cleveland’s Western Reserve
See id. at 701. The firms were quite prominent in the region. See MIRIAM DECOSTA-WILLIS, NOTABLE
BLACK MEMPHIANS 296 (2008); History, BURCH, PORTER & JOHNSON, PLLC, http://bpjlaw.com/history
.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). The presiding federal district court judge, Bailey Brown, had been a
partner in the Burch firm before he was elevated to the bench. Cody, supra, at 702. A member of his
firm described Lucius Burch as “the senior partner in our office and one of the most experienced and
well-respected trial lawyers in the region and a man of significant stature.” Id.
119
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 619; Cody, supra note 118, at 703–04.
120
Cody, supra note 118, at 703. Movement lawyers in Atlanta and New York also asked their
Memphis colleagues to assist Dr. King. GARROW, supra note 2, at 619.
121
See infra Appendix.
122
See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 52; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 77.
123
See, e.g., Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 694–95, 727 n.203.
124
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 39.
125
See id.; Tom Foreman Jr., Julius Chambers, Civil Rights Attorney, Dies at 76, WASH. POST (Aug.
4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/julius-chambers-civil-rights-attorney-dies-at-76
/2013/08/04/fc7b13c4-fc74-11e2-9bde-7ddaa186b751_story.html.
126
See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 117. The next year someone poured acid on the front seat of his
car. Id. at 242.
127
Gray was born and raised in Montgomery and graduated from the historically Black Alabama
State College located there. GRAY, supra note 7, at 6, 10–12. The college is now named Alabama State
University. See id. at 10; see also About ASU, ALA. ST. U., http://www.alasu.edu/about-asu/index.aspx
(last visited Sept. 14, 2015). In his part-time job with the local newspaper while attending Alabama
State College, Gray made multiple daily bus trips during which he routinely experienced
discrimination. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 5–6, 11–12.
128
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 13–15; Jonathan L. Entin, ‘Destroying Everything Segregated I Could
Find’: Fred Gray and Integration in Alabama, 7 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 252, 253
(2004); Bill Lubinger, A Legal Legend, THINK MAG. (Fall 2004), http://case.edu/think/fall2014/fredgray.html. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1950 that it was unconstitutional for state law
schools to exclude applicants because of their race, see Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding
that the University of Texas Law School’s exclusion of a Black applicant violated the Equal Protection
Clause because no equivalent law school existed for Blacks), the University of Alabama continued its
discriminatory policy. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 14–15 (explaining how the university imposed
strategic financial barriers to entry designed to keep Black students out).
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University, he had made a secret vow to return to his home state and use his legal
training to “destroy everything segregated [he] could find.”129
When Gray opened his law office in Montgomery in 1954, he and Rosa Parks
became NAACP colleagues and friends.130 It was thus natural that he served as her
defense counsel after she refused to give up her bus seat.131 That representation led
to Gray’s involvement in other Alabama movements and events, including Dr.
King’s 1960 perjury trial and the related New York Times Co. v. Sullivan libel
litigation, and the Selma movement.132 When Dr. King left Montgomery in 1960
and moved back to his hometown of Atlanta, he asked Fred Gray to join him there
as SCLC’s counsel.133 Gray declined, choosing to remain in Alabama and continue
the civil rights struggle there.134
Dr. King called on a number of local lawyers over the years, mostly in
Alabama and Georgia. In Alabama, Birmingham’s Arthur Shores was the “senior
member” of this group.135 For two decades, Shores had been the only Black lawyer
in Alabama. 136 The others that joined him during the Civil Rights Movement

129

GRAY, supra note 7, at 13. The university is now Case Western Reserve University. See History,
CASE W. RES. U., http://www.case.edu/about/history (last visited Sept. 14, 2015).
130
GRAY, supra note 7, at 31. Because of his interest in civil rights, and in order to build a network
for his practice, Gray became active in the local branch of the NAACP. Id. Rosa Parks was secretary of
the branch. Id. She and Gray worked together in bringing local youth into the organization. See
DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 8; GRAY, supra note 7, at 31. They often had lunch together
at his office, located a block and a half from the department store where Parks worked as a seamstress.
Id. at 31.
131
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 50. With the activities leading to the beginning of the bus boycott,
Gray recognized that his “days of having little to do in [his] fledgling law practice were over.” Id. at 52;
accord Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1030 n.198 (noting that Gray’s legal career changed dramatically
after he represented Rosa Parks).
132
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 61, 149, 156–57, 216; see also discussion infra Sections II.A.1.i.b,
II.A.1.ii, III.B.3.iii. As Gray recounts, “Mrs. Parks’s arrest . . . launched my legal career.” GRAY, supra
note 7, at 33. Initially, virtually all of the participants in the boycott were local. See generally
THORNTON, supra note 27, at 20–140 (discussing the Montgomery movement).
133
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 145.
134
Id. When Dr. King left Montgomery and his civil rights activities took him to other states, Gray
did not accompany him or continue to represent him. See id. at 155. As Gray said, “I feel honored and
proud that I was Dr. King’s first lawyer in the civil rights movement. . . . Martin was to have many
other lawyers on other occasions, but I was his first.” Id. Gray’s goal remained to challenge segregation
in central Alabama, where he went on to have an illustrious career as a civil rights lawyer well into the
twenty-first century. See id. at 155, 383–86; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1030 n.198. Notably, he
argued and won Gomillion v. Lightfoot before the Supreme Court. See 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding
that the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment when it redrew the boundary lines of the
City of Tuskegee in a way that excluded most Black residents from voting).
135
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031 n.198. Fred Gray considered Shores the “dean of AfricanAmerican lawyers in Alabama.” GRAY, supra note 7, at 347. Shores “handl[ed] civil rights cases
[across] Alabama before [Gray even] went to law school.” Id. Gray considered Shores his mentor. Id.
When Gray became president of the National Bar Association in 1985, he initiated the “NBA Hall of
Fame” to honor pioneers like Shores. Id.
136
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031 n.198. After the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965, Black
voter registration in Birmingham increased dramatically. ALAN F. WESTIN & BARRY MAHONEY, THE
TRIAL OF MARTIN LUTHER KING: THE LANDMARK BIRMINGHAM CASE AND ITS MEANING FOR AMERICA
TODAY 274 (1974). See generally GARROW, supra note 2, at 454 (discussing emphasis on voter
registration efforts in Birmingham). By the mid-1970s, Arthur Shores was a member of the city council.
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra, at 274.
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included Orzell Billingsley Jr., 137 Peter A. Hall, 138 Charles D. Langford, 139 and
Solomon S. Seay Jr.140 In Georgia, Donald Hollowell came to be known as “Mr.
137

Orzell Billingsley Jr. graduated from Howard University Law School in 1950 and became one of
the first Black lawyers in Alabama. Bravery and Vision: Black Firsts in Birmingham, BIRMINGHAM
PUB. LIBR., http://www.bplonline.org/resources/BlackBirmingham.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2015);
see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 38. Billingsley was involved with Dr. King’s movements early
on, representing Dr. King in Montgomery when he was indicted for allegedly violating Alabama’s antiboycott statute. See id. at 225–26. Billingsley also served as one of the couriers who carried Dr. King’s
famous “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” out of jail. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 246. See generally
infra note 659 (discussing Dr. King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”). He was heavily involved in
voter registration efforts as a legal advisor to the NAACP and worked with Peter Hall to “challenge[]
the exclusion of African Americans from Alabama’s juries.” 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR.: BIRTH OF A NEW AGE, DECEMBER 1955–DECEMBER 1956, at 184 n.4 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds.,
1997); see also, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203–04 (1965) (recognizing that a “State’s
purposeful and deliberate denial” to Blacks of a chance to serve as jurors because of their race violates
the Equal Protection Clause). Billingsley was also active in other civil rights cases in Alabama, most
importantly in the case of Caliph Washington, a Black man convicted of capital murder for an
accidental death. See Sherrel Wheeler Stewart, Civil Rights Lawyer Orzell Billingsley Dead at 77,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Dec. 19, 2001, at 1C. Billingsley fought the case through various appeals for
fifteen years, eventually securing an acquittal, as well as successfully challenging the county’s practice
of excluding Blacks from juries. See id.
138
Peter Hall earned his law degree in 1946 from DePaul University. 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 184 n.4. He was one of the first Black lawyers in Birmingham,
where he worked in private practice with Arthur Shores and Orzell Billingsley Jr. MIGNETTE Y.
PATRICK DORSEY, SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER 53 (2010); Frank Couch, Pete Hall, Son of Peter Hall, Civil
Rights Attorney and Birmingham’s First Black Judge, AL.COM (Feb. 19, 2013), http://videos.al.com
/birmingham-news/2013/02/pete_hall_son_of_peter_hall_ci.html. He also served as LDF’s local
counsel in Birmingham. See 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 184. Hall
was part of the legal team that defended Dr. King in Montgomery for violating Alabama’s anti-boycott
statute and, along with Billingsley, “repeatedly challenged” the practice of excluding Blacks from juries
in Alabama. Id. at 184 n.4; see, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. 202. In 1965, Hall joined LDF lawyers in
Montgomery to secure a federal injunction protecting the Selma-to-Montgomery march for voting
rights. See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). He was a founding member of the
Alabama Black Lawyers Association and secured significant victories in several civil rights cases
before becoming Birmingham’s first Black judge in 1972. History & Mission, ALA. LAW. ASS’N, http://
www.ala-lawyers.org/history-mission/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2015); Jon Solomon, Pete Hall: Son of
Birmingham’s First Black Judge Gains History Lesson About His Dad, AL.COM (Feb. 21, 2013, 8:00
AM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2013/02/pete_hall_son_of_birminghams_f.html; see Kennedy, supra
note 112, at 1030 n.198.
139
Charles Langford received his LL.B degree in 1952 from Catholic University of America and was
admitted to the Alabama State Bar the following year. 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
supra note 137, at 70 n.9; Alabama Senator Charles Langford; Rosa Parks’s Lawyer, WASH. POST,
Feb. 13, 2007, at B7 [hereinafter Charles Langford]. He opened his own law practice in Montgomery
and was the only Black lawyer in his hometown until Fred Gray returned there after law school. THE
MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT AND THE WOMEN WHO STARTED IT: THE MEMOIR OF JO ANN GIBSON
ROBINSON 44 (David J. Garrow ed., 1987) [hereinafter ROBINSON MEMOIR]; see also GRAY, supra note
7, at 26. Langford represented Rosa Parks after her arrest in 1955 and was active in other “legal battles
that shaped Alabama,” Charles Langford, supra, including the federal litigation that ended segregation
on public transportation, GARROW, supra note 2, at 59, and Dr. King’s 1960 perjury trial, id. at 130. He
represented both the MIA and Dr. King until 1960 and later became law partners with Fred Gray. 3 THE
PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 70 n.9.
In addition to his legal contributions to the Civil Rights Movement, Langford had a distinguished
political career. He was elected to the Alabama legislature in 1978, serving two terms in the Alabama
House of Representatives and then five terms in the Alabama Senate before retiring in 2002. See
Charles Langford, supra. Langford died in 2007 at age eighty-four. Id.
140
After graduating from Howard University School of Law in 1957, Solomon S. Seay Jr. returned
home to Montgomery to join the civil rights struggle. Selma to Montgomery March Profiles, NAACP
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Civil Rights.” 141 Other important local civil rights lawyers in the state included
C.B. King of Albany and Horace Ward of Atlanta.142 While all of these lawyers had
LDF (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/selma-montgomery-march-profiles-ldf-cocounsel-charles-stephen-ralston-fred-d-gray-and [hereinafter Selma Profiles]. His return to
Montgomery made him the third of only three Black lawyers practicing there at the time, with Charles
Langford and Fred Gray being the other two. Id. Seay frequently joined forces with LDF as local
counsel and devoted his career to “challenging segregation and discrimination across the State of
Alabama.” LDF Mourns Passing of Legendary Civil Rights Attorney Solomon Seay Jr., NAACP LDF
(Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/ldf-mourns-passing-legendary-civil-rightsattorney-solomon-seay-jr/ [hereinafter LDF Release]. He litigated significant cases in almost every area
of civil rights, including school desegregation, employment discrimination, police brutality, and voting
rights. Id.; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 193–94, 202, 204, 216 & n.26, 250. Seay was a member of
Dr. King’s defense team for the 1960 Alabama perjury trial, and he represented the four Black
ministers, including his father, who later became the MIA’s third president, in the related New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan libel litigation. Id. at 149, 156–57; Donald T. Ferron, Notes on MIA Executive
Board Meeting (Jan. 30, 1956), in 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 109,
111 n.6; see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). He also helped secure the injunction to
prevent interference with Dr. King’s 1965 voting rights march from Selma to Montgomery. See
Williams, 240 F. Supp. 100; GRAY, supra note 7, at 216–17, 216 n.26. Seay was active in many other
civil rights cases throughout Alabama and worked for decades to provide Black students equal
opportunities in education. LDF Release, supra; see, e.g., Knight v. Alabama, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1273
(N.D. Ala. 2004); Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967). Seay died in
2015 at age eighty-one. Rick Harmon, Civil Rights Attorney Solomon Seay Dies at Age 81,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Sept. 11, 2015, 6:30 p.m.), http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story
/news/2015/09/11/civil-rights-attorney-solomon-seay-dies-age/72101862/.
141
Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Foreword to DANIELS, supra note 41, at ix. People similarly called
Thurgood Marshall “Mr. Civil Rights” when he began to distinguish himself through his
accomplishments as a young lawyer with the NAACP. See KLUGER, supra note 13, at 271.
Donald Hollowell graduated from Chicago’s Loyola University Law School in 1951, then moved to
Atlanta and set up his own practice. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 29–30; see also Edward A. Hatfield,
Donald Hollowell (1917–2004), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Sept. 12, 2007), http://www
.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/donald-hollowell-1917-2004. He quickly became
well-known across Georgia as an effective advocate for social justice. See MAURICE C. DANIELS,
HORACE T. WARD: DESEGREGATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY, AND
JURISPRUDENCE 78 (2001) [hereinafter DANIELS, HORACE WARD]. He is perhaps best known for his
work on school desegregation cases across Georgia. Hatfield, supra.
Hollowell represented Dr. King at his hearing and eventually secured his release during his
imprisonment in a Georgia state prison for violating his probation. DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra,
166–69; see King v. State, 119 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961); see also DANIELS, supra note 41, at
115–19; GARROW, supra note 2, at 145, 148; discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.c. He also was one of the
attorneys who represented the Albany Movement in negotiations with the City of Albany. See DANIELS,
supra note 41, at 143–44, 146–47, 149–51; GARROW, supra note 2, at 185; discussion infra Section
II.B.2. He again represented Dr. King in court after mass arrests for another demonstration in Albany.
See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 152–53; GARROW, supra note 2, at 196; discussion infra Section
II.A.1.i.d. In 1962, Hollowell and C.B. King acted as local counsel for LDF and assisted in the appeals
to overturn an injunction against demonstrations in Albany. MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 138–39; see
also discussion infra Section II.A.2.ii.
In 1966, President Johnson appointed Hollowell director of the southeastern regional office of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, where he remained for nineteen years, becoming
chairman of the board in 1971. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 189, 201; Hatfield, supra. Hollowell died at
the age of 87 in 2004. See id.
142
See Jordan, supra note 141, at xii-xiii. After graduating from Case Western Reserve University
School of Law in 1952, Chevene Bowers (C.B.) King returned to his home state of Georgia and became
the only Black lawyer in the southwestern region of the state. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 132; Mary
Sterner Lawson, C.B. King (1923–1988), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Dec. 9, 2003), http://www
.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/c-b-king-1923-1988. During the early years of
his practice, C.B. King earned a reputation as “the only black lawyer south of Atlanta who would take
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important roles, the limited number of available local lawyers left some roles
needing to be filled by lawyers from other regions.

on civil and criminal cases,” and later became a prominent figure in defending protesters during the
Civil Rights Era. Id.
As “chief counsel” to the Albany Movement, C.B. King represented demonstrators arrested in
Albany, including Martin Luther King, Jr., Ralph Abernathy, William G. Anderson, and Andrew
Young. Ellen Lake, C.B. King, HARV. CRIMSON (May 13, 1964), http://www.thecrimson.com/article
/1964/5/13/cb-king-pcb-king-is-a/; see also Lawson, supra; discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.d. He
participated in negotiations with Albany city officials and helped draft the petition to dissolve the
federal injunction those officials had secured against the movement. GARROW, supra note 2, at 204,
207; see also discussion infra Section II.A.2.ii. He also defended Freedom Riders. Lawson, supra.
C.B. King ran twice for political office in the mid- to late-1960s. Id. Though unsuccessful, he was
Georgia’s first Black candidate since Reconstruction to run for the U.S. House of Representatives and
the first Black to run for governor of Georgia. Id. He was influential in the lives of numerous law
students who worked as interns with his law firm in Albany, many of whom “underwent life-changing
experiences under his tutelage, and . . . went on to become highly distinguished judges, members of
Congress, and respected civil and environmental rights advocates.” Id.
Shortly before C.B. King’s death, Georgia’s governor and state legislature presented him with the
first “Martin Luther King Jr. Humanitarian Award,” and he was honored posthumously in 2002 as
namesake of the new federal courthouse constructed in downtown Albany. Id. C.B. King died in 1988
at age sixty-four. Id.
Horace Ward graduated from Northwestern University School of Law in 1959, after he was rejected
by the University of Georgia School of Law—the university’s first Black applicant—and lost his racial
discrimination suit against the university. See DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 40–42, 95,
118; Dan Rodriguez, Judge Horace Ward ’59, An Extraordinary Alum, WORD ON STREETERVILLE BLOG
(Mar. 25, 2014), http://deansblog.law.northwestern.edu/2014/03/25/judge-harold-ward-59-anextraordinary-alum/; Stephanie Schupska, Horace Ward to Receive Honorary UGA Degree, UGA
TODAY (Mar. 20, 2014), http://news.uga.edu/releases/article/horace-ward-to-receive-honorary-ugadegree/. See generally infra note 390 (discussing Donald Hollowell’s involvement in the lawsuit). After
Northwestern, Ward returned to his home state of Georgia, where he became partner in Donald
Hollowell’s law firm and worked on several civil rights cases throughout the state, including Dr. King’s
defense when he was incarcerated in the Reidsville State Prison. See DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra
note 141, at 118, 166–69; see also King, 119 S.E.2d 77; Schupska, supra; discussion infra Section
II.A.1.i.c.
Ward was elected to the Georgia General Assembly in 1964 and became the second Black elected to
that office since Reconstruction. Schupska, supra. He left the Hollowell law firm to serve briefly as
deputy city attorney, and he then opened his own practice. DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at
185. After being re-elected to four terms in the Georgia Senate, he was appointed to the state judiciary
in 1974 as Georgia’s first Black trial court judge. See id. at 189, 197; Schupska, supra.
Ward was elevated to the federal bench in 1979 when President Carter appointed him to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 200–
01; see also Robert A. Pratt, Horace T. Ward (b. 1927), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 9, 2003), http://
www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/horace-t-ward-b-1927. He was the first
Black federal judge in Georgia. Lericia Harris, Civil Rights Attorney, Federal Judge Horace Ward
Dead at 88, CBS ATLANTA (Apr. 26, 2016, 8:40 AM), http://atlanta.cbslocal.com/2016/04/26/civilrights-attorney-federal-judge-horace-ward-dead-at-88/; see also DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note
141, at 201. Judge Ward assumed senior status in 1994 and retired from the bench in 2012. Schupska,
supra. In 2014, he was awarded an honorary law degree from the University of Georgia. Id.
While from an earlier generation, Austin Thomas (“A.T.”) Walden remained active in civil rights
work in the 1960s. For biographical information on Walden, see TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO
DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011), and J. CLAY
SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844–1944, at 198–99, 482 n.185,
565 (1993).
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ii. Northern Lawyers

Southern civil rights activists’ practice of enlisting northern lawyers dates
back at least to Plessy v. Ferguson,143 the landmark Supreme Court segregation
case of the 1890s. In challenging the constitutionality of a Louisiana train
segregation law, the New Orleans Citizens’ Committee brought in New York
lawyer Albion Tourgée to lead the litigation effort. 144 As civil rights legal
organizations formed in the North, their lawyers continued to go south throughout
the first half of the twentieth century.145
From the outset, Dr. King and his colleagues followed the tradition of drawing
on northern lawyers.146 This effort added significantly to the pool of experienced
and committed civil rights lawyers.147 It also increased the participation of Black
lawyers, which was particularly important in light of the dearth of Black lawyers—
especially Black civil rights lawyers—in the South.148
The Montgomery Improvement Association reached out to northern lawyers
for their assistance in sustaining the bus boycott and adding leverage to it.149 That
experience established a pattern. Throughout his career, Dr. King relied heavily on
both individual lawyers and legal organizations from the North.150 For example,

143

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
See CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 30 (1987).
The full name of the group that brought suit was the “Citizens’ Committee to Test the Constitutionality
of the Separate Car Law.” Id. at 29.
145
See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 13, at 100–04, 113–14, 132–37, 194–96, 222; see also Rabin, supra
note 75, at 209–18 (discussing the ACLU’s and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund’s early
efforts to reform the law through litigation).
146
See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 302 (discussing Montgomery’s boycott organizers seeking
counsel from NAACP lawyers in New York). See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 265 (1976) (“The refusal of white Southern
lawyers to defend black clients, combined with the unavailability of black lawyers, prompted another
invasion of carpetbaggers across the Mason-Dixon line: Northern lawyers committed to the objectives
of the civil rights movement.”). The lawyers’ experience and expertise included both desegregation
litigation and support of civil rights activists, such as criminal defense work. See infra note 256.
147
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 292; see also discussion infra Section I.B.2.iv.
148
See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 36–38, 271. See generally SMITH, supra note 142, at 63–
65, 199, app. 2 at 623–37. State law schools in the South, with rare exceptions, did not admit Black
applicants until forced to do so by the courts throughout the 1930s and ‘40s. Edward J. Littlejohn &
Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Black Enrollment in Law Schools: Forward to the Past?, 12 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 415, 429–30 (1987). At the time of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, only a few Black lawyers
practiced in Alabama. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 225–26 (calling Arthur Shores, Fred Gray,
and Orzell Billingsley “perhaps half the black bar of Alabama”).
Black civil rights lawyers comprised an even smaller group. The first edition of Fred Gray’s memoir
includes a photo from the 1960 meeting of the Southwest Bar Association, the southern affiliate of the
National Bar Association. See FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE 108 (1st ed. 1995). He identifies
the group of about fifty Blacks as “the major civil rights lawyers in the South at that time.” Id.
149
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 225–26.
150
See King, supra note 1, at xxiii–xxv; Dyer, supra note 38, at 251. As suggested earlier, enlisting
northern lawyers risked eliciting resentment of “outside agitators” coming South to upset the customs
and traditions that many white people valued so highly. GARROW, supra note 2, at 67. Whites’
resentment seemed to be based on memories of the “carpetbaggers” in the post-Civil War
Reconstruction regime as well. See generally BRUCE E. BAKER, WHAT RECONSTRUCTION MEANT:
HISTORICAL MEMORY IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 69 (2007).
144
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William Ming, of Chicago, and Hubert Delany, from New York, led Dr. King’s
legal team in his 1960 Alabama perjury trial.151
Many other northern lawyers, including numerous LDF staffers and
consultants, the NAACP’s Robert Carter, and William Kunstler also played
significant roles in Dr. King’s career. 152 These northern lawyers, among others,
were just one of the identities that filled a specific role for Dr. King.

151
William Ming graduated from the University of Chicago Law School in 1933. SMITH, supra note
142, at 39. Ming was one of the first Black members of a law review and was published in the
University of Chicago Law Review’s inaugural issue in 1933. See id. at 40. He became a member of the
faculty there in 1947. Id. at 52. Ming worked on numerous Supreme Court cases throughout his career,
including Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding state judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants in deeds unconstitutional), and Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding
exclusion of an applicant to the University of Texas Law School based on his race unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because separate facility provided for
Blacks was inferior in several respects). Howard Univ. Sch. of Law, William R. Ming, BROWN@50,
http://www.brownat50.org/brownbios/BioWmMing.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). Ming also served
on the legal team for Brown v. Board of Education. Id.; see 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Hubert Delany graduated from New York University Law School in 1926. George James, Hubert T.
Delany, 89, Ex-Judge and Civil Rights Advocate, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990, at 24. He served as
a justice in Domestic Relations Court in New York from 1942 to 1955, after which he worked in
private practice for many years. Id. He was an early civil rights advocate, serving on the boards of the
NAACP and LDF. Id.
Chauncey Eskridge also went south from Chicago to join the legal team for Dr. King’s perjury trial.
See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.b. He graduated from the John Marshall Law School in 1949.
Kenan Heise, Chauncey Eskridge, 70, Close Ally of Rev. King, CHI. TRIB., JAN. 19, 1988, at A10.
Eskridge was a longtime SCLC attorney and advised Dr. King on issues relating to his Chicago and
Memphis movements. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 585, 622–23; see also discussion infra Section
III.B.3.v. He also assisted with fundraising strategy. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 462–63. Dr. King
often stayed at Eskridge’s home while in Chicago. Id. at 465. Eskridge was with Dr. King when he was
assassinated and represented Dr. King’s estate. Heise, supra.
Eskridge argued many civil rights cases throughout the 1960s as an attorney for the NAACP’s
Chicago office. Id. He is perhaps best known for representing Muhammad Ali before the Supreme
Court in Clay v. United States. See 403 U.S. 698 (1971) (reversing Ali’s conviction for refusing to
report for the draft). Eskridge was elected circuit judge in 1981 and remained on the bench until 1986,
when he retired. Heise, supra. He died in 1988 at the age of seventy. Id.
152
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 59, 206–07, 213; GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 225–26, 323, 360–
64, 374; KING, supra note 7, at 127. Arthur Kinoy, Kunstler’s law partner, was also an active civil
rights lawyer. See LANGUM, supra note 84, at 66–73; Paul Lewis, Arthur Kinoy is Dead at 82; Lawyer
for Chicago Seven, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2003, at A11; Rutgers Professor Liberties Advocate, NEWARK
EVENING NEWS, Aug. 18, 1966, http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/rutgers-professorliberties-advocate; see also, e.g., KINOY, supra note 30, at 151–53, 180–208 (discussing Kinoy’s work
in the Montgomery and Danville movements). Kinoy also served as a legal mentor to Clarence Jones,
who became a member of Dr. King’s inner circle. JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5–6, 13. Kinoy
had extensive involvement in civil rights matters unrelated to Dr. King and SCLC. See generally
KINOY, supra note 30, at 161–80; Lewis, supra. While Kinoy also worked on movements closely tied
to Dr. King and SCLC, because of his communist past, Dr. King made clear that “Kinoy had no
[official] affiliation with SCLC.” GARROW, supra note 2, at 308.
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2. Identity Factors
i. Race

Dr. King had a strong preference for Black lawyers, though he enlisted many
white lawyers as well.153 During his initial attempt to enlist Clarence Jones, Dr.
King urged:
The movement is fortunate to have the generous support of many
northern white liberals, including lawyers. . . . One of my concerns,
however, is our dire need of committed Negro professionals—
doctors, accountants, insurance agents. Particularly lawyers. The
movement doesn’t have nearly enough of them—of people like you.
We’d like to see them get more involved with the movement to help
our southern brothers and sisters.154
Judging by the numbers and the reputations of the Black lawyers who joined him,
Dr. King achieved extraordinary success in this effort. While Black lawyers

153

See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 6–7. Recounting similar remarks by Dr. King in a sermon he
delivered the following weekend at an affluent Black Los Angeles church, Jones said that Dr. King
“noted the ‘literally hundreds of offers’ from white northern professionals, particularly lawyers.” Id. at
12. “What a shame it was, [Dr. King] said, that the kindness, generosity, and good will of those whites,
while dearly appreciated, was not dwarfed by the kindness, generosity, and good will of those Negroes
most in a position to offer them to their own people.” Id.
Part of Dr. King’s reason for making that point was to recruit Clarence Jones as part of the defense
team for his 1960 Alabama perjury trial. Forming an all-Black defense team for such a critical matter
showed Dr. King’s confidence in those Black lawyers’ ability to operate effectively in an all-white legal
system. It also underscored his stated racial priority.
Recruiting Black lawyers seemed to be part of Dr. King’s broader agenda of engaging middle-class
Black people in the Civil Rights Movement. Starting with the Montgomery Bus Boycott, he sought
both to build unity within Black communities and to bring to bear the skills and resources of middleclass and more affluent Blacks. See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 675 & 708 n.53,
710 n.70. One of the great strengths of the bus protest was the unity that overcame previous factions
within Montgomery’s Black community, including class divisions. See id. at 675, 689. See generally
THORNTON, supra note 27, at 29, 31–33 (discussing divisions within the Black community). Middleclass Blacks actively supported the protest, working in concert with the low-income and working-class
bus riders who were directly affected by the discriminatory policies and practices. Coleman, Nee &
Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 708 n.53. For example, some affluent Blacks offered their expensive cars
and their time as drivers to transport boycotters, as part of the “car pool” system. Id. at 676. The
strength and power of that unity became one of the lessons from the Montgomery protest. See id. at
676–77, 689.
Dr. King later pointed to this unity in reflecting on the MIA’s weekly meetings:
154

The mass meetings . . . cut across class lines. The vast majority present were
working people; yet there was always an appreciable number of professionals in the
audience. Physicians, teachers, and lawyers sat or stood beside domestic workers and
unskilled laborers. The Ph.D's and the no "D's" were bound together in a common
venture. The so-called "big Negroes" who owned cars and had never ridden the buses
came to know the maids and the laborers who rode the buses every day. Men and women
who had been separated from each other by false standards of class were now singing and
praying together in a common struggle . . . .
KING, supra note 7, at 68.
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constituted a tiny fraction of the bar nationally in the 1950s and 1960s,155 they
comprised nearly half of the more than seventy lawyers involved with Dr. King.156
Table 1: Black Representation in the Legal Profession, 1950–1970157
Year

Number

Percentage

1950

1,450

.80

1960

2,180

1.03

1970

3,728

1.37

In addition to the significant numbers of Black lawyers that Dr. King enlisted
overall, his preference for Black lawyers became clear in his heavy reliance on them
at critical times in his career. For example, the defense team in his Alabama perjury
trial consisted entirely of Black lawyers.158 Using Black lawyers in court provided
an opportunity to showcase their skills and talents. 159 Black lawyers could
sometimes best their white counterparts in a direct competition, showing that Black
lawyers could have success even on white segregationists’ terms.160
Dr. King shared a paradox with those lawyers. Both Dr. King and his lawyers
“represented the race” in two very different senses: seeking authenticity within the
Black community, while at the same time trying to be perceived as worthy
representatives of Blacks to the white community.161 Martin Luther King, Jr. faced
that dual challenge of “representing the race” in dealing with white government
officials, media, supporters, and opponents, while trying to build and retain
credibility and support in the Black community.162 Black lawyers served as the face
of the race and sought respect in virtually all-white courts and other public forums,
while establishing credibility in the Black community.163

155

See infra Table 1.
See infra Appendix (identifying lawyers by race).
157
1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION:
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION pt. 1, § 2, at 739 tbl.223 (1973) [hereinafter 1970 CENSUS OF
POPULATION]; 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION:
1950, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION pt. 1, ch. C, at 276 tbl.128 (1953) [hereinafter 1950
CENSUS OF POPULATION]; 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS OF
POPULATION: 1960, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION pt. 1, ch. D, at 544 tbl.205 (1964)
[hereinafter 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION].
158
See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.b. Similarly, his defense team in his Georgia incarceration
was entirely Black until his father added a white lawyer on his own initiative. See DANIELS, supra note
41, at 116; see also discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.c.
159
See infra notes 349–350 and accompanying text.
160
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1047–54 (discussing landmark bus segregation decision in
Gayle v. Browder and the initial reluctance to file the suit); see also JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at
6–7 (recounting Dr. King as having intimated a “dire need of committed Negro professionals”
becoming involved with the movement). Black lawyers’ participation represented an additional symbol
of racial unity across class lines. See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1023–24.
161
See generally KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
LAWYER (2012).
162
See generally BRANCH, supra note 32, passim; GARROW, supra note 2, passim.
163
White police, judges, and juries held all the positions of power. See, e.g., King, supra note 1, at
xxiii–xxiv (reflecting on the “white Southern power structure”); see also discussion infra Sections
II.A.1.i.a–d, II.A.2.i–ii, III.B.1.i, III.B.3.i–iii, III.B.3.v.
156
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ii. Gender

While women comprised a larger percentage of the nation’s lawyers than
Blacks, they too constituted a tiny fraction of the bar nationally in the 1950s and
1960s.164
Table 2: Women’s Representation in the Legal Profession, 1950–1970165
Year

Number

Percentage

1950

6,256

3.47

1960

7,434

3.50

1970

13,180

4.84

Unlike Dr. King’s efforts to enlist Black lawyers, there is no evidence Dr.
King expressed a desire to include a significant number of women among the
counsel. 166 Nor did any of his colleagues or those to whom he delegated the
selection of lawyers. 167 In contrast to Blacks’ impressive statistical overrepresentation, just two women—both of whom were Black—played significant
roles.168 While Dr. King did not seem to seek out women lawyers, he did sing the
praises of Constance Baker Motley and Marian Wright Edelman.169
Constance Baker Motley, a prominent civil rights lawyer, served with LDF
from 1946 to 1965.170 As LDF staff counsel and later associate counsel, Motley
164

See infra Table 2. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s experience illustrates the limited opportunities
those women had in the profession. She graduated near the top of her class from Stanford Law School
in 1952. ‘Out of Order’ at the Court: O'Connor on Being the First Female Justice, NPR (Mar. 5, 2013,
2:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=172982275. She contacted
forty legal employers, all of whom refused to interview her. Id. Many stated explicitly that they would
not hire a woman. Id. Justice O’Connor eventually took a job with the District Attorney for San Mateo
County, California based on her agreement to work for no pay at first and to sit at a desk next to the
secretary. Id.
165
1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, supra note 157, at 739 tbl.223; 1950 CENSUS OF POPULATION,
supra note 157, at 278 tbl.128; 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION, supra note 157, at 546 tbl.205; cf.
CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 4 tbls.I.1 & I.2 (1983) (listing slightly different figures and
percentages, while acknowledging discrepancies in government records). Virtually all of the Black civil
rights lawyers in the South were men. See GRAY, supra note 148, at 108 (displaying a photograph of
members of the Southwest Bar Association in 1960, showing one woman out of about fifty members).
Similarly, the cover photo of J. Clay Smith’s book, Emancipation, shows the 1932 moot court class
of Howard Law School, with twenty-six men and one woman. See SMITH, supra note 142.
166
The sources consulted do not reveal any internal discussion of the lawyers’ gender having any
bearing on their selection.
167
See discussion supra Section I.A.
168
Several other women played limited, behind-the-scenes roles. See infra Appendix.
169
See infra notes 175–176, 182 and accompanying text.
170
MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 59, 155, 206. Constance Baker Motley interned with Thurgood
Marshall at the fledgling NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) while attending Columbia
Law School. Id. at 58–59. She volunteered at LDF between the spring and summer of 1945, and
worked there as law clerk from October 1945 until she graduated from law school in June 1946. Id.
After law school, she became the first female staff attorney at LDF. See VRA at 50: Day 17, NAACP
LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/vra-at-50-day-17 (last visited Apr. 26, 2016). In her time at LDF, she
argued ten cases before the Supreme Court, winning nine of them. See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 193–
202. Her victories also included helping James Meredith gain admission to the University of
Mississippi in 1962 as its first Black student. Id. at 162–83; see Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10 (1962).
Motley had a distinguished career after her time at LDF as well. In 1964, she became the first Black
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represented Dr. King and other activists.171 LDF directors Thurgood Marshall and
his successor Jack Greenberg assigned her to provide assistance in various
places. 172 On other occasions, local counsel called on Motley as reinforcement
when they faced difficult challenges, as in Albany, Georgia.173 They did so out of
respect for her experience and expertise. 174 In a 1966 statement about the
“tremendous role” that lawyers played in the Civil Rights Movement, Dr. King
included Constance Baker Motley as one of a half-dozen of those lawyers he
mentioned by name.175 He singled her out as “that Portia” among “defenders of
great renown” in American history.176
Marian Wright Edelman met Dr. King in 1960 in Atlanta, when she was an
undergraduate student at Spelman College. 177 They developed their relationship
when she spent several years with LDF’s Mississippi office after law school.178
Through her work in Mississippi, she also came to know Senator Robert
Kennedy.179 In a 1967 meeting with Kennedy, she expressed her strong concerns
about the widespread existence of poverty and the need to educate the public about
poverty.180 She passed along Kennedy’s suggestion to Dr. King to “bring the poor
to Washington” to dramatize their plight and to press Congress for legislation to
address it.181 For bringing that message to him, Dr. King called her “an angel sent
woman elected to the New York State Senate. LINN WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE 127
(1994); MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 206. In 1965, she was the first woman elected to the Manhattan
(New York) Borough presidency. Douglas Martin, Constance Baker Motley, Civil Rights Trailblazer,
Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/29/nyregion/29motley.html.
In 1966, President Johnson appointed her as a federal district court judge. Id. She was the first Black
female appointed to the federal bench. Id. In 1982, she became the first woman to serve as Chief Judge
of the Southern District of New York, “the largest federal trial bench” in the United States. Rachel
Christmas Derrick, A Columbian Ahead of Her Time: Constance Baker Motley, COLUM. MAG., http://
www.columbia.edu/cu/alumni/Magazine/Spring2004/motley.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). In 2001,
President Bill Clinton awarded her the Presidential Citizens’ Medal, in recognition of her service to the
nation. Id. She died in 2005 at the age of eighty-four. Martin, supra.
171
See generally MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 132–55.
172
See discussion infra Sections II.A.1.i.d, II.A.2.ii, II.B.2, III.B.1.i, III.B.3.i. See generally
MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 70–73, 113, 142, 145, 162–63, 193 (illustrating instances in which
Thurgood Marshall assigned Motley to assist with LDF cases); Allan Morrison, Top Woman Civil
Rights Lawyer: Securing Rights for Millions, Negro Woman Is One of World’s Most Influential
Lawyers, EBONY, Jan. 1963, at 50, 52, 54 (quoting Jack Greenberg on his view of Motley as LDF’s
“field general” and on assigning her to the organization’s most challenging cases: “If a case is
important or tough, one that really requires a major undertaking, then Connie gets it.”).
173
See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 138–39; see also discussion infra Section II.A.2.ii.
174
See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 154–55. See generally id. at 79, 88–89; WESTIN & MAHONEY,
supra note 136, at 105.
175
King, supra note 1, at xxi, xxiii.
176
Id. at xxiii. The reference to Shakespeare’s heroine in The Merchant of Venice also suggests that
she was rare, if not unique, as a woman doing civil rights work. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
THE MERCHANT OF VENICE. She was doing men’s work, since the legal profession was historically a
male domain.
177
See MARIAN WRIGHT EDELMAN, LANTERNS: A MEMOIR OF MENTORS 63 (1999).
178
See id. at 73–75, 102–04. While in Mississippi, she engaged in a protracted struggle to secure
federal funding for the Child Development Group of Mississippi, a pre-school program for poor
children. See id. at 102–04. Mississippi’s segregationist senators strongly opposed the program. See id.
at 103. Dr. King assisted her in advocating on behalf of the program. See id. at 102–04.
179
See id. at 104–07, 172.
180
See id. at 104, 106–09.
181
See id. at 109.
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by God.”182 The idea evolved into the “Poor People’s Campaign,” which Dr. King
was planning when he was killed.183 Marian Wright Edelman served as counsel to
the campaign.184
It is not entirely clear why Dr. King had so few women lawyers.185 Dr. King’s
focus was on race, and attracting Black lawyers was a key part of his agenda. There
would be no reason to expect a similar effort to attract women lawyers unless they
were Black and added to the level of participation of Black lawyers.186
Moreover, with the separate spheres ideology still holding sway and the
women’s movement yet to be born to challenge it, 187 Dr. King headed an
organization that was male-dominated in its board, leadership, and staff.188 The
men, including Dr. King, retained many traditional views about gender roles.189
182

Id. The admiration and respect were mutual. In Edelman’s memoir about her mentors, she wrote
at length about Martin Luther King, Jr. Describing a meeting with him when she was in college, she
said: “He was wonderful. He’s almost Christ-like. Went up afterwards and he greeted me as if I were an
old and dear friend.” Id. at 63. Later she described him as “our greatest twentieth-century national
prophet.” Id. at 122.
183
See infra Section III.B.1.iii.
184
Marian Wright Edelman, CHILD. DEF. FUND, http://www.childrensdefense.org/about/leadership
/marian-wright-edelman/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015); see also infra notes 746, 754 and accompanying
text. She went on to become the founder of the Children’s Defense Fund, which she continued to lead
well into the twenty-first century. See Marian Wright Edelman, supra.
185
Coretta Scott King’s observation about her husband suggested the complexity and perhaps
contradictory nature of her husband’s views about women:

On the one hand, he believed that women are just as intelligent and capable as men and
that they should hold positions of authority and influence. But when it came to his own
situation, he thought in terms of his wife being a homemaker and a mother for his
children. He was very definite that he would expect whoever he married to be home
waiting for him.
CLAYBORNE CARSON, MARTIN’S DREAM: MY JOURNEY AND THE LEGACY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.
203 (2013).
186
See, e.g., Dorothy I. Height, “We Wanted the Voice of a Woman to Be Heard”: Black Women and
the 1963 March on Washington, in SISTERS IN THE STRUGGLE 83, 86 (Bettye Collier-Thomas & V.P.
Franklin eds., 2001) (“There was an all-consuming focus on race. We women were expected to put all
our energies into [the March on Washington]. . . . [T]here was a low tolerance level for . . . questions
about the women’s participation . . . .”).
187
The separate spheres philosophy is the idea that men should occupy the public sphere of work and
public policy, while women should occupy the private sphere of the home and family. The late
nineteenth-century conception of separate spheres is epitomized in Justice Bradley’s concurrence in
Bradwell v. Illinois, which upheld the State’s exclusion of women from the practice of law based solely
on their gender. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). It expresses both the positive and normative view
that men are biologically and genetically equipped for work and the public sphere while women are
suited for the domestic and family realm. See id. at 141–42 (Bradley, J., concurring).
Separate spheres ideology remained a common view of women’s nature, capacity, and appropriate
role in society well beyond the middle of the twentieth century. Law schools, the legal profession, and
the Civil Rights Movement itself reflected that constrained conception of women’s place. See generally
Cary Franklin, Separate Spheres, 123 YALE L.J. 2878 (2014).
188
See ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES
ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 103 (1984) (detailing how the SCLC’s male leaders’ views on women drove
them to select John Tilley over Ella Baker as SCLC’s first executive director).
189
See id. Bernard Lee, one of Dr. King’s personal assistants, once referred to him as a “male
chauvinist . . . believ[ing] that the wife should stay home and take care of the babies while he’d be out
there in the streets.” GARROW, supra note 2, at 375–76. See generally Lee, Bernard Scott (1935–1991),
KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_lee
_bernard_scott_1935_1991/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).
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Furthermore, as SCLC turned increasingly to LDF for legal representation in
the early 1960s, it relied heavily on that organization’s staff, volunteers, and local
cooperating attorneys.190 LDF was also a male-dominated organization. A lack of
women lawyers working at LDF (Constance Baker Motley was the organization’s
only woman lawyer for much of this period) may also help to explain the relatively
small number of women lawyers serving the movement. 191 A number of other
women lawyers made their mark as civil rights advocates during this period in
movements unrelated to Dr. King.192

When William Ming, Dr. King’s co-lead counsel in his 1960 perjury trial, was teaching at Howard
Law School, he wondered aloud why women were in law school at all. See MACK, supra note 161, at
229.
In his co-authored book Behind the Dream, Clarence Jones, who helped write the “I Have a Dream”
speech, noted with regret that virtually all the speakers at the March on Washington were men. JONES &
CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 100–01. This was the case even though there were prominent activists like
Rosa Parks on the podium who the crowd would have wanted to hear. See id.
Lawyer and civil rights activist Pauli Murray expressed strong feelings about the exclusion of
women:

It was bitterly humiliating for Negro women on August 28 to see themselves accorded
little more than token recognition in the historic March on Washington. Not a single
woman was invited to make one of the major speeches or to be part of the delegation of
leaders who went to the White House. This omission was deliberate. Representations for
recognition of women were made to the policy-making body sufficiently in advance of
the August 28 arrangements to have permitted the necessary adjustments of the program.
Pauli Murray, The Negro Woman in the Quest for Equality, ACORN, June 1964, reprinted in REBELS IN
LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS 172, 175 (J. Clay Smith Jr. ed., 1998).
Coretta Scott King also expressed concerns about the treatment of women at the March on
Washington. She had hoped to march at her husband’s side: “I felt that the involvement in the
Movement of some of the wives had been so extensive that they should have been granted the privilege
of marching with their husbands and of completely sharing this experience together, as they had shared
the dangers and the hardships.” CARSON, supra note 185, at 210.
190
See infra Section I.B.4.i. Pauli Murray, one of the most prominent Black women lawyers of the
era, sought employment with LDF after law school but Thurgood Marshall rejected her application. See
PAULI MURRAY, PAULI MURRAY: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BLACK ACTIVIST, FEMINIST, LAWYER,
PRIEST, AND POET 263 (1987). Murray dressed and carried herself in an androgynous style. See MACK,
supra note 161, at 214. That made Marshall concerned about how she would fare in front of southern
judges and juries. See id. at 220.
191
See Constance Baker Motley, My Personal Debt to Thurgood Marshall, 101 YALE L.J. 19, 19
(1991) (“My tribute acknowledges my personal debt to Thurgood Marshall for aiding my career at a
time when nobody was hiring women lawyers.”); Dorothy Roberts, Constance Baker Motley, in THE
YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 393, 394 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) (“Upon
graduating in 1946, Motley was hired as the only woman on the LDF legal team . . . .”). See generally
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 32–36; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 151–55.
192
In his 1966 civil rights memoir, lawyer William Kunstler listed about 350 lawyers who made
significant contributions to the civil rights cause. See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at xi–xv. While men
dominated the list, it included more than thirty women civil rights lawyers. See id. Many of those
women lived in the North and did their civil rights work in their own communities. However, women
were represented among the lawyers who joined hundreds of college students in Mississippi in the
massive voter registration drive in 1964’s “Freedom Summer.” See LEN HOLT, THE SUMMER THAT
DIDN’T END: THE STORY OF THE MISSISSIPPI CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT OF 1964 app. 3, at 280 (1965). Eight
of the sixty-nine lawyers who went to Mississippi in support of the activists were women. See id. Most
of them appeared to have been associated with the National Lawyers Guild. See id.
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iii. Religion

An SCLC board member once said, “SCLC is not an organization, it’s a
church.”193 Black ministers led it, and it was “firmly rooted in the Black church.”194
Even the name reflected the faith-based core of the organization.195 Dr. King felt it
was important that “Christian” be included in the name to emphasize that the
organization’s participants and its potential base came mostly from the church.196
Ministers dominated the formal structure, including the Board and the high levels
of the staff.197 Those origins could have led to a search for Christian lawyers who
shared the organization’s religious beliefs and motivations. Nevertheless, religious
affiliation did not seem to matter in the selection of lawyers.198 Movement leaders
seemed indifferent about whether their lawyers shared the same faith and faithbased commitment to civil rights.199
In fact, several of Dr. King’s lawyers were Jewish.200 Having Jewish lawyers
seemed consistent with Dr. King’s sense of kinship with the Jewish people because
of their shared history of struggle against systematic oppression.201 For example,
Jack Greenberg, who succeeded Thurgood Marshall in leading LDF, was Jewish.202
Stanley Levison and Harry Wachtel, two members of Dr. King’s inner circle, were
also Jewish.203 Levison was one of Dr. King’s most loyal and trusted advisers.204 It
thus appears Dr. King did not attempt to recruit lawyers exclusively of the Christian
faith.

193

FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 1.
Id.
195
See MORRIS, supra note 188, at 86.
196
GARROW, supra note 2, at 97. Bayard Rustin tried to dissuade Dr. King, for fear that the name
might put off non-religious civil rights supporters, but Dr. King was unmoved. Id.
197
See id. at 104–05; MORRIS, supra note 188, at 103.
198
While Fred Gray is a minister as well as a lawyer, that seemed irrelevant to his selection to
represent the Montgomery Improvement Association. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 13, 52–54.
199
The sources do not reveal any internal discussion of the lawyers’ religion having any bearing on
their selection.
200
In a 2007 panel discussion on Jewish lawyers in the Civil Rights Movement, former LDF head
Jack Greenberg recalled: “[O]f the 17 [lawyers who signed the Brown v. Board of Education brief],
four were white. And of the four, three were Jewish. And the fourth was Charles Black, who . . . was
married to Barbara Black, who was Jewish . . . . Jewish involvement in LDF was substantial . . . among
the whites, in the early days at least, I would say ninety percent of them were Jewish. As time went on,
more and more non-Jews became involved.” Jewish Lawyers in the Civil Rights Movement, supra note
74. The involvement of Jewish lawyers in Dr. King’s campaigns may have reflected the more general
connection between Blacks and Jews in the Civil Rights Movement, especially in the 1950s and early
1960s. See generally JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 125–41.
201
See JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 126–27. Jones quotes Dr. King as having said: “There isn’t
anyone in this country more likely to understand our struggle than Jews. Whatever progress we’ve
made so far as a people, their support has been essential.” Id. at 129.
202
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 48.
203
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 582.
204
See discussion infra Section I.B.5.
194
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iv. Age
Dr. King’s lawyers included the country’s most experienced and celebrated
civil rights lawyers. 205 At the same time, Dr. King also welcomed—even
embraced—relatively inexperienced young lawyers. 206 That inclusiveness is not
surprising in light of the fact that Dr. King was only twenty-six years old and a year
into his first ministry when he assumed the mantle of leadership of the MIA.207
Moreover, there were few established civil rights lawyers available to serve the
burgeoning Civil Rights Movement. 208 Young, idealistic lawyers provided an
important source of supply to meet a growing demand.
Once again, Fred Gray epitomized the significant role that young lawyers
played.209 In 1955, at age twenty-four, and only a year and a half out of law school,
Gray defended Rosa Parks and then served as the MIA’s lawyer.210 While Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s first lawyer may have been his youngest, least experienced one,
he was not the only one whose youth stood out. In his account of Dr. King recruiting
him for the perjury defense team, Clarence Jones says that Dr. King repeatedly
described him as a “young man” or young lawyer.211 It was as if his youth helped
to qualify him for the assignment as a legal researcher, while at the same time

205

See discussion infra Section I.B.4.i. See generally WILLIAM T. COLEMAN JR. WITH DONALD T.
BLISS, COUNSEL FOR THE SITUATION: SHAPING THE LAW TO REALIZE AMERICA’S PROMISE 199 (2010)
(“Since the 1930s LDF lawyers have forged much of the transformative legal precedent on civil rights
through litigation in the federal and state courts and appeals to the Supreme Court. The Inc[.] Fund has
attracted some of the finest lawyers, regardless of color, who have gone on to extraordinary careers as
federal judges, law school professors, leading law firm partners, and elected officials.”); MOTLEY,
supra note 13, at 59 (discussing LDF’s “outstanding lawyers”); WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136,
at 93–94 (discussing extensive credentials of lead-LDF lawyers Jack Greenberg and Constance Baker
Motley).
206
See, e.g., JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 2, 4–7 (noting that Clarence Jones was “less than a
year out of law school” when Dr. King recruited him). Unlike twenty-first century law students, who
have access to legal clinics, externships, and summer jobs, most of these young lawyers had limited
practical experience when they joined the Civil Rights Movement. See, e.g., MOTLEY, supra note 13, at
58–59.
Moreover, some young lawyers were seeking to represent civil rights activists. See id. at 154–55.
Their ideological commitment sometimes grew out of their own encounters with racism. For example,
Fred Gray rode the Montgomery buses extensively and felt the sting of discrimination there. See supra
note 127 and accompanying text. Horace Ward was rejected from the University of Georgia Law
School and lost his suit challenging that exclusion. See supra note 142. These young lawyers graduated
when the modern Civil Rights Movement was getting started, and there were opportunities for idealistic
young lawyers to become activists for social change.
Also, it was difficult for Black lawyers to make a living practicing law at that time. For example,
Fred Gray had a great deal of time on his hands when he started his practice in Montgomery. See GRAY,
supra note 7, at 31.
207
GARROW, supra note 2, at 32.
208
See Jewish Lawyers in the Civil Rights Movement, supra note 74.
209
When Rosa Parks refused to give up her bus seat, Gray’s life and career took a remarkable turn.
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 33.
210
See id. at 6, 22, 50–53, 55–56.
211
JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 12–13. Jones was twenty-nine years old in 1960, having
graduated from law school in 1959 after serving in the military. See Jones, Clarence Benjamin (1931–
), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc
_jones_clarence_benjamin_1931/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2015).
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obligating him both to remember where he came from and to serve the civil rights
cause.212
In addition to Fred Gray and Clarence Jones, three other young lawyers
similarly assumed significant roles. The first was Horace Ward, of Atlanta, who
attended Morehouse College with Martin Luther King, Jr.213 In 1960, the year after
Ward graduated from law school, he assisted Dr. King’s defense counsel in a
Georgia criminal matter. 214 The second was Norman Amaker, who was only
twenty-eight years old when he played a central role in the Birmingham Movement
of 1963.215 A staffer at the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Amaker
had been out of law school just four years.216 And the third was Marian Wright
Edelman, who worked on the Poor People’s Campaign in 1968, and who was just
twenty-eight years old and less than five years out of law school when she assumed
that important responsibility.217
At the same time, Dr. King, his colleagues, and the young lawyers themselves
relied very heavily on the older, more experienced lawyers who had established the
field of civil rights law and repeatedly brought their expertise to bear.218 Those
lawyers included Thurgood Marshall, Robert Carter, Jack Greenberg, and
Constance Baker Motley.219
3. Strategic Commitments
In light of Dr. King’s commitment to nonviolent direct action, it would be
understandable if he expected the lawyers to share a belief in the principle and its
efficacy. As Dr. King’s own understanding of, and commitment to, nonviolent
direct action deepened,220 he might have become insistent that his lawyers were on
the same strategic page. But Dr. King did not seem concerned about strategic
conformity. While most of his lawyers supported nonviolent direct action, several
remained committed to litigation as the essential means to bring about civil rights
progress.

212

See JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 13–14.
DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 26.
214
See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.c.
215
See ESKEW, supra note 50, at 249, 252; GARROW, supra note 2, at 243; WESTIN & MAHONEY,
supra note 136, at 77; Who is Norman Amaker?, LOY. U. CHI. SCH. L., http://www.luc.edu/law/amaker
/who_is_norman_amaker.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2016); see also discussion infra Section III.B.3.i.
216
See Who is Norman Amaker?, supra note 215.
217
See EDELMAN, supra note 177, at 67, 73–74, 76, 109–11; Krissah Thompson, Marian Wright
Edelman Marks 40 Years of Advocacy at Children’s Defense Fund, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2013), http:
//wpo.st/mBsc1; Interview by Henry Hampton with Marian Wright Edelman (Dec. 21, 1988), http://
digital.wustl.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=eop;cc=eop;rgn=main;view=text;idno=ede5427.0676.044.
Edelman graduated from Yale Law School in 1963. Marian Wright Edelman, BRITANNICA.COM, http://
www.britannica.com/biography/Marian-Wright-Edelman (last visited Sept. 17, 2015).
218
See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 7, at 72–73; see also sources cited supra note 205.
219
See discussion supra Section I.A, infra Sections II.A.1.i.a, II.A.1.i.d, II.A.2.ii, II.B.1–2, III.B.1.i,
III.B.1.iii, III.B.3.i–iii, III.B.3.vi.
220
See generally KING, supra note 7; MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 67–68, 79, 99, 121–
34.
213
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Thurgood Marshall served as the most prominent case in point.221 His training
and experience led him to view the courts as the central venue for achieving racial
progress.222 He even expressed disdain for the Montgomery Bus Boycott: “All that
walking for nothing. They might as well have waited for the Court decision.”223 A
Marshall biographer suggests that “[i]n his heart, he viewed the bus boycott and
King’s speeches as street theater that did not come close to equaling the main
event—the NAACP’s effort to get the courts to end legal segregation.”224
William Ming, Dr. King’s co-lead counsel in his perjury trial, came from the
same court-focused tradition as Thurgood Marshall. 225 He had worked with
Marshall on the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund’s school
desegregation litigation campaign that included a series of Supreme Court higher
education decisions and culminated with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.226
Birmingham lawyer Arthur Shores initially expressed deep skepticism about
nonviolent direct action.227 He strongly opposed the 1963 direct action campaign

221
See Aldon Morris, Leon Forrest Professor of Sociology & African Am. Studies, Nw. Univ.,
Remarks at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin
Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014),
in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 624, 631 (2016).
222
See generally KLUGER, supra note 13, at 133–36, 156, 213–15, 222–24, 265–68, 270–73.
223
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 74 (2000).
224
JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 247 (Three Rivers Press
2004) (1998). Williams also suggests that, notwithstanding Marshall’s deep reservations, he did make
some supportive comments about the bus boycott publicly: “Even as he dismissed King’s protest tactics
in private, Marshall told the delegates that the NAACP had to evaluate King’s nonviolent technique to
see ‘to what extent it can be used in addition to our other means of protest.’ ” Id. at 251 (quoting
Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, Keynote Address at the NAACP Annual Convention (June 26,
1956)).
While Dr. King may not have been fully aware of Marshall’s attitude toward the boycott and direct
action generally, Marshall’s core strategic commitment to the courts as the engine for social change was
a matter of long-standing public record. See, e.g., id. at 247 (describing Marshall’s belief that “people
[should] obey the laws and the courts, even if they disliked them”). See generally TUSHNET, supra note
13, at 232–82; Thurgood Marshall, NAACP LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/thurgood-marshall (last
visited Sept. 17, 2015).
225
See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 91, 113, 134–35, 137, 198; see also infra notes 683–684 and
accompanying text (discussing the interaction between Ming and Dr. King during the Chicago Freedom
Movement).
226
See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 89–91, 137, 198. The cases included Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948), Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
227
See ESKEW, supra note 50, at 324; Glenn T. Eskew, The Alabama Christian Movement for
Human Rights and the Birmingham Struggle for Civil Rights, 1956–1963, in BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA,
1956–1963: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 3, 17 (David J. Garrow ed., 1989). Professor
Eskew identifies Shores as having been a member of “Birmingham’s black bourgeoisie,” which had
long “opposed [the] use of direct action confrontation.” Id. at 66–67.
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in his hometown.228 He preferred to negotiate a compromise and then turn to the
courts if necessary, rather than engaging in any type of direct action.229
Notwithstanding these divergent strategic commitments, the lawyers were
prepared to provide whatever assistance activists needed. 230 Consequently, the
lawyers’ stance on nonviolent direct action seemed largely immaterial to Dr. King.
4. Civil Rights Legal Organizations
In addition to individual lawyers, Martin Luther King, Jr. relied heavily on
civil rights legal organizations. He established an especially close working
relationship with the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF).231 He also
secured legal assistance from the similarly named but separate NAACP. 232 On
occasion, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) cooperating attorneys also
played a role. 233 While Dr. King avoided having too many public ties to the
National Lawyers Guild (NLG), he did enlist individual members from that
organization.234
i. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
In 1940, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) formed as a
separate entity from the NAACP to carry out litigation campaigns, and Thurgood
Marshall served as the organization’s first director-counsel.235 Marshall emerged as
228

See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 768, 901. Shores and other Black lawyers in Birmingham were
opposed to a lawsuit to desegregate the city’s parks, viewing it as a bad idea because history showed the
city would close all the parks if it lost. See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 222–23. They collectively
agreed that none of them would handle the case unless the Alabama Christian Movement for Human
Rights hired all of them, which they knew it could not afford to do. See id. at 223–24.
229
See ESKEW, supra note 50, at 324; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 194; see also, e.g., TUSHNET,
supra note 13, at 113–14, 119. Professor Thornton describes Shores as “a man always eager to
accommodate white community leaders” through compromise. THORNTON, supra note 27, at 223.
230
See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., KINOY, supra note 30, at 192–93
(“Lawyers were no longer the central agents fighting to achieve the goals of freedom and equality
through their own special arena, the courts of law. Their role now was vastly different. Their primary
task was to find ways of helping the Black people themselves resist the efforts of the power structure to
derail their own forward movement to enforce the constitutional promises of freedom and equality.”);
ANDREW YOUNG, AN EASY BURDEN: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA 215–16 (1996) (“[LDF’s] style was such that they never discouraged us from anything. Their
position was that they could not dictate the strategy of the movement but would be there to manage the
legal ramifications of our decisions. . . . [Dr. King] determined the political strategy, and the LDF
crafted a complementary legal strategy to minimize our exposure to legal sanctions.”). See generally
KINOY, supra note 30, at 168–69, 189.
231
See infra Section I.B.4.i.
232
See infra Section I.B.4.ii.
233
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 375.
234
See infra Section I.B.4.iv. Jack Greenberg avoided the National Lawyers Guild, presumably
because of its reputation of having connections to the Communist Party. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra
note 51, at 376–80. However, Dr. King listed NLG among the legal organizations that had helped
advance civil rights. King, supra note 1, at xxv. His list also included the ACLU, the Law Students
Civil Rights Research Council, the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee, the NAACP LDF, and
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights Under Law. Id.
235
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 17–18 (discussing LDF’s incorporation in March 1940).
Because the NAACP’s lobbying and propaganda activities disqualified it from receiving tax-deductible
contributions, its board created LDF as an independent charitable organization that would carry out the

529

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2016

the most prominent civil rights litigator of his era,236 and LDF became the country’s
preeminent civil rights litigation organization.237
Fred Gray turned to LDF for assistance early in the Montgomery Bus
Boycott.238 After that, Dr. King relied increasingly on the organization for legal
assistance.239 In 1961, as Thurgood Marshall left LDF for a seat on the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals bench, he picked Jack Greenburg as his successor. 240
Greenberg had been with LDF for more than a decade, and he was on the legal team
that won Brown v. Board of Education.241 The relationship between LDF and Dr.
NAACP’s non-lobbying and non-propaganda activities, hoping that its tax-exempt status would attract
contributions from the Rockefeller family. See id. at 17; see also NAACP v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Besides serving as a means to ensure on-going
financing of civil rights litigation, the creation of the LDF provided an important tax advantage.”). LDF
had its own board of directors, though all of its original directors also served on the NAACP’s board.
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 18. That influence “assured indirect control” over LDF’s operations. Id.
236
See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 23,
23 (1991) (“Thurgood Marshall was probably the most important advocate in America, one who used
his formidable legal skills to end the evils of discrimination. . . . [I]t was his presentations, in case after
case and in court after court, that helped bring about a society in which ‘equal protection of the laws’
could be a reality and not merely a legal phrase.”).
237
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 551; Rabin, supra note 75, at 216–18. Marshall led the
organization through its decades-long public education desegregation litigation campaign, culminating
with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For more on those efforts, see KLUGER, supra
note 13.
238
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 70 (stating Gray sought input from Thurgood Marshall shortly after
the boycott began to guide his discussion with movement leaders about filing a case in federal court).
239
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 360–64, 374; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135, 159; MLK
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 216–17; King, supra note 1, at xxv.
240
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 315–17; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 51. As a white
lawyer, Greenberg’s appointment produced controversy both within and outside of the organization.
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 7, 318–19; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 151–54.
Thurgood Marshall went on to serve as Solicitor General from 1965 to 1967. WILLIAMS, supra note
224, at 317, 338. In 1967, President Johnson appointed him to the Supreme Court, where he served
until 1991. Id. at 330–31, 391.
241
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 25, 175, 551–52; see 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning the
“separate but equal” doctrine); see also Jack Greenberg, NAACP LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/jackgreenberg-biography (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Greenberg LDF Bio]. Jack Greenberg
graduated from Columbia Law School in 1948, and the following year he joined LDF as an assistant
counsel under Thurgood Marshall. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at xiii; see also Jack Greenberg,
COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Jack_Greenberg (last visited Jan. 16, 2016)
[hereinafter Greenberg Faculty Bio]. During his thirty-five years with LDF, Greenberg argued forty
cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and hundreds more in the lower courts, in areas such as school
desegregation, employment discrimination, and the death penalty. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at xiii;
see, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that, in the three cases before
the Court, the death penalty violated the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause of the Eighth
Amendment—applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment—and temporarily ending all
executions); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (prohibiting reliance on tests with
discriminatory impact for employment and promotion decisions unless the employer can show that such
practice is “related to job performance”); Alexander v. Holmes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969)
(holding that segregated school systems must desegregate “at once”).
Greenberg was an adjunct professor at Columbia Law School from 1970–84, and he left LDF in
1984 to join the law school’s faculty. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at xiii; Greenberg Faculty Bio, supra.
He served as Dean of Columbia College from 1989–93, and then returned to teaching full-time as a
professor at the law school. Id. He has spent numerous semesters as a visiting professor at law schools
worldwide, and has written several books and other publications reflecting on his battles and victories
in the Civil Rights Movement. See id; Greenberg LDF Bio, supra.
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King deepened, since Greenberg was far more sympathetic to Dr. King’s nonviolent
direct action strategies than Marshall had been. 242 By 1963, LDF had become
SCLC’s primary legal counsel.243
Dr. King’s relationship with LDF had many benefits for the movement. First,
it added substantially to the supply of capable, committed lawyers.244 LDF’s level
of experience and the depth and breadth of expertise dwarfed that of any other
group. The staff included many of the top civil rights lawyers in the country.245
Including Greenberg and Motley, LDF had seventeen staff lawyers by the mid-

In 1996, the American Bar Association recognized Greenberg for his exceptional contributions to
civil rights by awarding him the Thurgood Marshall Award. Id. In 2001, President Clinton awarded
Greenberg a Presidential Citizens Medal, noting, “In the courtroom and the classroom, Jack Greenberg
has been a crusader for freedom and equality for more than half a century.” Id.; see also Jennifer Shotz,
Law Professor Jack Greenberg Awarded Presidential Citizens Medal, COLUM. NEWS (Jan. 12, 2001),
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/01/01/jackGreenberg.html.
Greenberg is a founding member of the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and
continued to serve on LDF’s Board of Directors. Greenberg Faculty Bio, supra.
242
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463–65. There had also been personal tensions between
Thurgood Marshall and Dr. King. Marshall resented the fact that Dr. King’s reputation was growing
and overtaking his own as a leader of the Civil Rights Movement. See WILLIAMS, supra note 224, at
251–52.
243
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 374. SCLC never had a full-time in-house legal staff. As its
primary outside counsel, LDF became the closest thing the organization had to such an arrangement.
See id.; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 178 (stating LDF took over all SCLC’s important
litigation in June 1964 when the Gandhi Society expired); Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Robert
McDougal, Jr. (Dec. 14, 1965), http://thekingcenter.org/archive/document/letter-mlk-robert-mcdougaljr# (“[T]he NAACP’s Legal Defense [F]und handles all litigations and judicial proceedings for the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference.”). Michael Meltsner, an LDF staff attorney during this
period, argued that “[w]hile every lawyer who was ever in the same room with Martin Luther King has
claimed to have represented him, it was Greenberg—and LDF—that King asked time and time again to
do his most important legal work.” MICHAEL MELTSNER, THE MAKING OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 135
(2006). But some sources suggest that Chauncey Eskridge acted as SCLC “legal counsel” for a period
of time. See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 2, at 622 (calling Eskridge “[l]ongtime SCLC attorney”); Heise,
supra note 151 (stating Eskridge was SCLC’s “legal counsel in the late 1960s”).
244
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 323–26, 374. LDF had a very large and varied docket of its
own, both substantively and geographically. See id. at 323–26. Even so, LDF provided far more legal
resources to SCLC than any other organization. See id. at 374, 552.
245
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 72–73; King, supra note 1, at xxiii; Rabin, supra note 75, at 217 n.38,
232 n.78.
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1960s.246 They included James Nabrit III,247 Norman Amaker,248 Leroy Clark,249
Melvyn Zarr,250 and Steve Ralston,251 among others. LDF’s consultants constituted
246

GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 323.
After graduating from Yale Law School in 1955, James M. Nabrit III served in the Army and then
practiced at a Washington, D.C. law firm before joining LDF as a staff attorney in 1959. Matt Schudel,
Civil Rights Stalwart Argued Key Cases Before High Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2013, at B5. He
worked on a variety of civil rights cases at LDF, including school desegregation, prison conditions,
public accommodations, and criminal defense. James M. Nabrit, 1932–2013, NAACP LDF (Mar. 24,
2013), http://www.naacpldf.org/news/james-m-nabrit-1932-2013 [hereinafter Nabrit].
Nabrit co-wrote the Supreme Court brief for the appeal of Dr. King’s 1964 arrest in Birmingham for
violating an injunction. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 363; see Walker v. City of Birmingham,
388 U.S. 307 (1967); see also discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. Nabrit also helped write the detailed
plan for the Selma to Montgomery 1965 voting rights march that the district court approved. Nabrit,
supra; see discussion infra Section III.B.3.iii.
Nabrit continued to work for LDF until 1989. Nabrit, supra. He argued twelve cases before the
Supreme Court, including Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), which found that
Denver’s segregated schools violated the Equal Protection clause. After his retirement, Nabrit
continued to advise the organization until his death at the age of 80 in 2013. See Nabrit, supra.
248
After graduating from Columbia Law School in 1959, Norman Amaker became a staff attorney
for LDF. Who is Norman Amaker?, supra note 215. Amaker worked on a variety of civil rights cases at
LDF, including school desegregation, voting rights, employment discrimination, and the death penalty,
and argued cases before all levels of state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court. Id.; see also
James Janega, Norman Amaker, 65, Key Civil Rights Figure, CHI. TRIB. (June 11, 2000), http://articles
.chicagotribune.com/2000-06-11/news/0006110048_1_adam-clayton-powell-naacp-legal-defense-fundfirst-year-students.
Amaker represented demonstrators arrested during Martin Luther King, Jr.’s voter registration drive
in Selma, Alabama, GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 381, and he briefed Dr. King and other SCLC
leaders on the likely consequences of violating the injunction against marches in Birmingham. BRANCH,
supra note 32, at 728; see discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. After Dr. King was arrested for violating
the injunction, Amaker served as one of the couriers who carried Dr. King’s famous “Letter from a
Birmingham Jail” out of jail. Who is Norman Amaker?, supra note 215. See generally infra note 659
(discussing Dr. King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”).
Amaker left LDF in 1971 to become the Executive Director of Neighborhood Legal Services
Program, a Washington, D.C. legal aid organization. See Who is Norman Amaker?, supra note 215. He
became a law professor at Rutgers Law School in 1973, and moved to Loyola University Chicago
School of Law in 1976. Id. Amaker taught at Loyola until his death in 2000 at the age of sixty-five. See
id.
249
After Leroy Clark graduated from Columbia Law School in 1961, he worked briefly at the State
of New York Attorney General’s office before joining LDF as a staff attorney in 1962. See New
Member Joins NAACP Defense Fund, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 22, 1962, at 8-D. Clark defended
Dr. King after his arrest for violating the injunction against demonstrating in Birmingham in 1963.
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 362; see discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. He also represented
demonstrators arrested in 1965 for participating in voting rights demonstrations in Selma. GREENBERG,
supra note 51, at 381. See generally infra Section III.B.3.iii (discussing Selma arrests). After Selma,
Clark worked with Dr. King on planning for the Poor People’s Campaign and was instrumental in
bringing the campaign to fruition. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463; see also discussion infra Sections
III.B.1.iii, III.B.3.vi.
In 1968, Clark became a professor at NYU Law School, where he worked for eleven years, and then
served as general counsel for the EEOC from 1979–1981. Leroy D. Clark, CATH. U. AM. COLUMBUS
SCH. LAW, http://www.law.edu/fac-staff/clark-leroy/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). He went on
to become a professor at Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law from 1981 until his
retirement in 2006. Black Law Students Association Honors Professor Emeritus Leroy Clark, CATH. U.
AM. COLUMBUS SCH. LAW, http://www.law.edu/2013-Winter-Spring/BLSA-Honors-Prof-EmeritusLeroy-Clark.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
250
Melvyn Zarr graduated from Harvard Law School in 1963. Melvyn Zarr, Recollections of My
Time in the Civil Rights Movement, 61 ME. L. REV. 365, 366 (2009). He started working for LDF as a
summer position to make money before the bar exam, and ended up accepting a full time position at the
247
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a small group of highly committed civil rights advocates, 252 including law
professors Louis Pollak 253 and Anthony Amsterdam. 254 A network of local
end of the summer. Id. at 367–69. Zarr worked on numerous civil rights issues during his time at LDF,
starting with demonstrator cases. See id. at 368. He spent the summer of 1966 in Grenada, Mississippi,
giving advice and doing defense work for Dr. King and others involved with a string of SCLC
demonstrations. See id. at 372. Starting in the mid-60s, Zarr was the Mississippi member of LDF’s
“Demonstration Team.” Id. at 373. If Dr. King was demonstrating in Mississippi, Zarr traveled there to
supplement the local lawyers. Id. He also worked with Dr. King to plan the Poor People’s Campaign.
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463; see discussion infra Section III.B.1.iii.
Zarr continued doing civil rights work with LDF after Dr. King’s death, including arguing before the
Supreme Court in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), which held that the exclusionary rule
applies to fingerprint evidence obtained during an illegal detention. In 1969, he left LDF to become codirector of a group focusing on poverty law reform. Zarr, supra, at 375. He went on to become a
professor at University of Maine School of Law in 1973. Id.
251
Charles Stephen Ralston earned his law degree in 1962 from the University of California at
Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law. Selma Profiles, supra note 140. After law school, he served in the
United States Army Reserves and then taught for a year at Columbia Law School before joining LDF in
1964 as a staff attorney. Id. His caseload at LDF included housing and employment discrimination,
capital punishment, school desegregation, and voting rights. Id.
Ralston co-wrote the motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent interference with Dr.
King’s 1965 voting rights march from Selma to Montgomery. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 383; see
also discussion infra Section III.B.3.iii. He moved to San Francisco is 1968 to open LDF’s West Coast
office, but eventually returned to New York and, in 1988, was appointed to lead LDF’s appellate
litigation practice. Selma Profiles, supra note 140. After serving as senior staff attorney and LDF’s
employment litigation practice lead from 1993 to 2001, Ralston moved back to San Francisco, where he
opened his own practice and continued his work with LDF as a cooperating attorney. Id.
252
See generally GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 171.
253
Louis Pollak graduated from Yale Law School in 1948. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959). After law school,
he clerked for Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, and then went to work for a New York law firm.
Dennis Hevesi, Louis H. Pollak, Civil Rights Activist and Federal Judge, Dies at 89, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 2012, at A24. While at the firm, he began volunteering at LDF, doing consulting and brief writing
for school desegregation cases. See id.; see also COLEMAN, supra note 205, at 122, 143, 145, 147, 153;
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 171. He at one time was vice president of LDF’s Board. Jack Greenberg,
Louis H. Pollak, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 295, 296 (1978). He went on to work for the State Department and
in the legal department of a union. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 171. In 1955, Pollak joined the
faculty at Yale Law School, and in 1965 he became dean. See Hevesi, supra. While at Yale, Pollak
continued to volunteer with LDF and played an active role in cases during the Freedom Riders
Movement. Id. He successfully argued Abernathy v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 447 (1965), the Supreme Court
decision that overturned the convictions of Freedom Riders by citing its holding in Boynton v. Virginia,
364 U.S. 454 (1960), that racial segregation in public transportation was illegal. Pollak was also part of
the team that met with Dr. King to plan the Poor People’s Campaign. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at
463; see also discussion infra Section III.B.1.iii.
Pollak left Yale in 1974 to join the faculty at University of Pennsylvania Law School, and became
dean of the law school the following year. Hevesi, supra. In 1978, President Carter appointed him
district judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. Pollak assumed senior status in 1992. Id. He
died in 2012 at the age of eighty-nine. Id.
254
Anthony Amsterdam graduated in 1960 from University of Pennsylvania Law School and then
clerked for Justice Felix Frankfurter. Anthony G. Amsterdam – Biography, NYU SCH. L., http://its.law
.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?section=bio&personID=19743 (last visited Oct. 1, 2015)
[hereinafter Amsterdam Profile]. After his clerkship, Amsterdam spent a year as an Assistant United
States Attorney and then joined the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. See THE
RULE OF LAW ORAL HISTORY PROJECT: THE REMINISCENCES OF ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM 29–30
(Columbia Univ. Oral History Research Office ed., 2010) [hereinafter REMINISCENCES].
Amsterdam had written a student note for the University of Pennsylvania Law Review on the
Supreme Court’s application of the vagueness doctrine to address local officials’ use of vague statutes
such as disorderly conduct and trespassing to discriminate against civil rights demonstrators. Id. at 35–
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cooperating lawyers multiplied the organization’s resources.255 By the mid-1960s,
about 200 cooperating lawyers served as local counsel in LDF’s litigation.256
With significant numbers of lawyers at its disposal, LDF gave priority to Dr.
King and SCLC in assigning its lawyers. With so many crises, Dr. King often
needed lawyers on very short notice who could commit the time and resources
required to address Dr. King’s needs.257 Jack Greenberg repeatedly dispatched staff
lawyers upon request, with little or no delay. 258 He also made himself and
36. Based on that research, LDF called on him, starting in 1963, for assistance in defending
demonstrators, including those involved in SCLC demonstrations. Id. Amsterdam worked with
cooperating LDF attorneys, primarily writing briefs. Id. at 41; see, e.g., discussion infra Section
III.B.3.i.
Amsterdam went on to do a variety of pro bono work throughout his career, including civil rights
cases with LDF and poverty work with the ACLU. See REMINISCENCES, supra, at 117. His primary
focus was the death penalty, including arguing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme
Court decision that ruled existing state death penalty laws unconstitutional. He argued numerous cases
before the Supreme Court and wrote amicus briefs in many others. See, e.g., Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that North Carolina’s mandatory death sentence for first-degree
murder violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
(reversing a death penalty conviction for a Black Alabama man who had pled guilty to robbery, where
it was unclear whether the defendant had voluntarily and understandingly entered his guilty plea).
Amsterdam left Penn Law School for Stanford in 1969 and went on to NYU in 1981. Amsterdam
Profile, supra.
255
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 298, 394; Rabin, supra note 75, at 216–18.
256
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 394. Along with performing substantial work for Dr. King and
SCLC, LDF performed significant litigation in many areas of civil rights during that time. After its
victories in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), holding “separate but equal”
unconstitutional in the area of public education, and Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S.
294 (1955), directing localities to move towards compliance with “all deliberate speed,” id. at 301, LDF
initiated lawsuits all over the South to enforce Brown. History, NAACP LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org
/history (last visited Mar. 3, 2015); see, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that
a Virginia school board’s adoption of a “freedom-of-choice” plan, in which each student chose which
public school to attend, did not constitute adequate compliance with Brown when not a single white
student had chosen to attend a formerly Black school and eighty-five percent of Black students still
attended the same school that they attended prior to Brown); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
(denying an Arkansas school board’s post-Brown request to suspend its judicially-approved school
integration plan pending the resolution of various legal challenges of state laws aimed at circumventing
Brown). In 1961, LDF had forty-six school cases, and that number grew to 185 in 1965. GREENBERG,
supra note 51, at 324.
Throughout the 1960s, LDF argued approximately forty demonstration cases before the Supreme
Court, virtually all of which were successful except for Dr. King’s conviction for marching in
Birmingham when there was a state court injunction prohibiting the march. Id. at 323; see Walker v.
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); see also discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. Demonstration
cases involved fighting for those convicted of crimes like trespass or breach of the peace for
participating in sit-ins or other demonstrations against segregation. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at
288–92. LDF used various arguments against these types of convictions, largely focusing on how the
state enforced segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 292–95.
By the mid-1960s, those types of cases began to decrease as consistent victories led to widespread
compliance with integration of public accommodations. See id. at 323. Also in the mid-1960s, LDF’s
legal staff and budget grew substantially, which enabled LDF to increase the variety of cases it
litigated. See id. LDF attorneys began working on enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with an
emphasis on the equal employment sections of the Act. Id. at 323–24. They also expanded their
criminal defense work, fighting against racial discrimination in capital punishment, which eventually
developed into an attack on the constitutionality of capital punishment. See id. at 326, 394.
257
See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 364, 374, 381–83, 465; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135,
159.
258
See sources cited supra note 94.
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Constance Baker Motley available at times and places that Dr. King requested.259
Moreover, turning to LDF advanced Dr. King’s objective of maximizing
representation by Black lawyers. Blacks comprised the majority of the
organization’s lawyers.260
In addition, LDF was responsive to SCLC’s changing legal needs. Dr. King
and Jack Greenberg shared the same conception of the appropriate lawyer-client
relationships.261 Dr. King and his colleagues needed to be able to make the final
decisions about strategies and tactics.262 Jack Greenberg perceived the role of LDF
as laying out the law and the implications of taking alternative routes, without
pressing its views about what SCLC should do.263 LDF lawyers willingly carried
out whatever tasks Dr. King asked of them. Since the lawyers’ roles changed
significantly with the movement’s strategic shifts, LDF’s flexibility proved
valuable.264
LDF also had the geographical flexibility necessary to support the SCLC
campaigns. 265 The organizations’ structures and methods of operation mirrored
each other’s. Each had a base, with LDF in New York and SCLC in Atlanta, and
each pursued its goals in many places, with LDF’s local cooperating lawyers and
SCLC’s affiliate organizations throughout the region.266
Still another significant attraction of LDF was that the non-profit organization
did not charge fees to its clients. LDF relied on its own fund-raising efforts to
sustain its staff and network of cooperating lawyers. 267 That was extremely
important in light of SCLC’s recurring financial challenges.268
ii. NAACP
In response to Fred Gray’s request, NAACP General Counsel Robert Carter
provided legal backup in Montgomery early on.269 He assisted local lawyers both
259

See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 306–08, 362, 463; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 158–59.
See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 154–55.
261
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 374.
262
See id.
263
See id.; id. at 380.
264
See, e.g., discussion infra Section III.B.3.i (discussing example of LDF respecting Dr. King’s
decision to violate a state court injunction in Birmingham in 1963).
265
See Rabin, supra note 75, at 216–17. See generally GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 291–92, 298,
323, 374, 394 (discussing LDF’s network of cooperating lawyers and alliance with SCLC).
266
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 71; GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 17; sources cited supra
note 265.
267
For insights into LDF’s fundraising strategies, see GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 395–403. In
appreciation for the services, Dr. King contributed to LDF, with apologies for the modest size of the
contributions. See Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Thurgood Marshall (Feb. 6, 1958), in 4 THE
PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: SYMBOLS OF THE MOVEMENT, JANUARY 1957–DECEMBER 1958,
at 360, 360 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 2000).
268
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 47, 142.
269
See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 302; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 682. Robert
L. Carter graduated from Howard Law School in 1940 and earned an LL.M. from Columbia Law
School in 1941. Howard Univ. Sch. of Law, Robert L. Carter (1917–2012), BROWN@50, http://www
.brownat50.org/brownbios/biojudgerbtcarter.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). He served in the Army
from 1941 to 1944, where he first experienced harsh racism and became determined to end racial
discrimination. ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE OF
EQUAL RIGHTS 36, 49–50 (2005).
260

535

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2016

in defending Rosa Parks for refusing to give up her seat and in Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s prosecution under the state anti-boycott statute.270 The NAACP also joined in
the challenge to the constitutionality of the state and local bus segregation laws
along with LDF and Fred Gray.271
After Montgomery, the NAACP had much less interaction with Dr. King and
SCLC than LDF. It had a much smaller legal staff than LDF, and it had to direct
substantial resources to defending itself against legal attacks from southern
states.272
iii. American Civil Liberties Union
In addition to its own small staff, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
operated through a network of “cooperating attorneys.”273 In April 1968, the head
of the ACLU’s southern region called on a Memphis law firm to provide pro bono
After leaving the Army, Carter joined LDF in 1944 as Thurgood Marshall’s legal assistant, and then
became an assistant special counsel the following year. Roy Reed, Robert L. Carter, 94, Leading
Strategist Against Segregation and U.S. Judge, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, at A17; Black History
Month Spotlight: Robert L. Carter, NAACP LDF (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release
/black-history-month-spotlight-robert-l-carter [hereinafter Carter Spotlight]; see also KLUGER, supra
note 13, at 271 (referring to Carter as Thurgood Marshall’s “key assistant” and describing him as
“limber, quiet, and strongly self-disciplined”). He played a critical role in the long series of school
desegregation cases, including working as a lead attorney in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636
(1950) (holding the University of Texas’s refusal to admit a Black student to its law school because of
his race unconstitutional, where separate facility provided for Blacks was inferior in several respects),
and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Carter Spotlight, supra; see also
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 166, 180, 422–23. In 1956, Carter became NAACP’s general counsel.
See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 150; see also TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 310. During his tenure as a
civil rights attorney, Carter argued twenty-two cases before the Supreme Court, winning twenty-one of
them. Carter Spotlight, supra.
Carter resigned from the NAACP in 1968. CARTER, supra, at 202. He began a yearlong fellowship at
Columbia University, after which he became a partner at a small New York City law firm. See id. at
204, 207. In 1972, Carter was appointed by President Nixon to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, where he served until retiring in 2009 as a senior judge. Dennis McLellan,
Robert L. Carter, 1917–2012; NAACP Attorney Fought Segregation, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, at AA6;
Carter Spotlight, supra. Carter died in 2012, at age 94. McLellan, supra.
270
See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 302–03.
271
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 71–72; see also Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam), aff’g
142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); discussion infra Section II.B.1. In addition to providing lawyers
and helping with legal costs, the NAACP supported the boycott by raising funds for the MIA. National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://
kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_national_association_for_the
_advancement_of_colored_people_naacp1/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). Dr. King wrote NAACP
Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins in May 1956 to thank him for encouraging these efforts:

[T]he whole Executive Board of the Montgomery Improvement Association is deeply
gratified to know of the support that the National Office consented to give for our
struggle. All of the offers that were made concerning the three legal matters are
satisfactory to us. I assure you that this will go a long, long way in lifting the legal burden
that we confront. Moreover, this deep spirit of cooperation from the NAACP will give us
renewed courage and vigor to carry on.
Letter from M.L. King, Jr., President, Montgomery Improvement Ass’n, to Roy Wilkins, Exec. Sec’y,
NAACP (May 1, 1956), in 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 243, 243–
44.
272
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 237, 261.
273
See Rabin, supra note 75, at 223–24.

536

Vol. 10:3]

Leonard S. Rubinowitz

representation to Dr. King and the local striking sanitation workers in seeking the
court’s permission to carry out a protest march.274
iv. National Lawyers Guild
In 1937, a group of lawyers organized the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) as
an alternative to the politically conservative and racially exclusionary American
Bar Association.275 It had a “general commitment to progressive government and
the use of the law as an instrument for social change.”276 It was the first whiteorganized lawyers’ organization to accept Black members.277
Dr. King recognized the Guild’s important contributions to the Civil Rights
Movement.278 At the same time, there was reason for Dr. King to be wary of having
too close and too public ties to NLG. The federal government viewed the
organization as closely tied to the Communist Party.279 Since opponents of the Civil

274

See BEIFUSS, supra note 65, at 268; Cody, supra note 118, at 703–04; see also W.J. Michael
Cody, Burch, Porter & Johnson (Memphis), Remarks at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and
Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the
March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 679, 683 (2016)
[hereinafter Cody Remarks]; discussion infra Section III.B.3.v.
275
See SMITH, supra note 142, at 550. See generally TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 14–16 (1986); THE NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD: FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (Ann Fagan Ginger & Eugene M. Tobin eds.,
1988); Our History, NAT’L LAW. GUILD, http://www.nlg.org/our-history (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
By the time Martin Luther King, Jr.’s career began, NLG had become the first racially integrated
organization of lawyers to have a Black president. See ROBERT J. BLAKELY WITH MARCUS SHEPARD,
EARL B. DICKERSON: A VOICE FOR FREEDOM AND EQUALITY, at xviii (2006). Earl Dickerson, a Chicago
activist, lawyer, and businessman, led NLG from 1951 to 1954. John T. McQuiston, Earl B. Dickerson
Dies at 95; Lawyer and Rights Advocate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1986, at B12; The Early Years, NAT’L
LAW. GUILD, http://www.nlg.org/early-years (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
276
STEVE BABSON, DAVE RIDDLE & DAVID ELSILA, THE COLOR OF LAW: ERNIE GOODMAN, DETROIT,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LABOR AND CIVIL RIGHTS 80 (2010).
277
See SMITH, supra note 142, at 550. More than a dozen Black lawyers attended NLG’s first annual
meeting. Id. It took the form of a membership organization rather than housing a staff of lawyers like
LDF and the NAACP. See Our History, supra note 275. The organization was structured around local
chapters. See The Early Years, supra note 275. Members participated through committees and projects.
See id. At the first annual meeting, pioneering civil rights lawyer Charles Hamilton Houston was
elected to serve as the New York chapter’s second vice-president, making him “the first black lawyer to
hold office in a nationally affiliated association founded by white lawyers.” SMITH, supra note 142, at
550; see also Houston an Officer of Lawyers’ Guild, 44 CRISIS 48 (1937).
278
See King, supra note 1, at xxv. In 1962, NLG created the “Committee to Assist Southern
Lawyers.” THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 275, at 187–88. It announced the committee’s
formation at a meeting held under the auspices of SCLC, at a Virginia church. Id. at 188. Dr. King was
the main speaker. Id.
Also in 1962, SCLC co-sponsored an NLG “Workshop Seminar for Lawyers on Civil Rights and
Negligence Law.” BABSON, RIDDLE & ELSILA, supra note 276, at 303. This was a major step in NLG’s
southern campaign, attracting nearly sixty Black and white lawyers from every state in the South, and
from the North, as well. Id. Once again, Dr. King spoke at the event. See id.
279
The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) published a report in 1950, entitled
National Lawyers Guild: Legal Bulwark of the Communist Party, that “decimated the ranks of the
[NLG].” Blacklist Resistance: The NLG Fights for Its Life, NAT’L LAW. GUILD http://www.nlg.org
/about/history/blacklist-resistance-nlg-fights-its-life (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
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Rights Movement consistently tried to discredit the movement by painting it as a
tool of the Communist Party, associating with NLG posed risks.280
Nevertheless, a number of the lawyers that Dr. King enlisted were prominent
members of the National Lawyers Guild. Clifford Durr, who worked with Fred
Gray on the bus boycott,281 served as president of the Guild from 1949 to 1950.282
Hubert Delany, who served as co-lead counsel in Dr. King’s 1960 perjury trial, was
elected to NLG’s national board in 1939.283 William Kunstler, who was special
counsel to SCLC at one point, was also a Guild member.284
5. An Inner Circle
While Dr. King headed Atlanta-based SCLC, he formed an informal inner
circle of advisers and confidants based in New York.285 The group granted him
refuge from the institutional challenges and tensions within the SCLC.286 It served
him both personally and in his institutional role as president of SCLC.287
While SCLC’s Board and top staff members were comprised largely of
southern Black ministers,288 Dr. King’s inner circle was racially integrated, with

280

When he became head of LDF, Jack Greenberg continued LDF’s previous policies and practices
by consistently declining to cooperate with NLG. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 376–80. He
declined NLG’s invitation to its workshop on civil rights “in a terse two-line note . . . that conveyed, by
its brevity, the wariness of [LDF] toward [NLG].” BABSON, RIDDLE & ELSILA, supra note 276, at 303.
The perceived taint of communist sympathies loomed large. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 378.
281
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 44.
282
See Sarah Hart Brown, Clifford Durr, ENCYCLOPEDIA ALA. (July 31, 2007), http://www
.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1254. Starting in 1949, Durr served as President of NLG for
eighteen months, forever marking him as a radical, tying him to the communist party, and causing both
personal and professional ostracism. See BROWN, supra note 114, at 24, 82–84.
283
SMITH, supra note 142, at 551; see discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.b. Delany and Earl Dickerson,
who was elected to the board at the same time, were the first Black lawyers who served on the board of
a national white-organized bar organization. SMITH, supra note 142, at 551.
However, when faced with questions from President Johnson’s administration about “subversives,”
Dr. King made it clear that one NLG member had no affiliation with SCLC. See supra note 152.
284
LANGUM, supra note 84, at 64–65.
285
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 5, 38. Clarence Jones says that, in addition to himself, Dr.
King’s inner circle included Bayard Rustin, Stanley Levison, Harry Wachtel, Professor Lawrence
Reddick, Cleveland Robinson, and Reverends Ralph Abernathy, Walter Fauntroy, Thomas Kilgore,
Wyatt Tee Walker, and Andy Young. JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 4–6.
286
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 860; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 38–41, 168.
287
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 50–51, 165–66, 169–73; GARROW, supra note 2, passim;
JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5, 44–45.
288
See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 4–5; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Northerners as well as Southerners,289 and ministers290 and activists,291 as well as
three lawyers. 292 The lawyers included Stanley Levison, a prosperous white
businessman and attorney, Harry Wachtel, a white New York corporate lawyer, and
Clarence Jones, the Black lawyer Dr. King recruited for his perjury defense team.293
289

See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 4–6.
See id. at 5–6. After completing his undergraduate and master’s degrees, Ralph David Abernathy
accepted a call to be the pastor at First Baptist Church in Montgomery in 1951. RALPH DAVID
ABERNATHY, AND THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 93, 97–99 (1989);
Richard Severo, Ralph David Abernathy, Rights Pioneer, is Dead at 64, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1990, at
B7. He and Martin Luther King, Jr. met when Dr. King visited Montgomery’s Dexter Avenue Church
for the first time, and the two became fast friends. See ABERNATHY, supra, at 123–24, 128–29. During
the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Abernathy served Dr. King as a second-in-command. STEPHEN B.
OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 74 (1st HarperPerennial ed.
1994). Later, Abernathy served as vice president of SCLC, and was Dr. King’s chosen heir since “no
one articulate[d his] ideas more thoroughly than Ralph Abernathy.” BRANCH, supra note 59, at 197.
Abernathy worked with Dr. King throughout all of his major movements, going to jail with him
seventeen times and cradling him after he was shot. Severo, supra.
After Dr. King’s death, Abernathy became president of SCLC, having previously been designated
his “automatic successor.” FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 257, 385. He spearheaded the Poor People’s
Campaign. ABERNATHY, supra, at 494, 499. In 1977, Abernathy resigned from his role as president of
SCLC to launch a campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives. See id. at 583–84. After losing that
election, Abernathy returned to his work as a minister. See id. at 585–86. He died in 1990, at the age of
64. Severo, supra.
291
See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 4–6. Bayard Rustin was one of Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s closest advisors, starting with the Montgomery Bus Boycott. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at
24–25, 29–33, 38–42. In 1937, Rustin became a member of a communist organization, which he left in
1941 when he began working as a race relations organizer for an international justice organization. See
DANIEL LEVINE, BAYARD RUSTIN AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 18–20, 25–26, 28–30 (2000). In
1946, he organized and participated in an early version of the Freedom Rides. Id. at 52–56. In 1953,
Rustin was arrested on a “morals charge” for performing a homosexual act and later convicted, which
ultimately cost him his job. See id. at 70–72 (“Within a week, Bayard had resigned or been asked to
resign . . . .”). He then became the executive secretary for a pacifist organization, which was his only
official job for the next twelve years, though he was frequently on loan to the Civil Rights Movement.
See JERVIS ANDERSON, BAYARD RUSTIN: TROUBLES I’VE SEEN: A BIOGRAPHY 172–73, 286–87 (Univ.
of Cal. Press 1998) (1997); LEVINE, supra, at 91, 153–55.
A few days after the Montgomery Bus Boycott began, an anti-segregationist author called Rustin to
encourage him to work with Dr. King and vice versa. See id. at 78. Rustin was forced to leave
Montgomery a few days after he arrived due to concerns about his homosexuality and his communist
ties hurting the movement. See HARVARD SITKOFF, KING: PILGRIMAGE TO THE MOUNTAINTOP 43–44
(2008). However, Dr. King and Rustin had formed an immediate connection, and Rustin became a
trusted advisor, teaching him about Gandhi and nonviolence. Id. at 43. From the time of the boycott
until Dr. King’s death, Rustin worked with Dr. King as a ghostwriter, strategic advisor, and fundraiser,
as well as working to increase publicity and northern support for Dr. King’s movements. See
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 38–40, 51, 170–71; LEVINE, supra, at 84–85, 91; SITKOFF, supra, at 49–
50. Rustin also worked on a team of advisors that helped create the SCLC, calling a group of Black
activists together, and fighting for the all-Black, top-down structure of the organization. Id. at 58–59.
Rustin’s best-known contribution to the Civil Rights Movement was his organization of the 1963
March on Washington, which was attended by 250,000 people. See LEVINE, supra, at 131, 144–46.
Rustin was also helping Dr. King plan the Poor People’s Campaign before Dr. King died. See id. at
202–04.
292
See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5–6. The non-lawyers in the inner circle included
Bayard Rustin, Cleveland Robinson, Professor Lawrence Reddick, and Reverends Thomas Kilgore,
Walter Fauntroy, Wyatt Tee Walker, Ralph Abernathy, and Andrew Young. Id.
293
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 30, 97–98; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5–6; see supra
notes 86–87 and accompanying text. Professor Fairclough describes Wachtel as “a wealthy corporation
lawyer, the general counsel and executive vice-president of the McCrory Corporation, the well-known
chain store.” FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 97. In 1984, Wachtel helped found Gold & Wachtel, a
290
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Like the other members of the inner circle, the lawyers took on roles as strategists,
counselors, writers, fundraisers, and confidants.294
Stanley Levison met Dr. King very early in the minister’s career, in 1956, and
quickly became part of his inner circle. 295 Levison was forty-four, and Martin
Luther King, Jr. was twenty-seven at the time.296 The relationship developed into
Dr. King’s “closest friendship with a white person.” 297 Levison was more of a
confidant and advisor than a traditional lawyer to Dr. King. His contributions
included strategizing about movements, providing political advice, assisting with
drafting SCLC’s founding documents, negotiating book contracts, editing Dr.
King’s writings, fundraising, and even preparing Dr. King’s income tax returns.298
He was also “one of the few people willing to criticize King to his face.”299
Martin Luther King, Jr. kept trying to compensate Levison for his invaluable
assistance, but Levison explained his refusal in terms of the benefits he received
from their relationship:
My skills were acquired not only in a cloistered academic
environment, but also in the commercial jungle. . . . Although our
culture approves, and even honors th[ose] practices, to me they were
always abhorrent. Hence, I looked forward to the time when I could
use these skills not for myself but for socially constructive ends. The
liberation struggle is the most positive and rewarding area of work
anyone could experience.300
Some years before meeting Dr. King, Levison had been directly tied to the
Communist Party.301 The Kennedy administration was aware of Levison’s prior
activities.302 In 1963, President Kennedy personally urged Dr. King to cut ties with
Levison to avoid tainting the Civil Rights Movement and undermining the
administration’s ability to get civil rights legislation through Congress. 303
midsize Manhattan law firm specializing in litigation and corporate work. Wolfgang Saxon, Harry H.
Wachtel, 79, Confidant and Legal Counsel to Dr. King, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at B10; see also
BRANCH, supra note 59, at 28 (calling Wachtel “a Wall Street law partner”).
294
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 172–73; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5, 25–27, 68–
71, 78; JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 6–7, 25; Saxon, supra note 293.
295
See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5. Civil rights activists Ella Baker and Bayard Rustin
introduced them. Garrow, supra note 88, at 80, 85.
296
Garrow, supra note 88, at 85.
297
Id. Professor Garrow suggests that the FBI wiretap on Levison’s phone “attest[s] to what a
valuable, insightful, and influential friend Stanley Levison remained to King right up to King’s death.”
Id. at 86. Clarence Jones, a fellow member of Dr. King’s inner circle, said “Stanley Levison is someone
who deserves a statue for his devotion to Martin and [his] work for the civil rights movement.” JONES &
ENGEL, supra note 86, at 7.
298
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 30–32, 38–48, 66, 97–98, 172, 199–200, 287, 361, 369;
GARROW, supra note 2, at 102, 116. Commenting on Levison’s level of commitment, Clarence Jones
said, “[I]t’s safe to say that if Stanley had ever been convinced that complete civil rights for Negroes
could have been accomplished somehow by his own impoverishment and death, Stanley would’ve
considered it a bargain.” JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 6–7.
299
GARROW, supra note 2, at 105.
300
Id. at 117.
301
See id. at 194–95.
302
See id.
303
Id. at 272–73; see JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 179, 184–86.
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Levison’s loyalty to Martin Luther King, Jr. and to the movement led Levison to
readily agree to cut off their relationship.304 With great reluctance, Dr. King ceased
direct contact with Levison. 305 However, he continued their extensive
communication by using Clarence Jones as an intermediary, and then resumed
direct contact eighteen months later. 306 Dr. King’s willingness to take the risks
involved in continuing that relationship attests to its importance to him.
As discussed earlier, Dr. King recruited Clarence Jones to join his defense
team for the 1960 perjury trial. That beginning soon led to a very close professional
and personal relationship. Jones went from reluctant participant to a self-described
“disciple” of Martin Luther King, Jr. 307 After his “conversion,” Jones became
devoted to Dr. King.308 He served as lawyer, advisor, confidant, and speechwriter,
with intense and continuous involvement until Dr. King’s death in 1968.309 Jones’s
contributions also included helping write the “I Have a Dream” speech and assisting
with critical fund-raising for bail and for SCLC generally.310
While Harry Wachtel’s relationship with Martin Luther King, Jr. was not as
long or as close as those of Stanley Levison or Clarence Jones, it also developed
quickly into a personal one.311 Wachtel met Dr. King at a New York fundraiser and
304

JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 40–41. Levison did not participate in the March on
Washington, to avoid the risk of being seen with anyone connected with Dr. King, but he agreed to be
available by phone from New York if his input was needed. See id. at 42.
305
See id. at 41. When members of the Kennedy administration began informing Dr. King about their
concerns with Levison, he listened, thanked them for their concern, and said “he was not one to
question” Levison’s motives. GARROW, supra note 2, at 195. He only unwillingly ceased direct contact
over a year later, at Levison’s encouragement. See id. at 275.
306
BRANCH, supra note 59, at 27; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 275; JONES & CONNELLY, supra
note 53, at 40 & 195 n.15. In March 1965, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover hand-delivered a “classified”
letter to President Johnson in the White House, reporting that Dr. King was resuming contact with
Levison a year and a half after breaking off all communication under heavy pressure from President
Kennedy. BRANCH, supra note 59, at 27.
307
See supra note 87.
308
JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 44, 121.
309
See id. at 44–45, 54–55, 57–59; JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, passim.
310
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 462, 480, 535–36; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at xvi;
JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 181. Jones even made his New York City home available as a refuge
for Dr. King in the lead-up to the 1963 March on Washington. JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at
12.
While Clarence Jones had great success in both law and business long after Dr. King’s death, he
remained loyal to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s memory even a half century later. He was the first Black
partner in a Wall Street investment banking firm, founded many successful business ventures, and has
“provided strategic legal and financial consulting services to several governments around the world.”
Clarence B. Jones, AM. PROGRAM BUREAU, http://www.apbspeakers.com/speaker/clarence-b-jones (last
visited Sept. 22, 2015). He also taught courses at Stanford University, where he went on to become a
scholar writer in residence at the Martin Luther King Research and Education Institute, along with
becoming a diversity scholar and visiting professor at the University of San Francisco. See id. He has
also co-authored two books related to Dr. King. Id.; see JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53; JONES &
ENGEL, supra note 86.
311
See Saxon, supra note 293. Harry Wachtel graduated from Columbia Law School in 1940, and
began working at a law firm in New York City. See Wachtel, Harry H. (1917–1997), KING INST.
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_watchel_harry_h
_1917_1997/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Wachtel]. Aside from serving in the military
during World War II, he remained in private practice in New York his entire life. Id. After meeting Dr.
King, he immediately began working to create the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, to further
fundraising efforts for Dr. King’s movements. Id.; see also discussion infra Section II.A.3. Wachtel
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volunteered his help.312 Like Levison, he assisted in a variety of ways, including
fundraising, arranging meetings for Dr. King with important public officials, and
advising him on a range of issues.313 He also refused any compensation for his
work.314
Membership in the inner circle depended in part on the willingness and ability
to carry out a variety of tasks effectively. Loyalty to Dr. King and trustworthiness
also seemed to be critical. The relationships were deeply personal as well as
professional, so these lawyer-advisors played a crucial role in supporting Dr. King
and his work. They also all worked closely with Dr. King for a significant period
of time, covering both the early and later years of Dr. King’s career.
II. DEPLOYING THE LAWYERS: THE EARLY YEARS (1955–1962)
In the early years of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s career, the activists often
engaged in “persuasive nonviolence,” which was designed to raise consciousness
and change the minds of white officials and the white community through their
protests. 315 The lawyers played two distinct roles. First, most of their
responsibilities were new ones that grew out of the movement’s central focus on
nonviolent direct action. 316 As activists engaged in boycotts, marches,
demonstrations, and other forms of protest, the lawyers’ assignments primarily
involved supporting, facilitating, and protecting those strategies and tactics.
Second, the lawyers also continued to play the more traditional role of civil
rights lawyers—challenging the constitutionality of racially discriminatory laws in
federal court. When clients found that nonviolent direct action alone was not
quickly became a member of Dr. King’s inner circle, and remained a close advisor until Dr. King’s
death. Wachtel, supra. He also served on the defense team for New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and he
traveled with Dr. King to Norway when he won the Nobel Prize. Id.
After Dr. King’s death, Wachtel remained involved with Dr. King’s legacy. He became the personal
lawyer for Coretta Scott King, was vice president and counsel for the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for
Nonviolent Social Change from 1969 to 1982, and served as a SCLC trustee. Saxon, supra note 293.
312
Saxon, supra note 293.
313
See id.
314
Id.
315
See KING, supra note 7, at 192–94. See generally MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 157–58 (describing
how Dr. King’s “civil disobedience . . . added a new, but also synergistic, dimension” to Blacks’
historic struggle for equal rights). Dr. King explained that while the law intends to regulate behavior,
nonviolence fills the gap in actually achieving that aim:

In the end, for laws to be obeyed, men must believe they are right.
Here nonviolence comes in as the ultimate form of persuasion. It is the method
which seeks to implement the just law by appealing to the conscience of the great decent
majority who through blindness, fear, pride, or irrationality have allowed their
consciences to sleep.
....
. . . [P]araphrasing the words of Gandhi: “We will match your capacity to inflict
suffering with our capacity to endure suffering. We will meet your physical force with
soul force. We will not hate you, but we cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust
laws. Do to us what you will and we will still love you. . . . But we will soon wear you
down by our capacity to suffer. And in winning our freedom we will so appeal to your
heart and conscience that we will win you in the process.”
KING, supra note 7, at 192–94.
316
See discussion infra Section II.A.
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enough to achieve their goals, they sent their lawyers to court to proceed with
“complementary desegregation litigation.” 317 The goal was to add leverage for
change by combining direct action and traditional civil rights litigation.
This Part examines both “support efforts” and “complementary desegregation
litigation” by the lawyers in the early years. Since the initial activism in each
movement involved nonviolent direct action, the discussion focuses on the lawyers’
support efforts first. In addition to movements they initiated, Dr. King and the
protesters encountered criminal prosecutions and civil suits requiring legal
assistance during that period.
The discussion of “complementary desegregation litigation” begins with a
brief history of civil rights litigation and a discussion of Dr. King’s views about the
courts’ role. It then turns to the Montgomery and the Albany (Georgia) movements,
the two major movements of the early period where the leaders had their lawyers
initiate “complementary desegregation litigation.”
A. Support for Nonviolent Direct Action
From Rosa Parks’ arrest on, lawyers were ever present throughout Martin
Luther King, Jr.’s career. They provided some sort of support in virtually every
movement and major event in which Dr. King was involved. By providing
extensive, critical assistance to facilitate the activists’ nonviolent direct action, they
contributed significantly to whatever measure of success the movements achieved.
The lawyers’ main job was to make it possible for the activists to carry out their
boycotts, marches, demonstrations, and other protest tactics. 318 That entailed:
(1) defending Dr. King, his organizations, and the protesters in both criminal and
civil litigation; 319 (2) seeking necessary permissions, challenging court-ordered
injunctions preventing or limiting protest activities, and requesting their own
injunctions against public officials and private actors impeding protests; 320 and
(3) securing funding for these purposes.321
From the outset, local and state officials turned to the legal system to resist
movements for change. They used criminal prosecutions and civil suits in an effort
to undermine the movements and nullify the activists’ initiatives. 322 They also
sought injunctions to block the protest activities at the core of nonviolent direct
action.323 These two dominant responses repeatedly forced the activists and their
lawyers into a reactive posture.324 The lawyers defended Dr. King, his colleagues,
and the protesters on numerous occasions, and they fought and appealed opponents’
efforts to enjoin their nonviolent tactics.

317

See discussion infra Section II.B.
See supra note 230.
319
See infra Section II.A.1.
320
See infra Section II.A.2.
321
See infra Section II.A.3.
322
See discussion infra Section II.A.1.
323
See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
324
See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 234.
318
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1. Defending Dr. King, His Organizations, and the Protesters
Public officials used both criminal prosecutions and civil suits as key parts of
their strategic arsenal to resist change and maintain the status quo. 325 In turn,
movement lawyers played important roles in defending the activists and enabling
them to pursue their nonviolent direct action.326
The lawyers had significant successes, but also some losses. Two of the most
critical cases civil rights lawyers won during this time were the 1960 prosecution
of Dr. King for perjury in Alabama,327 and a libel case that could have crippled the
movement. 328 While the lawyers sometimes lost their cases, even a conviction
could have benefits by building support and solidarity in a movement.329
i. Criminal Defense
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s description of himself as a “frequenter of jails”330
suggests that the southern criminal justice system caught him—and his fellow
protesters—in its web repeatedly. The idea of using the criminal justice system to
defeat local civil rights campaigns surfaced early on. Local officials in Montgomery
believed that successful prosecutions would have a powerful chilling effect on civil
rights activism.331
The deployment of civil rights lawyers began on December 1, 1955, when
Rosa Parks enlisted Fred Gray as her defense counsel after she was arrested for
refusing to give up her bus seat.332 In a matter of days, Gray went from being a
young lawyer struggling to build a solo practice to Rosa Parks’ defense counsel and
attorney for the newly formed Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA).333
Gray lost that first case. 334 Prosecutors initially charged Rosa Parks with
violating the city’s bus segregation ordinance, but when this proved problematic,

325

See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1028–47 (discussing public officials’ efforts to break the
Montgomery Bus Boycott); see also discussion infra Sections II.A.1.i, II.A.1.ii.
326
With respect to arrests and jailing of King, other leaders, and protesters, the lawyers once again
responded to the decisions of the activists. Sometimes that meant providing defense or assisting with
bail. See, e.g., HARRY BELAFONTE WITH MICHAEL SHNAYERSON, MY SONG: A MEMOIR 254–65 (2011)
(describing lawyer Clarence Jones’s involvement in raising bail money for the Birmingham
movement); see also discussion infra Section II.A.1.i. On other occasions, the movement used mass
arrests to build public support, and adopted a “jail, no bail” stance. See BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON,
supra, at 258–64. See generally Martin Luther King, Jr., “A Creative Protest,” Address to Student
Protesters at White Rock Baptist Church (Feb. 16, 1960) (“Let us not fear going to jail. If the officials
threaten to arrest us for standing up for our rights, we must answer by saying that we are willing and
prepared to fill up the jails of the South. Maybe it will take this willingness to stay in jail to arouse the
dozing conscience of our nation.”), in 5 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: THRESHOLD OF A
NEW DECADE, JANUARY 1959-DECEMBER 1960, at 367, 369 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 2005).
327
See infra Section II.A.1.i.b.
328
See infra Section II.A.1.ii.
329
See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.a.
330
King, supra note 1, at xxi.
331
See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 678–80.
332
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 32–33; JEANNE THEOHARIS, THE REBELLIOUS LIFE OF MRS. ROSA
PARKS 60–66, 75–77 (2013).
333
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 49–53.
334
See infra notes 337–338 and accompanying text.
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she was charged with violating the state bus segregation law.335 Her defense was
that her conduct on the bus constituted a protest against the segregation
ordinance.336 The local judge rejected Gray’s argument that the law under which
officials prosecuted her was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. 337
Parks was found guilty of violating a Montgomery ordinance making it unlawful to
commit any state-law misdemeanor in the city, and Gray lost the right to appeal the
constitutional issue on procedural grounds.338
a. Montgomery Boycott Prosecution (1956)
After the bus boycott was well underway, Montgomery officials resorted to a
seldom-used 1921 Alabama anti-boycott statute in an attempt to derail it.339 They
secured indictments against Martin Luther King, Jr. and eighty-nine other boycott
leaders for conspiring to hinder a business “without a just cause or legal excuse.”340
In announcing Dr. King’s indictment, the grand jury said: “We are committed to
segregation by custom and by law, [and] we intend to maintain it.”341 Consequently,

335
GARROW, supra note 2, at 21; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 62. Montgomery’s bus segregation
ordinance provided that “it shall be unlawful for any passenger to refuse or fail to take a seat among
those assigned to the race to which he belongs, at the request of any such employee in charge, if there is
such a seat vacant.” MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE ch. 6, § 11 (1952); see also Browder v. Gayle, 142 F.
Supp. 707, 711 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1956). As Fred Gray explains, “The problem for the city was that the
evidence indicated that all the seats were occupied, so there was no vacant seat to which Mrs. Parks
could have moved.” GRAY, supra note 7, at 56 n.5. Prosecutor D. Eugene Loe got around this problem
by amending the charging documents to allege that Parks had violated the state segregation statute. Id.
That statute compelled bus companies to segregate bus seating, terminals, ticket windows, and other
facilities. THORNTON, supra note 27, at 44. With this amendment, Prosecutor Loe was able to proceed
under a city ordinance that made a violation of the state bus segregation statute also a municipal
offense. GRAY, supra note 7, at 56 n.5 (citing MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE ch. 1, § 8 (1952)). As Gray
points out, the amended complaint was also problematic because the state statute did not apply to
municipal bus lines. Id. at 57 n.5.
336
Jonathan L. Entin, Assoc. Dean for Acad. Affairs, David L. Brennan Professor of Law &
Professor of Political Sci., Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the Northwestern Law
Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From
Montgomery to the March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y
640, 649 (2016).
337
See Transcript of Record at 5–7, Parks v. City of Montgomery, 92 So. 2d 683 (Ala. Ct. App.
1957) (No. 3 Div. 5); GRAY, supra note 7, at 56; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 674.
Fred Gray states that the constitutional issues he raised were denied summarily: “I knew that this was
not the forum to challenge the segregation ordinances because of complications in how the city’s
ordinances related to state statutes and the way [Parks] was originally charged.” GRAY, supra note 7, at
56.
338
GRAY, supra note 7, at 56 & n.5.
339
The Alabama statute read, in relevant part:

Two or more persons who, without a just cause or legal excuse for so doing, enter into
any combination, conspiracy, agreement, arrangement, or understanding for the purpose
of hindering, delaying, or preventing any other persons, firms, corporation, or association
of persons from carrying on any lawful business shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 54 (1940) (current version at ALA. CODE § 13A-11-122 (2015)). For a detailed
discussion of this prosecution, see GRAY, supra note 7, at 84–89, and Kennedy, supra note 112, at
1029–43.
340
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1029.
341
GARROW, supra note 2, at 64.
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actions like the bus boycott, which was based on opposition to segregation, could
not be based on a “just cause.”
Prosecutors proceeded to trial only with Dr. King.342 The State’s theory was
that King controlled the MIA, which had been formed for the exclusive purpose of
sustaining the boycott—thus hindering the business of the bus company.343 The
prosecutors also tried to show that Blacks had stopped riding the buses mostly
because of physical intimidation and violence, which—in their view—was
sanctioned by Dr. King and the MIA.344
Alabama’s leading Black lawyers—Fred Gray, Charles Langford, Arthur
Shores, Peter Hall, and Orzell Billingsley—represented Dr. King. 345 NAACP
General Counsel Robert Carter, from New York, assisted, but Judge Eugene W.
Carter would not permit him to examine witnesses.346 Because both sides consented
to a bench trial, segregationist Judge Carter acted as the fact finder while presiding
over the four-day trial.347 As expected, he found Dr. King guilty, even though the
prosecution had presented no evidence linking either Dr. King or the MIA to the
alleged intimidation and violence. 348 Nevertheless, Dr. King’s Black lawyers
offered a strong defense, demonstrating their superior skills and talent inside the
courtroom.349 In the process, they even secured a modicum of respect from white
segregationists.350
342

Thornton, supra note 112, at 227.
See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031.
344
Id. at 1031–32.
345
GRAY, supra note 7, at 88; cf. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1030 (omitting Charles Langford).
346
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031. Judge Carter said he limited Robert Carter’s participation
because (i) the case involved only a misdemeanor, (ii) Carter was not admitted to the Alabama Bar, and
(iii) Dr. King had adequate representation by local counsel. Id.
347
Id. at 1029. On his own motion, Judge Carter asked the grand jury to consider a possible violation
of Alabama’s antiboycott statute. Id. at 1029–30; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 63 (“Montgomery
newspapers reported that [Judge Carter] had instructed solicitor William Thetford and the current grand
jury to consider whether the MIA’s protest was a violation of Alabama’s antiboycott statute.”).
348
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031–32, 1034; Thornton, supra note 112, at 227.
349
See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1034. As Professor Kennedy notes:
343

[King’s lawyers] raised a variety of constitutional objections to his prosecution, the most
persuasive of which included the following: (1) the anti-boycotting statute deprived King
of due process of law by failing to apprise him precisely of the wrong he was charged
with committing; (2) because King was "selectively" prosecuted, the application of the
law denied him due process and equal protection; and (3) the statute on its face and as
applied abridged rights protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 1036 (footnotes omitted). Dr. King’s lawyers stood their best chance of prevailing on these claims
in a federal forum, but the case never made it there. See id. at 1043. While the lawyers gave notice of
appeal at the time judgment was entered, they missed a filing deadline to perfect the appeal, and on this
technicality the Court of Appeals of Alabama granted the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal. See
King v. State, 98 So. 2d 443, 444 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957); see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 89. This in turn
closed off the route to a federal forum by way of appealing the case through the Alabama state courts
and then petitioning for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
350
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1034 (describing how Mayor Gayle answered “No, sir” to a question
posed by a Black attorney, after which “[s]ilent applause erupted from the blacks in the courtroom”).
See generally Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers as
Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161, 180 (1994) (reviewing SMITH, supra note 142) (“[B]lack
lawyers undermined the pervasive psychology of racism. . . . Even in defeat, a black lawyer could
demonstrate the competence of African-Americans to white judges, lawyers, jurors, and spectators who
otherwise might have resisted notions of racial equality. The mere presence of black lawyers—
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After delivering his verdict, Judge Carter announced that he would fine Dr.
King $500 and assess an additional $500 for court costs.351 The judge knew of Dr.
King’s deep commitment to nonviolence, and he gave this as his reason for not
imposing a prison sentence.352
As suggested earlier, even though prosecutors had secured a conviction
against Dr. King, they did not go to trial with any of the other people indicted.353
The authorities realized that their prosecution of Dr. King had backfired, because
the legal attack on Dr. King further solidified the Black community’s commitment
to the boycott.354 Also, the mass indictments put Dr. King and the entire movement
on the national stage, drawing attention from the New York Times, the New York
Herald Tribune, and television networks such as ABC. 355 The media coverage
resulted in both greater external support and internal solidarity,356 which would be
critical in facing the battles ahead.

especially in the South—chipped away at segregation.” (footnote omitted)). At the same time, there
were problematic aspects of defense counsel’s performance, including inadequate witness preparation
and elicitation of testimony that was ostensibly dubious, including Dr. King’s—which was evasive, at
best. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1034–36; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 184.
351
GARROW, supra note 2, at 74; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 184; GRAY, supra note 7, at 89.
352
Thornton, supra note 112, at 227. When Dr. King refused to pay the fine, however, Judge Carter
sentenced him to “386 days of [hard] labor in the Montgomery County Jail.” 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 16; see also Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1034 n.217. The
sentence was ultimately suspended after King’s lawyers gave notice of appeal to the Alabama Court of
Appeals, and King was then released on bond. GARROW, supra note 2, at 74; 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 16.
353
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 202. But see GRAY, supra note 7, at 88 (stating that the prosecutors
and the court agreed early on that Dr. King’s case would be the only case tried, and that “[t]he other
cases would be resolved depending on the outcome of his case”). The other cases were dismissed as
charges were simultaneously dropped against multiple whites accused of bombing a Black taxi stand
and the homes of numerous MIA leaders. BRANCH, supra note 32, at 199–202. But Fred Gray suggests
that the charges against the other eighty-nine defendants were dropped because “the defense mounted
on King’s behalf [showed authorities] it would simply be too expensive to proceed against the others.”
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1043 n.266.
354
See RICHARD LENTZ, SYMBOLS, THE NEWS MAGAZINES, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING 27 (1990);
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1029. When the indictments were announced, many of those indicted
proudly turned themselves in to the sheriff. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1029 & n.187. Being on the
list of indicted protesters became a “badge of honor.” Id. at 1029; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 85–
86 (explaining how some people involved in the boycott became disappointed when they were not
arrested). Moreover, the prosecution may have made martyrs of the movement’s leaders. Kennedy,
supra note 112, at 1029 n.186. The prosecution also gave the boycott a national and international media
prominence that it had previously lacked. Id. at 1029; see also 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR., supra note 137, at 15.
The city also embarked on a so-called “get tough” policy designed to deplete the movement’s
resources and wear down its will. Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 678; Kennedy, supra
note 112, at 1026; see also THORNTON, supra note 27, at 73–77. Police systematically harassed car pool
drivers, writing them tickets for minor or non-existent violations. BRANCH, supra note 32, at 159; see
also GARROW, supra note 2, at 55; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1028; Get Tough Policy, NEWSL. FROM
M.I.A. (Montgomery Improvement Ass’n, Montgomery, Ala.), June 7, 1956, at 2, 3, http://
kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/primarydocuments/560607_001.pdf.
355
GARROW, supra note 2, at 66; see also LENTZ, supra note 354, at 27 (noting coverage from
Newsweek magazine).
356
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 66–67; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1029.
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b. Dr. King’s Alabama Perjury Trial (1960)
The worst Alabama prosecution was yet to come. The state’s effort to
criminalize Martin Luther King, Jr. and remove him from his leadership position
reached its apex in 1960, when segregationist Governor John Patterson directed the
local prosecutor to seek indictments against Dr. King for perjury based on his state
income taxes.357 Charging perjury rather than tax evasion served to ratchet up the
crime (and the possible punishment) from a misdemeanor to a felony.358 Dr. King’s
indictment was the first of its kind ever brought in Alabama, which suggests that
the state sought to deprive the movement of Dr. King’s leadership for as long as
possible.359
The perjury prosecution represented a potential turning point in Dr. King’s
career and the Civil Rights Movement with which he was associated.360 The stakes
were high. If convicted, Dr. King would have faced a prison sentence of two to five
years for each of two crimes 361 —an eternity in a movement like this. With a
segregationist judge presiding, only white witnesses for the State, and an all-white
jury in a segregated courtroom, the odds were stacked against Dr. King. 362
Moreover, the public accusations challenging his honesty and integrity forced him
to endure the most humiliating encounter thus far in his career.363 As Dr. King later
recollected: “Passions were inflamed. Feelings ran high. The press and other
communications media were hostile. Defeat seemed certain[,] and we in the
freedom struggle braced ourselves for the inevitable.”364
Between February and March 1960, a “Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South” assembled a highly accomplished
legal team of more than half a dozen Black lawyers. 365 Some came from the
North—William Ming and Chauncey Eskridge from Chicago, former Judge Hubert
Delany from New York, and Clarence Jones, from Los Angeles. 366 Ming and
Delany served as co-lead counsel based on their extensive experience in important
357

See Dyer, supra note 38, at 247; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 146 (stating his belief that the
charges were “part of the plan of Governor John Patterson, or someone in his administration, to harass
and intimidate African Americans in general, and King in particular, for political reasons”); THORNTON,
supra note 27, at 117, 615 n.147.
358
Dyer, supra note 38, at 248.
359
See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1991).
360
King, supra note 1, at xxiii–xxiv.
361
The statute provided for a punishment of between two and five years’ imprisonment in the state
penitentiary. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 382 (1940). See generally MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at
141 (“The white Southern power structure . . . indicted me for perjury and openly proclaimed that I
would be imprisoned for at least ten years.”).
362
See King, supra note 1, at xxiv.
363
GARROW, supra note 2, at 130. A conviction would have cast a huge cloud over Dr. King. Entin,
supra note 336, at 655. Even if he had been able to get a conviction overturned on appeal, “the
argument would be [that] he got off on [a] technicality . . . .” Id.
364
King, supra note 1, at xxiv.
365
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 149 (naming Hubert Delany, William Ming, Arthur Shores, Solomon
Seay Jr., and himself as the lawyers selected to represent Dr. King, and stating that Ming added
Chauncey Eskridge as a tax expert); JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 6–7, 10–16 (naming Clarence
Jones as part of Dr. King’s perjury defense team); Dyer, supra note 38, at 251.
366
Dyer, supra note 38, at 251; see also discussion supra Section I.B. Ming added Chauncey
Eskridge, a young tax expert from his office. GRAY, supra note 7, at 149.
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litigation.367 Alabamians rounded out the team, including Fred Gray, Solomon Seay
Jr., and Arthur Shores.368
Dr. King’s counsel effectively undercut the State’s case both through crossexamination of the State’s witnesses and through careful presentation of the facts
through their own witnesses. For example, William Ming’s cross-examination of
the State’s auditor helped expose the trumped-up nature of the charges. The auditor
acknowledged that after a detailed review of Dr. King’s tax documents for the years
in question (1956 and 1958), he informed Dr. King he had found no evidence of
fraud in his tax returns.369
Dr. King’s lawyers also brought out strong supportive testimony from their
own witnesses.370 In the end, the jury took less than four hours to return a verdict
of acquittal.371 In his statement to the press outside the Montgomery courtroom, Dr.
King said, “I certainly want to commend all of the lawyers, this brilliant array of
lawyers who represented me in this case. And I’m sure that their brilliant and
profound arguments and that factual evidence played a great part in the ultimate
decision, which was one of not guilty.”372
Dr. King later paid homage to his defense team again, singling out the co-lead
counsel for special praise:
There were two men among us who persevered with the
conviction that it was possible, in this context, to marshal facts and
law and thus win vindication. These men were our lawyers, Negro
lawyers—Negro lawyers from the North: William Ming of Chicago
and Hubert Delaney from New York.
They brought to the courtroom wisdom, courage, and a highly
developed art of advocacy; but most important, they brought the
367

See GRAY, supra note 7, at 149–50 (calling Ming “an excellent trial lawyer with substantial
experience in tax law,” and referring to Delaney as both “an expert in research and appellate law” and a
“masterful jurist”); MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 141; Dyer, supra note 38, at 252; see also
supra note 151 and accompanying text.
368
See discussion supra Sections I.A, I.B.1.i; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 148–49. The
committee selected the members of the team from nominations and offers of assistance they received.
Dyer, supra note 38, at 251. Dr. King added Clarence Jones to the team. See supra notes 86–87 and
accompanying text.
369
Dyer, supra note 38, at 255.
370
The defense called R.D. Nesbitt Sr., who served as a deacon and clerk at Dexter Avenue Baptist
Church when Dr. King was pastor there. GRAY, supra note 7, at 153. Nesbitt testified to many of the
transactions between Dr. King and the church, and pointed out that Dr. King had refused an increase in
pay. Id. As their final witness, the defense called Black bank president Jesse B. Blayton Sr. Dyer, supra
note 38, at 256. Blayton was also certified public accountant. Id. He had audited Dr. King’s financials
after Dr. King was indicted and was able to account for every cent of his tax returns. Id. Fred Gray
described Blayton as “a real wizard”: “I don’t think any of those white jurors had ever listened to a
person, African American or white, who knew as much about facts and figures and accounting as Mr.
Blanton [sic]. He completely mesmerized the jurors.” GRAY, supra note 7, at 153.
371
See Dyer, supra note 38, at 258. According to Gray, the entire team was “joyfully surprised . . . .
No one would have predicted that an all-white jury in Montgomery, Alabama, the Cradle of the
Confederacy, in May 1960, . . . would exonerate Martin Luther King Jr. But it really happened.” GRAY,
supra note 7, at 154.
372
Martin Luther King, Jr., Statement on Perjury Acquittal (May 28, 1960), in 5 THE PAPERS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 326, at 462, 462.
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lawyers’ indomitable determination to win. After a trial of three
days, by the sheer strength of their legal arsenal, they overcame the
most vicious Southern taboos festering in a virulent and inflamed
atmosphere and they persuaded an all-white jury to accept the word
of a Negro over that of white men.373
c. Dr. King’s Incarceration in Georgia (1960)
Later in 1960, Dr. King faced still another state court prosecution. This time
it was in the Georgia courts, in an episode steeped in racial undertones from start
to finish. Once again, the stakes were high. Rather than humiliation and the risk of
a lengthy prison sentence, this time there was a very serious threat to Dr. King’s
personal safety from racist prison guards and white prisoners in a maximumsecurity prison.374
Earlier that year, Dr. King had resigned his Montgomery ministry and returned
home to Atlanta to serve as associate pastor at his father’s large and prominent
Ebenezer Baptist Church.375 After moving back to Georgia, Dr. King neglected to
get a Georgia driver’s license within the ninety-day period allowed by law.376
In May 1960, local police in DeKalb County stopped Dr. King and cited him
for driving without a valid driver’s license.377 At the time he was stopped, Dr. King
was driving Lillian Smith, the white southern author of the anti-racist novel Strange
Fruit, from his house in Atlanta back to Emory University Hospital in neighboring
DeKalb County.378 The police stopped him because he was a Black man driving
with a white woman sitting in the front seat with him. 379 For the minor traffic
violation, Judge Oscar Mitchell of the DeKalb Civil and Criminal Court fined Dr.
King $25 and sentenced him to twelve months of labor in the public works camp.380
Judge Mitchell suspended that sentence, however, and placed Dr. King on
probation for a year.381
373

King, supra note 1, at xxiv.
See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 116–17; GARROW, supra note 2, at 146; LEWIS, supra note 47, at
126–27.
375
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 266–67.
376
GARROW, supra note 2, at 135–36.
377
Id.; see also DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 166. Dr. King was also cited for having
expired license plates on the borrowed car he was driving. GARROW, supra note 2, at 135, 143.
378
GARROW, supra note 2, at 135; GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 301; LEWIS, supra note 47, at 121;
see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 356–57; Judge Horace Ward, N. Dist. of Ga., Remarks at the
Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s
Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L.
& SOC. POL’Y 657, 664 (2016). Lillian Smith was receiving cancer treatments from Emory University
Hospital. BRANCH, supra note 32, at 356.
379
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 356–57; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 135; Ward, supra note
378, at 664. It was a customary practice for police to conduct traffic stops when they spotted
“interracial groups of travelers.” BRANCH, supra note 32, at 356–57.
380
See King v. State, 119 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961); see also DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra
note 141, at 166.
381
GARROW, supra note 2, at 143; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 357. According to Professor
Garrow, Dr. King heard Judge Mitchell impose the $25 fine but did not see the paperwork detailing the
terms of his probation, which required that King “not violate any Federal or State penal statutes or
municipal ordinances.” GARROW, supra note 2, at 143; see also King, 119 S.E.2d at 79 (quoting this
language in Judge Mitchell’s sentence).
374
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Shortly thereafter, young local activists urged Dr. King to join them in a sitin, seeking luncheon service at one of Atlanta’s major department stores.382 They
were protesting the Jim Crow practices at the restaurants in those stores.383 Though
initially hesitant, Dr. King eventually submitted to the student protest leaders’
renewed requests and agreed to join the sit-in.384 Dr. King was promptly arrested
for trespass, along with more than fifty other demonstrators.385 When Dr. King
refused bail, he spent the night in jail for the first time in his life.386
Based on this arrest, Judge Mitchell revoked Dr. King’s probation and
sentenced him to four months of hard labor for the original traffic violation.387 What
made matters even worse is that officials took Dr. King from the county jail in the
middle of the night, “put him in leg irons and handcuffs, . . . laid him on the floor
in the back of a paddy wagon with nobody back there but a German Shepherd,” and
drove 300 miles over bad country roads to a state maximum-security prison.388 Dr.
King described it as the worst night of his life.389 Once imprisoned at that facility,
Dr. King was at the mercy of white racist prison guards and inmates convicted of
very serious crimes.
Dr. King had already enlisted Atlanta civil rights lawyer Donald Hollowell
and his associate Horace Ward as defense counsel to appeal his sentence and secure

382

GARROW, supra note 2, at 143.
DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 166.
384
GARROW, supra note 2, at 143.
385
See DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 166.
386
Id. at 166–67; see also DANIELS, supra note 41, at 110–11; GARROW, supra note 2, at 143–44.
387
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 115. The sentence for the original traffic violation included twelve
months in the public works camp, which Judge Oscar Mitchell immediately suspended, placing Dr.
King on probation for one year. See supra note 381 and accompanying text. After Dr. King’s arrest in
Atlanta, Judge Mitchell ordered him to show cause why he should not serve the twelve-month sentence
for violating the terms of his probation. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 115.
388
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 116–17; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 146.
389
See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 117.
383
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his release.390 During the appeal, Dr. King’s lawyers secured his release from the
maximum-security prison on bond.391 He had spent eight days incarcerated.392
On appeal, Hollowell argued that the original sentence of twelve months
exceeded the statutory maximum of six months for the traffic offense and was
therefore invalid.393 If Hollowell’s arguments were correct, the sentence originally
entered by Judge Mitchell was illegal, meaning Dr. King was not under any
probationary sentence that could be revoked.394

390

See id. at 115. After the student arrests in Atlanta, Thurgood Marshall of the LDF promised to pay
the legal expenses and “appeal every fine.” Id. at 108. Marshall eventually hired Donald Hollowell and
his partners, promising “unlimited financial support.” Id.
Horace T. Ward joined Hollowell’s law office as an associate in 1960 and became partner in 1962.
DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 165. Hollowell and Ward knew each other from when
Hollowell represented Ward in his case challenging the University of Georgia School of Law’s
rejection of his application for admission. See id. at 30–35, 40, 77. Ward lost his case and ultimately
graduated from Northwestern University School of law in 1959. Id. at 111, 118. He began to work with
Hollowell shortly thereafter. See id. at 118.
On his own initiative, Martin Luther King Sr. enlisted Morris Abram, a prominent white Atlanta
attorney, to work on Dr. King’s defense, as well. His father believed that a white lawyer might have an
advantage in operating within “the virtually all-white criminal justice system.” DANIELS, supra note 41,
at 116; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 353, 362. In fact, Hollowell did endure blatant racism as a
Black lawyer in Georgia in the 1960s: “The trial judge listened very attentively to the lawyers who
represented the state of Georgia. When Donald Hollowell got up to speak, to argue . . . the trial judge
spun around and turned his back on Hollowell.” DANIELS, supra note 41, at 122.
391
DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 168; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 119. Before Dr.
King was jailed, Hollowell filed an appeal of his original traffic conviction. See id. at 115. Hollowell
used this appeal to argue that Dr. King should be released for his arrest in Atlanta while his conviction
was being appealed. Id. After Judge Mitchell rejected Hollowell’s argument and sentenced Dr. King,
Robert Kennedy personally called Judge Mitchell to express his disagreement with the judge’s decision.
GARROW, supra note 2, at 147. After filing a writ of habeas corpus, Hollowell again argued that Dr.
King should be released while his traffic conviction was being appealed. This time, Judge Mitchell
agreed. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 116, 119.
392
DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 168; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 119.
393
See King v. State, 119 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961); DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note
141, at 168–69; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 120.
394
Hollowell raised the same argument in a hearing before Judge Mitchell six days after Dr. King
was arrested:

The statutes expressly and particularly limit the amount of imprisonment sentence which
can be issued or imposed by the court, that the maximum sentence shall not exceed six
months to work on the chain gang or public road and I submit to Your Honor that in his
Order of the 23rd of September, Your Honor sentenced the defendant to 12 months on the
Public Works Camp and that inasmuch as the sentence of the Court exceeds that which
the statute provided, then that sentence is a nullity, and if said sentence is a nullity, then
this particular hearing, your Honor, which is based upon that sentence, would be
dismissed because there is nothing upon which to base it, Sir.
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 115. When Judge Mitchell sentenced King to four months of hard labor,
Hollowell objected to the unusually harsh treatment:
We Submit Your Honor that the judgment which we are asking Your Honor to vacate, in
all legal fairness, and in all conscionable fairness, we would submit that it should be
vacated and this man ought to be at liberty. I don’t think the Solicitor could bring me in
one case . . . which shows that there has ever been in the history of the State of Georgia,
from the time of its inception, been an individual who was sentenced to serve four
months on the public works for failing to have a driver’s license.
Id. at 115–16.
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At the same time that Hollowell was seeking Dr. King’s release in court,
Senator John Kennedy, who was nearing the final stages of his run for the
presidency, intervened. 395 He called Coretta Scott King to express his concern
about her husband’s plight.396 Through continuing involvement by both Senator
Kennedy and his brother Robert, Judge Mitchell agreed to release Dr. King.397 As
a result, candidate Kennedy received much of the credit for Dr. King’s release.398
However, Donald Hollowell and Horace Ward provided the legal basis for the
release. Following Dr. King’s release, they appealed his sentence to the Court of
Appeals of Georgia. 399 Ultimately, the appellate court vindicated their claim. 400
The court agreed that Judge Mitchell’s initial sentence of twelve months was
illegal:
Since the sentence as originally entered was, as to that part of it
relating to imprisonment, illegal and therefore a nullity, it could not
be enforced by any subsequent order such as that passed revoking
its probationary feature. The probationary feature of the sentence
being void, the defendant was not under probation at the time he
allegedly committed the crime [trespass] for which the purported
probationary sentence was sought to be revoked. Accordingly, no
probationary sentence may be revoked for the commission of this
crime. The judgment of revocation in case No. 38718 is reversed.401
The lawyers had done their job. The threat to Dr. King’s personal safety in a
maximum-security prison and on a chain gang had passed. However, there would
be more arrests still to come.
d. The Albany (Georgia) Movement (1961–1962)
A year later, Donald Hollowell found himself, along with local civil rights
lawyer Chevene Bowers (C.B.) King, defending Dr. King and hundreds of
demonstrators arrested in the southwest Georgia city of Albany.402 In 1961, Albany

395

DANIELS, supra note 41, at 117–18.
Id. at 118; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 362.
397
According to then-Georgia Governor Ernest Vandiver, Senator Kennedy called to ask if there was
anything he could do to get Dr. King out of jail. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 118. Vandiver enlisted
former Georgia Secretary of State George Stewart to talk to Judge Mitchell, who agreed to let Dr. King
go if either Robert or Senator Kennedy relayed the message. Id.; see also supra note 391 (discussing
Robert Kennedy’s phone call to Judge Mitchell).
398
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 118–19.
399
Id. at 120.
400
See King v. State, 119 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961). The Court of Appeals held that “[t]he
sentence was not an alternative sentence entitling [Dr. King] to an absolute discharge on payment of the
fine assessed against him,” but because its imprisonment feature exceeded the maximum term permitted
by statute, the “illegal sentence of probation” could not “form a basis for [any] subsequent order of
revocation.” Id. at 79.
401
Id. at 81.
402
See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 130–59 (detailing Donald Hollowell’s and C.B. King’s
involvement in the Albany Movement). Professor Daniels points out that “the southwest region of
Georgia was one of the most notoriously racist parts of the state, well known for its violence against
396
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had 60,000 residents, about forty percent of whom were Black. 403 Albany was
characterized by pervasive, rigid segregation, with the white majority unwilling to
allow even modest reform.404
In October 1961, two field staff of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC, pronounced “Snick”) began to organize the Black community
to challenge the city’s structure of segregation.405 SNCC had been formed a year
earlier by young sit-in protesters who saw themselves as the vanguard of the
freedom struggle in the South.406 Their initial small sit-in garnered attention from
Albany’s Black community, whose leaders then formed the “Albany
Movement.”407 The coalition of organizations that joined forces favored different
strategies and tactics, resulting in significant internal tensions.408 The campaign
used demonstrations, bus boycotts, sit-ins, and jail-ins to challenge the status
quo.409
As the movement carried out protests, Police Chief Laurie Pritchett ordered
hundreds of arrests for minor violations such as disturbing the peace, disorderly
conduct, trespassing, and carrying out a parade without a permit.410 He avoided
applying state and local segregation laws to prevent appeals to the federal courts.411
He also instructed his officers to make the arrests peacefully and to avoid the use
of force that could draw federal attention.412

blacks.” Id. at 134. For useful overviews of the Albany Movement, see BRANCH, supra note 32, at 528–
58, 602–39; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 85–91, 100–06; GARROW, supra note 2, at 173–230.
403
CARSON, supra note 27, at 56.
404
See id. at 56–58. On the surface, relations between the races seemed quite peaceful; but the deeper
reality was quite different. See id.; LEWIS, supra note 47, at 140–43.
405
See CARSON, supra note 27, at 56. The “field secretaries” were Charles Sherrod and Cordell
Reagon. Id.
406
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 62–64; GARROW, supra note 2, at 131–34. For an in-depth
study of SNCC, see CARSON, supra note 27.
407
See LEWIS, supra note 47, at 144–45. On November 1, 1961, SNCC coordinated a small bus
station sit-in to protest Albany’s refusal to abide by the Interstate Commerce Commission’s order to
desegregate transportation facilities. CARSON, supra note 27, at 58; see also KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at
94. For a slightly different account of the Albany Movement’s formation, see BRANCH, supra note 32,
at 528–29, which describes an incident involving a white sheriff shooting a Black field hand in the neck
without justification as the impetus behind the movement.
The participating organizations included SNCC, the NAACP, the Federation of Women’s Clubs, the
Negro Voters League, the Ministerial Alliance, and the Criterion Club. MORRIS, supra note 188, at 241;
see also CARSON, supra note 27, at 58; LEWIS, supra note 47, at 145.
408
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 529. The lack of trust among the several organizations plagued the
Albany Movement from the outset. See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 139 (explaining that this lack of
trust was what led the various civil rights groups to form the movement).
409
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 137. For additional insight into the Albany Movement’s strategies and
tactics, see BRANCH, supra note 32, at 530–44, GARROW, supra note 2, at 176, and MORRIS, supra note
188, at 241.
410
See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 138.
411
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 527; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 138.
412
MORRIS, supra note 188, at 250. Nevertheless, there were still incidents of police violence. In one
instance, a pregnant woman was knocked down and kicked by a police officer while attempting to pass
food to jailed protesters. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 143. On another occasion, a Black man was
knocked to the floor and dragged to the back of a courtroom for sitting at the front. Id.
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C.B. King, Albany’s sole civil rights lawyer, and Atlanta’s Donald Hollowell
represented protesters that were arrested.413 With the demonstrations continuing,
the arrests mounted. When the local jail filled up, Pritchett shipped his prisoners to
surrounding counties’ jails. 414 In all, attorneys King and Hollowell represented
more than 700 jailed demonstrators.415 They worked extraordinary hours to provide
representation for the protesters. 416 They secured the release of hundreds of
them.417 They continued to serve their clients after the marches and demonstrations
ended, trying to clear their records and helping them return to their jobs.418
In addition to the hundreds of demonstrators, Hollowell and C.B. King
represented Dr. King and his SCLC colleagues.419 Notwithstanding strong internal
opposition, the Albany Movement invited Dr. King to come to the aid of their
faltering movement in December 1961.420 He needed legal representation almost
immediately because he was arrested while leading a prayer vigil to city hall the
day after he arrived.421 Police Chief Pritchett arrested Dr. King and the participants

413

DANIELS, supra note 41, at 137, 156. C.B. King and Hollowell had met by chance in 1949, when
King was an undergraduate at Fisk University and Hollowell a law student at Loyola Law School in
Chicago. Id. at 132. During that meeting, they discovered their shared passion for using the law to
achieve racial justice. Id.
LDF lawyer Constance Baker Motley joined the team later. See id. at 154–55; see also MOTLEY,
supra note 13, at 138–39.
C.B. King and Hollowell began representing Albany protesters in November 1961, with the trial of
five youths jailed for refusing to leave the white waiting room at the local bus terminal. DANIELS, supra
note 41, at 139–41; GARROW, supra note 2, at 177. While the lawyers were able to prevent further jail
time, the judge convicted their clients, fined them each $100, and placed them on probation for a brief
period. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 141–42; GARROW, supra note 2, at 178.
414
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 536; GARROW, supra note 2, at 208. Professor Daniels gives a less
benign account of Pritchett’s tactics: “In a clever effort to avoid filling the jails, a strategy often
employed by civil rights leaders to force officials to concede to some of their demands, Chief Pritchett
negotiated agreements for additional jail space with surrounding counties . . . notorious for their cruel
treatment of blacks.” DANIELS, supra note 41, at 142.
415
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 141. They also participated in negotiations with Albany officials to
end segregation in the city. Id. at 137.
416
Id. at 143–44. John Lewis, a civil rights activist and later congressman from Atlanta, credited
King and Hollowell as the central lawyers representing the demonstrators: “C.B. King and Don
Hollowell . . . more than any other two lawyers, played a major role in defending the people that were
arrested, people who had been beaten in jail in Albany . . . .” Id. at 137. Hollowell rarely took credit for
his achievements; but at C.B. King’s burial, he acknowledged, “No one knows how hard we worked.”
Id. at 159.
417
Id. at 145. Hollowell and King did a number of things to get protesters released, including bailing
them out, id. at 151–52, and negotiating agreements with Albany officials to release protesters on their
own recognizance, id. at 146, 152, 154.
418
Id. at 156. Activist Joseph Lowery recalled that the young demonstrators would say, “King is our
leader, Hollowell is our lawyer. We shall not be moved.” Id.
419
See id. at 150 (stating that Hollowell was chief lawyer to Dr. King, Ralph Abernathy, and other
movement leaders); GARROW, supra note 2, at 185–86, 196, 211 (discussing Hollowell and C.B. King
representing Dr. King and the Albany Movement). Hollowell managed to maintain trust and credibility
with all of the factions involved in the Albany Movement. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 151. Ultimately,
this may have created a rift with Dr. King because Hollowell supported the more radical SNCC, which
openly opposed King’s leadership. Id. at 148, 151.
420
GARROW, supra note 2, at 180–81.
421
See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 144–45; GARROW, supra note 2, at 184.
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for parading without a permit. 422 Once again, Donald Hollowell and C.B. King
represented Dr. King, as well as others who had joined the vigil.423
Months later, Dr. King and Reverend Abernathy went before Judge A.N.
Durden Sr. for sentencing.424 He imposed a $178 fine or forty-five days in jail.425
Since the defendants believed that their conviction was unjust, they refused to pay
the fine and opted for imprisonment.426 City officials were concerned about the
attention the incarceration might receive, including possible federal intervention,
and arranged to have King’s and Abernathy’s fines paid surreptitiously, under the
pretense that “an anonymous black donor had paid [them].”427
While the Albany Movement failed to achieve its immediate goals, it laid the
groundwork for subsequent movements. Many give credit to Donald Hollowell and
C.B. King for helping to underpin the movement, and for providing the support and
hope needed to sustain it.428
***
Years later, Dr. King expressed his respect, admiration, and appreciation for
the services of his numerous defense counsel who represented him in his many
encounters with state prosecutors: “I cannot help but wish in my heart that the same
kind of skill and devotion which Bob Ming and Hubert Delaney accorded to me
could be available to thousands of civil rights workers, to thousands of ordinary
Negros, who are every day facing prejudiced courtrooms.”429

422

DANIELS, supra note 41, at 145; GARROW, supra note 2, at 184.
See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 151 (pointing out that Dr. King and Abernathy were released from
jail on bond after Hollowell, C.B. King, and city officials reached an agreement); GARROW, supra note
2, at 195–96 (stating that Hollowell and C.B. King represented Dr. King when he returned to Albany in
late February to stand trial for his December arrest). Dr. King was initially brought to trial two days
after his arrest, but proceedings were postponed once negotiations began that morning between
Hollowell, C.B. King, and Albany officials. Id. at 185. Hollowell and C.B King eventually negotiated
with Albany officials a “gentlemen’s understanding that none of the jailed demonstrators would be
brought to trial, although their release would not include dropping charges.” Id. at 186. The city later
denied that there was ever an agreement. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 152.
424
GARROW, supra note 2, at 201–02.
425
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 152.
426
See id. at 153.
427
Id. at 154; see also LEWIS, supra note 47, at 159–60. Dr. King expressed his disappointment with
the situation: “[T]his is one time that I’m out of jail and I’m not happy to be out . . . I do not appreciate
the subtle and conniving tactics used to get us out of jail.” GARROW, supra note 2, at 203.
428
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 156. Civil rights leader Joseph Lowery gave the following assessment
of Hollowell’s and C.B. King’s importance in the Albany Movement:
423

When the Albany Movement heated up in ’61 when King got arrested, it was [Hollowell
and C.B. King] who stepped into the breach, who filed lawsuits, who tried to fight off the
attempts of Chief of Police Laurie Pritchett to suspend the First Amendment in Albany.
Hollowell and C.B. King raised the legal questions and forced the government at the
local, state, and national levels to face the issues of segregation and discrimination and
brutality on the part of law enforcement officials. They did it brilliantly, and Albany was
never the same.
Id. (alteration in original).
429
King, supra note 1, at xxiv.
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ii. Civil Actions: Libel Cases

Another team of lawyers represented civil rights leaders, including Dr. King,
and the New York Times, in libel litigation that was a direct outgrowth of Dr. King’s
Alabama perjury prosecution.430 The perjury trial required resources that were not
readily available to the movement.431 In an effort to raise money for Dr. King’s
defense, his supporters formed the “Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and
the Struggle for Freedom in the South.” 432 The committee ran a full-page
advertisement in the New York Times on March 29, 1960.433 Without naming any
public officials, it made both general and specific charges about southern racist
policies and practices.434 It also made an urgent plea for donations.435 A number of
activists’, celebrities’, and ministers’ names appeared in support of the fundraising
effort. 436 The advertisement had the desired effect, attracting donations several
times its cost.437
However, when word of the advertisement reached Alabama, public officials
reacted swiftly and furiously. Montgomery Police Commissioner L.B. Sullivan
sued the New York Times and four Black Alabama ministers named in the ad for
libel.438 He sought $500,000 in damages,439 an amount that would translate into
millions of dollars in twenty-first century terms. He did not include Martin Luther
King, Jr. as a defendant, apparently because his name did not appear as an endorser.
However, Alabama Governor Patterson quickly followed up with his own suit,
naming Dr. King among the defendants.440 Patterson sought $1 million dollars in
damages.441

430
See Dyer, supra note 38, at 249–50; Entin, supra note 128, at 262. The lawyers were a
combination of New York Times lawyers—both locally-based and from New York—and civil rights
lawyers. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 157; LEWIS, supra note 359, at 23–24, 27. For a discussion of the
lawyers and the extent to which they focused their advocacy on race, see Carlo A. Pedrioli, New York
Times v. Sullivan and the Rhetorics of Race: A Look at the Briefs, Oral Arguments, and Opinions, 7
GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 109, 119–20 (2015).
431
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 130; see also Dyer, supra note 38, at 249.
432
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 257 (1964); Fred D. Gray, The Sullivan Case: A
Direct Product of the Civil Rights Movement, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1223, 1225 (1992).
433
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–57; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 288–89; GRAY, supra note 7, at
148, 156.
434
See LEWIS, supra note 359, at 6–7.
435
See Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at L25, reprinted in LEWIS, supra note
359, at 2–3.
436
See id.
437
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 288–89; see also LEWIS, supra note 359, at 7.
438
LEWIS, supra note 359, at 10, 12. None of the endorsers other than the four ministers were from
Alabama. The ministers were included as defendants to preclude removal to federal court. See id. at 13–
14. Including the four Alabama ministers was also designed to deter their activism. Gray, supra note
432, at 1226.
439
LEWIS, supra note 359, at 12.
440
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 312; LEWIS, supra note 359, at 13. Besides Sullivan and Patterson,
three other officials filed libel suits: “Earl James, the mayor of Montgomery; Frank Parks, another city
commissioner; and Clyde Sellers, a former commissioner.” Id. Each sought $500,000 in damages from
the New York Times and the four ministers. Id.
441
LEWIS, supra note 359, at 13.
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For the New York Times, even that sum was less of a problem than the threat
the suit posed to the future of a free press.442 Sullivan hoped that a large monetary
judgment would intimidate the media and keep them from covering racial events in
Alabama.443 The libel suits by the governor and two other commissioners were part
of the same strategy.444
For SCLC, the suit endangered the very survival of the organization.445 While
the legal issues in the litigation focused on the First Amendment, the outcome of
the case had profound implications for the future of the Civil Rights Movement. As
a result, the defense lawyers included both litigators protective of the New York
Times and the media’s freedoms, and civil rights lawyers seeking to avoid the fiscal
disaster that could accompany an adverse decision.446
Fred Gray, a member of the Black ministers’ legal team, described his view
of the case:
There was not a scintilla of evidence against our clients. They had
no knowledge of the advertisement. They had not written it. They
had never seen it. They did not know their names would be in it.
They were not aware of it until they received the letter from
Commissioner Sullivan requesting a retraction.447
After a three-day trial, 448 segregationist Judge Walter Burgyn Jones 449
“instructed the jury that the challenged statements in the [advertisement] were
‘libelous per se’ ” and that under Alabama law, “a statement that was libelous per
se was presumed to be false; the defendant could overcome that presumption only
by proving the statement true in all material respects.”450 As expected, the jury
found for plaintiff Sullivan and awarded him the full $500,000.451
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.452 In an opinion by Justice
Brennan, the Court held that a libel suit by public officials required proof of actual
malice, 453 and that the evidence presented was constitutionally insufficient to

442

See id. at 34.
Gray, supra note 432, at 1226.
444
Id.
445
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 296, 312, 579–80; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 171.
446
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 162–64; LEWIS, supra note 359, at 7.
447
Gray, supra note 432, at 1227. In his closing argument, Gray explained why his clients never
responded to the Commissioner’s letter asking for a retraction: “How could these individual defendants
retract something—if you’ll pardon the expression—they didn’t tract?” Id.; accord Entin, supra note
128, at 264.
448
LEWIS, supra note 359, at 27.
449
See id. at 25–26.
450
Id. at 32.
451
See id. at 33. The plaintiff immediately proceeded to levy on the ministers’ property, taking their
cars, and forcing the sale of Reverend Abernathy’s interest in family property in the state. Gray, supra
note 432, at 1227. After the Supreme Court’s reversal, Gray was able to recover for the ministers the
proceeds from those sales. Id. at 1228; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 163. The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Montgomery County Circuit Court, but it was never retried. Gray, supra note
432, at 1228.
452
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964).
453
See id. at 279–80. The Court reasoned that:
443
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support the judgment against the defendants.454 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is
best known as a landmark libel decision; but for civil rights advocates, the decision
represents the Supreme Court protecting the financial viability of the movement, as
well. 455 This landmark decision was just one of many court cases that would
majorly impact the effectiveness of the movement.
2. Permissions and Injunctions
Dr. King’s adversaries learned early on that injunctions, usually issued by
segregationist judges, could be a potent weapon against organized protests. 456
Injunctions placed legal restrictions on the movements’ activities in carrying out
their nonviolent direct action strategies. Each injunction posed a dilemma for Dr.
King and presented hard choices involving both principle and practical aspects. The
lawyers provided advice and counsel about the possible paths to pursue.457
The choices that Dr. King and his associates made in responding to an
injunction determined the assignments for the lawyers. Activists’ options included:
(1) comply, with no appeal, which required no action by the lawyers; (2) comply
and appeal, with lawyers taking the appeal; or (3) violate the injunction and face
contempt of court sanctions, with lawyers handling the appeal of the contempt
citation (while perhaps also appealing the injunction).458
In the early years, responses to injunctions were fairly straightforward.
Officials sought and secured injunctions against activists’ action, and the leaders
either complied without appealing (as in the Montgomery Bus Boycott), 459 or
complied and appealed to get the injunction dissolved (as in the Albany
Movement). 460 In some campaigns, lawyers also participated in the process of

The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id.

454

Id. at 285–88.
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 579–80; GRAY, supra note 7, at 162–63.
456
Montgomery officials waited a long time to seek an injunction against the MIA’s car pool system.
Stopping the car pool earlier could have been a devastating blow to the boycott. See GRAY, supra note
7, at 92; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 74–75, 91–93. See generally Bayard Rustin, Montgomery Diary,
LIBERATION, Apr. 1956, at 7, 9 (“The success of the car pool is at the heart of the movement.”),
reprinted in DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 164, 167.
457
See infra notes 482–483, 491, 495–498 and accompanying text.
458
Dr. King chose each of those options with one or more injunctions. In Montgomery (1956) and
Chicago (1966), he complied with an injunction without appealing it. See discussion infra Sections
II.A.2.i (Montgomery), III.B.3.iv (Chicago). In Albany, Georgia (1962) and St. Augustine, Florida
(1963–1964), he complied with and appealed the injunction. See discussion infra Sections II.A.2.ii
(Albany), III.B.3.ii (St. Augustine). In Selma, Alabama (1965), he walked a tightrope and managed to
comply. See discussion infra Section III.B.3.iii. In Birmingham (1963), he violated the injunction, faced
a contempt citation, and appealed the contempt citation to the Supreme Court. See discussion infra
Section III.B.3.i; see also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 311–15 (1967). In Memphis
(1968), he said that he was prepared to violate an injunction if necessary; but the judge modified the
injunction and permitted the planned demonstration to take place. See discussion infra Section III.B.3.v.
459
See discussion infra Section II.A.2.i.
460
See discussion infra Section II.A.2.ii.
455
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seeking local approvals for the planned direct action activities.461 As with other
assignments, lawyers’ efforts to secure necessary approvals started with the
Montgomery Bus Boycott and continued throughout Dr. King’s career.
i. Montgomery: Permissions and Injunction (1955–1956)
The bus boycott did not involve marches or demonstrations like many of the
later movements. The boycott of local buses formed the core strategy to address the
discriminatory policies and practices. To enable Black residents to get to school, to
work, or to shopping areas without taking a bus, the MIA created an elaborate “car
pool” system.462 Thousands of Black Montgomerians rode back and forth on a daily
basis for many months in donated cars driven by volunteers.463
The City of Montgomery had a franchise process that transit systems were
required to follow to operate in the city.464 The city bus line that the MIA was
boycotting had such a franchise and served the whole city with its bus routes.465
Since the MIA established its car pool system without securing a franchise from
the city, movement leaders feared that the city would at some point turn to the courts
to enjoin the operation of the car pool system.466 Such an injunction could have a
devastating impact on the movement.467
In anticipation of a possible legal challenge to its operation, the MIA
preemptively applied for a transit franchise for the car pool system. 468 In early
January 1962, the MIA’s leadership asked Fred Gray and Charles Langford to draft
and submit an application to operate the car pool as a jitney service.469 City officials
rejected it on the grounds that the city did not need another transit system.470 Later,
the MIA tried again, as one last effort to secure the permission that would protect
it against a possible injunction.471 As expected, the city responded the same way it
had to the first request.472 Those turndowns left the MIA vulnerable to an injunction
prohibiting the operation of the car pool, which came soon thereafter.473
461

See discussion infra Sections II.A.2.i, III.B.3.i, III.B.3.vi.
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 145–46; GARROW, supra note 2, at 27, 29; Coleman, Nee &
Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 675–76.
463
See sources cited supra note 462. Yancey Martin, who was part of the cadre of college-aged
drivers that helped sustain the boycott over holiday breaks, recounts his experience: “[W]e saw the
transportation end really kinda being the backbone of the movement because folks had to work and they
had to have that little money.” HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP
SOUTH REMEMBERED 60 (1977).
464
See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 74–75; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 58; Kennedy, supra
note 112, at 1047.
465
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 59; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 56, 604 n.96.
466
See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 676 & 711 n.72.
467
See supra note 456 and accompanying text.
468
See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 74–75.
469
Id. at 74; see also Donald T. Ferron, Notes on MIA Executive Board Meeting (Jan. 23, 1956), in
DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 121, 123–24.
470
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 677; “All-White” Bus Service Planned, NEWSL.
FROM M.I.A. (Montgomery Improvement Ass’n, Montgomery, Ala.), Mar. 8, 1957, at 3, 3, http://www
.crmvet.org/docs/mia/570308_mia_newsletter.pdf.
471
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 75.
472
See id.
473
See supra note 456 and accompanying text.
462
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On November 5, 1956, the city filed a lawsuit against the MIA, Dr. King, and
other protest leaders in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County to enjoin the
operation of the “car pool.”474 Judge Eugene Carter, an ardent segregationist,475
presided over the case.476 In an effort to get the case out of Judge Carter’s hands,
Fred Gray and the other MIA lawyers asked the federal district court to enjoin the
city from filing or prosecuting any action in state court against the car pool.477 Judge
Frank Johnson, a frequent ally of civil rights advocates,478 rejected the motion as
failing to claim any injury beyond that which flows from the enforcement of local
ordinances.479
In the November 13 circuit court hearing, Fred Gray led the MIA’s legal team,
which included three other prominent Black Alabama lawyers—Orzell Billingsley,
Peter Hall, and Arthur Shores.480 The court’s hearing provided an early example of
Dr. King and his associates turning to lawyers to protect and facilitate the
movement. Not surprisingly, the lawyers’ efforts to oppose the issuance of an
injunction were to no avail. Judge Carter granted the order prohibiting the
continuation of the car pool system.481
At that point, three options presented themselves: (1) comply with the
injunction and shut down the car pool system; (2) comply with the injunction,
appeal it, and suspend operation of the car pool in the meantime; and (3) violate the
injunction as an act of civil disobedience, based on a claim that it was an unjust
order. MIA’s lawyers “advised compliance with [the] injunction.”482 With a weak
case on the merits and a recalcitrant segregationist appellate judiciary, an appeal
would have been an exercise in futility.483 Dr. King took their advice.
474

GRAY, supra note 7, at 92. Fred Gray, lead counsel for the MIA, noted that: “It is interesting that
the city had not filed such a lawsuit earlier. If such a case had been filed in December 1955 or January
1956, the Bus Protest might never have garnered the necessary support, financial or otherwise, to
sustain itself.” Id.
475
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1030.
476
GRAY, supra note 7, at 92.
477
KING, supra note 7, at 138; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1047.
478
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 244.
479
See Browder v. City of Montgomery, 146 F. Supp. 127, 131 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (“The court is of
the opinion that the petitioners have not been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to the
enforcement of city ordinances, or that this court by issuing the relief prayed for could afford petitioners
protection which could not be secured by hearing in the State court proceeding and an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.”).
480
GRAY, supra note 7, at 92–93; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1030.
481
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1047 (citing City of Montgomery v. Montgomery Improvement
Ass’n, No. 31075 (Montgomery Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 1956), reprinted in 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 123
(1956)). During the hearing on the injunction, word arrived from Washington that the Supreme Court
had struck down the segregation laws without a hearing, in a very brief per curiam opinion. Id. at 1051
(citing Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956)).
482
LEWIS, supra note 47, at 80.
483
Even before the judge’s decision, Dr. King seemed to assume that the MIA would obey the
expected injunction. In Stride Toward Freedom, Dr. King’s account of the boycott, he told of his sense
of doom the night before the hearing. KING, supra note 7, at 138. He anticipated that the judge would
grant the injunction. Id. He acknowledged that it was not feasible to ask the thousands of protesters to
undergo even greater sacrifice by walking to and from their jobs and schools:

I knew that they had willingly suffered for nearly twelve months, but how could they
function at all with the car pool destroyed? Could we ask them to walk back and forth
every day to their jobs? And if not, would we then be forced to admit that the protest had
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ii. Albany, Georgia: Injunction (1961–1962)
The Albany Movement had extreme challenges on many levels, not the least
of which was Dr. King’s decision about whether to comply with an injunction.
Segregation was deeply embedded in all aspects of social and political life, the
police chief had a very effective method of resisting the movement nonviolently,
and significant internal tensions plagued the movement.484 Even without the court’s
intervention, activists faced great hardships in trying to accomplish their very broad
and ambitious goals.485
In July 1962, the Albany Movement finally seemed to be gaining some
momentum. 486 At that point, city officials sought an injunction against the
movement’s demonstrations from Federal District Judge J. Robert Elliott.487 On
July 20, just hours before a planned march to city hall, the acknowledged
failed in the end? For the first time in our long struggle together, I almost shrank from
appearing before them.
Id. He seemed resigned to complying with the expected injunction and shutting down the transportation
system.
As it turned out, the injunction was largely moot as soon as it was issued because the Supreme Court
struck down the bus segregation laws the day the local court issued the injunction. See id. at 138–40.
But that was fortuitous, and Dr. King’s thinking before the Court’s decision did not seem to include the
possibility of violating the expected injunction. Since the Supreme Court decision would become final
soon, the MIA shut down the system and carried out makeshift transportation arrangements in the
interim. GARROW, supra note 2, at 81; see also KING, supra note 7, at 142; Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Address to MIA Mass Meeting at Holt Street Baptist Church (Nov. 14, 1956), in 3 THE PAPERS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 424, 425–27; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note
34, at 677; cf. BRANCH, supra note 32, at 194 (stating that boycotters endured the delay until the
integration orders reached Montgomery by walking: “In effect, they would struggle through a victory
lap.”).
The car pool’s purpose and scale suggested that it was serving as a transit system, and it was doing
so without a city franchise. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 91–92; KING, supra note 7, at 58–59; Coleman,
Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 676–77; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 193 (noting a city
witness’s testimony in the injunction hearing that “the MIA had deposited $189,000 in his Montgomery
bank, a sum that city lawyers used to ridicule King’s contention that the car pool was a voluntary,
‘share-a-ride’ cooperative.”). The MIA’s two applications for a franchise showed their awareness of
that fact. Moreover, the city’s claim that there was no need for an additional transit system seemed
borne out by the fact that the bus system had accommodated the Black ridership before the boycott. In
fact, Black passengers constituted the majority of the patrons of the system. See GARROW, supra note 2,
at 26; KING, supra note 7, at 91–92; JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS
YEARS, 1954–1965, at 62 (25th anniversary ed. 2013). See generally BRANCH, supra note 32, at 150
(discussing financial strain bus system experienced on account of decreased Black patronage).
484
See supra notes 402–404, 408 and accompanying text.
485
Because the Albany movement was a compilation of various organizations, this meant that there
were competing agendas and personalities, making it difficult to have a cohesive and consistent
message. Additionally, the police chief had learned from prior movements and schooled his officers in
the use of nonviolent tactics for subduing protesters, making it impossible for the movement to garner
the media attention that had served it well in the past. See supra notes 408–412 and accompanying text.
486
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 45; see also LEWIS, supra note 47, at 159–61.
487
GARROW, supra note 2, at 206. President Kennedy had appointed Judge Elliott to the district court
bench, along with a number of other segregationists in the South. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING
FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REGAN 167 (1997); see also
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 609, 699–700. Elliott had been a leader behind the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt
from the Democratic Party. UC Davis Sch. of Law, Remembering Our Roots: Celebrating Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2013), https://youtu.be/fMPRvSnywVU (keynote address by
Clarence B. Jones).
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segregationist judge issued a temporary restraining order without notifying Dr.
King or Albany Movement leaders. 488 The order barred Dr. King and other
movement supporters from “engaging in ‘unlawful picketing, congregating, or
marching in the streets’ and from doing anything else ‘designed to provoke
breaches of the peace.’ ”489
This extremely broad injunction prohibited virtually all of the activities that
the movement contemplated.490 Dr. King’s lawyers advised him that the injunction
was almost certainly invalid, because of its sweeping infringement of First
Amendment rights of speech and assembly. 491 Initially, Dr. King contemplated
violating the injunction because he believed that it was an “unjust law.”492 For him,
the injunction was a “law that the majority inflicted on the minority that was not
binding on itself.” 493 Moreover, it did not square with the moral law of the
universe.494
But Clarence Jones, Dr. King’s lawyer and confidant, implored him to obey
the injunction.495 He argued that the federal courts had generally been favorable to
the Civil Rights Movement and had upheld the constitutional rights of Blacks.496
Jones also suggested that Dr. King would lose his moral standing and “his
credentials to complain about state governors and various officials throughout the
South who had announced their intention to disobey instances of federal court
ordered injunctions under the Brown decision.”497
Ultimately, Dr. King decided to comply with the injunction.498 For him, it was
critical that this injunction came from a federal judge. He made a sharp distinction
488

See LEWIS, supra note 47, at 161; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 138.
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 45; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 206. Judge Elliott
reasoned that the protests and the police response to them would deny white people their equal
protection rights by depriving them of police officers and other resources. DANIELS, supra note 41, at
154.
490
The movement planned several marches in Albany to bring attention to segregation and the
infringement on Blacks’ rights, which would be compromised if the injunction were sustained. See
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 45 (pointing out that obeying the injunction “would halt the
Movement’s momentum”); see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 103 (noting that Dr. King canceled
the impending marches); KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 102 (recalling Dr. King saying, “I don’t mind
violating an unjust state injunction, but I won’t violate a federal one”).
491
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 45. William Kunstler later recalled his belief at the time
that the restraining order was unlawful: “I constantly stressed the fact that I considered the injunction
illegal. While I did not advise King to violate it, I made it quite clear that I did not think he was bound
by it.” KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 102.
492
UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 207.
493
UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487.
494
Id. Dr. King elaborated on the “just law” question in his Letter from Birmingham Jail. See infra
note 659 and accompanying text.
495
UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487. Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Burke Marshall,
head of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, also urged Dr. King to obey the injunction.
Id.; see GARROW, supra note 2, at 207.
496
UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487.
497
Id.
498
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 103. Clarence Jones recounted, “Eventually, after a heated
discussion with me and a continued heated discussion with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had
made the same point I had made about his undermining and forfeiting his moral credibility by
disobeying Judge Elliott’s injunction, he agreed to abide by the injunction.” UC Davis Sch. of Law,
supra note 487.
489
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between the federal and state courts.499 He agreed that federal courts had served as
frequent allies in the civil rights struggle, with judges having sufficient
independence from local politics and pressures to give the movement a number of
important victories. 500 Dr. King made this distinction notwithstanding his
awareness of the presence of a number of segregationists on the Deep South’s
federal bench during this period, including Judge Elliott.501 Disobeying the order
would also have risked alienating the Justice Department, which was committed to
compliance with federal court orders.502
So Dr. King had his lawyers appeal the injunction as violating First
Amendment rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of
speech.503 Donald Hollowell and C.B. King sought the assistance of veteran LDF
lawyer Constance Baker Motley with the appeal. 504 Dr. King and his team of
lawyers promptly went to Atlanta to ask Judge Elbert Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals to dissolve the injunction.505 Judge Tuttle vacated Judge Elliott’s
temporary restraining order on July 24, 1962, holding that it violated the First
Amendment rights of Dr. King and other movement supporters.506
But in a movement that was already reeling from extremely strong and
effective resistance, as well as constantly quarreling factions, even the four-day
499

Kunstler recalled King saying, “The federal courts have given us our greatest victories and I
cannot, in good conscience, declare war on them. Elliott may be a segregationist, but he is still a United
States District Judge, and I’ll rely on the upper courts to reverse him.” KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 102.
500
MORRIS, supra note 188, at 247; UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487. SCLC aide Andrew
Young described King’s perspective:

It was a federal injunction, and Dr. King felt that the federal courts were our only real
ally nationally. They had challenged segregated law schools, dining cars, etc., then the
1954 school decision, and had helped in Montgomery. Breaking a federal court injunction
in Albany was a slap in the face of the federal courts that he couldn’t bring himself to
make.
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 59.
501
For example, in Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), where a three-judge
federal court ruled Montgomery’s bus segregation laws unconstitutional, segregationist Judge Seybourn
Harris Lynne dissented. He began his dissenting opinion by stating, “Only a profound, philosophical
disagreement with the ultimate conclusion of the majority ‘that the separate but equal doctrine can no
longer be safely followed as a correct statement of the law’ would prompt this, my first dissent.” Id. at
717 (Lynne, J., dissenting).
When Dr. King first found out about the injunction, he called Burke Marshall of the Justice
Department and demanded to know why a recent Kennedy appointee was working with city officials to
end the movement. GARROW, supra note 2, at 206.
Although President Kennedy did not want to appoint segregationists, he appointed segregationists
William Harold Cox, J. Robert Elliot, and Pat Mehaffy. GOLDMAN, supra note 487, at 167–68. Still, Pat
Mehaffy was the only appointee that the administration knew was a segregationist. Id. at 168.
502
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 45. When Dr. King spoke with Burke Marshall of the
Justice Department after the injunction was issued, Marshall instructed Dr. King that he would have to
seek a reversal through the appeals process, and that in the meantime he would have to obey the
injunction. GARROW, supra note 2, at 206.
503
MORRIS, supra note 188, at 248; UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487. Dr. King also
distinguished between local segregation laws, which he challenged, and federal law, which he
respected. See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 46.
504
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 154; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 138–39.
505
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 154–55; see also MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 139. The team also
included Clarence Jones and Orzell Billingsley. UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487.
506
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 46; UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487; see also
MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 138–39.
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delay it experienced added to the movement’s woes. 507 The movement never
regained its credibility or momentum.508
In hindsight, Dr. King viewed his decision not to violate the Albany injunction
as a strategic mistake. 509 That experience became a lesson learned for future
campaigns, especially for the next major campaign, in Birmingham, in 1963.510
3. Fundraising
While fundraising is not a traditional responsibility for lawyers, some of Dr.
King’s lawyers took on that assignment as well.511 Financial needs ranged from
recurring expenses, such as those growing out of encounters with the legal
system—lawyers’ fees, court costs, bail, and fines—to MIA and SCLC staff
salaries, to other frequent expenses like travel. 512 There were also movementspecific expenses. In the early years, creating and maintaining Montgomery’s
yearlong “car pool” system was the primary example of such a financial
challenge.513
Dr. King was a consummate fundraiser and held center stage in that domain.514
However, even his monumental efforts fell short of the movements’ overall
requirements.515 In 1962, New York lawyers Harry Wachtel, Clarence Jones, and
Theodore Kheel stepped in to help bridge the gap.516 They founded the Gandhi
Society for Human Rights in an effort to provide financial and legal support for the
movement.517 Dr. King served as honorary president, and Clarence Jones filled the
roles of general counsel and acting executive director. 518 The society’s mission
statement defined its role as “legal defense and aid for civil rights cases, educational
507

See MORRIS, supra note 188, at 248; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 46.
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 46. See generally FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 105–06
(describing reports that towards the end of July the movement was “running out of steam”).
509
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 59–60. An SCLC aide reflected on Dr. King’s reaction:
“But after the Albany campaign collapsed, Dr. King lamented the fact that he had abided by the
injunction, and he entered the planning for Birmingham ready to defy even a federal court rather than
see the Albany collapse repeated. And if he had allowed himself to be halted in his tracks in
Birmingham [from an injunction], it would have become the technique used against the movement
everywhere throughout the South.” Id.
510
KING, supra note 22, at 35.
511
See discussion supra Section I.B.5.
512
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 153, 159, 185–86; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 96–97, 117,
142–44, 178; see also Interview by Glenn E. Smiley with Martin Luther King, Minister, Dexter Ave.
Baptist Church, in Montgomery, Ala. (Mar. 1, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document
/mlk-interview-glenn-e-smiley.
513
See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 675, 676 & 710 nn.66 & 69–70.
514
See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 32, at 149, 254, 300, 321, 352, 381–83, 573–75, 578, 581, 589,
595–96, 641, 683, 803, 805–06, 870; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 49, 70, 96–97, 256, 287, 345;
GARROW, supra note 2, at 151, 153, 155, 234, 429, 461–63; LEWIS, supra note 47, at 120, 156.
515
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 299–300, 515, 571; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 47–48, 142.
516
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 198.
517
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 97–98; GARROW, supra note 2, at 198.
518
Gandhi Society for Human Rights, KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford
.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_gandhi_society_for_human_rights/index.html (last visited Jan. 18,
2016). The board of directors included, among others, Mordecai Johnson, President Emeritus of
Howard University, William Kunstler, special counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union, and
Benjamin Mays, President of Morehouse College. Id.
508
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materials propagating nonviolent methods and voter registration activities, and
financial assistance to other organizations for civil rights projects.”519
In recognizing both the importance and the cost of legal representation, Dr.
King urged that a major focus of the Gandhi Society’s efforts should be breaking
barriers to justice through greater access to legal defense, particularly for those
engaging in efforts to assert their constitutional rights:
Many people who are poor find themselves in legal actions, and the
heavy cost of defense is a crippling difficulty, thus hindering the
progress of citizens who may be informed of their rights but lack the
means to carry on. Also, there are areas where positive legal steps
should be taken in the form of injunctive suits or other actions to
remove illegal obstacles, and again where the financial means do not
exist to see a project to completion.520
B. Complementary Desegregation Litigation
Starting in the 1930s, one of the prominent strands of civil rights work was
constitutional litigation challenging state-imposed segregation laws in the South.521
The initial focus was on the exclusion of Blacks from law schools and graduate
schools. 522 Brown v. Board of Education 523 represents the culmination of a
litigation campaign to challenge racial exclusion and segregation in all levels of
public education. 524 Throughout the campaign, the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund (LDF) relied almost exclusively on the courts to bring about the
changes they were seeking. The LDF’s theory was that the law—state constitutional
provisions, state statutes, and local ordinances—was the problem, and the courts
could provide the solution. The assumption was that there was no need for mass
519

Id. However, the organization quickly fell on hard times. See discussion infra Section III.B.4.
Letter from Martin Luther King Jr. to Harry Wachtel (Feb. 12, 1962), in 7 THE PAPERS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: TO SAVE THE SOUL OF AMERICA, JANUARY 1961-AUGUST 1962, at 397, 398
(Clayborne Carson & Tenisha Armstrong eds., 2014).
521
See generally KLARMAN, supra note 13, at 148–52, 160–62 (discussing school equalization
cases); KLUGER, supra note 13, at 132–37 (discussing Nathan Margold’s strategic vision for the
NAACP’s legal drive); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at 21–33 (1987) (examining the legal background of racial discrimination in
the 1930s and the Margold Report, which emphasized a direct challenge to segregation on
constitutional grounds); Rabin, supra note 75, at 215–16 (discussing the NAACP’s litigation campaign
plan).
For discussion of central, but less publicized, aspects of civil rights lawyering in the first half of the
twentieth century, focused on “racial uplift,” see MACK, supra note 161, at 1–11.
522
See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment required that Black student be admitted to publicly-funded law school that restricted access
to whites, where separate facility provided for Blacks was inferior in several respects); Sipuel v. Bd. of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (Black student denied admission to the state’s only law school because of
her race entitled to secure legal education from a state institution that was equal to that afforded to
whites); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (State must offer Blacks facilities for
graduate education “substantially equal” to those afforded for whites); see also KLUGER, supra note 13,
at 185–92, 201–03, 257–68 (examining cases challenging segregated universities); TUSHNET, supra
note 13, at 121–49 (same).
523
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
524
See KLUGER, supra note 13, at 293–94; TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 150–67.
520
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movements or other strategies such as nonviolent direct action.525 This series of
“test cases” became the prototype of a freestanding judicial strategy.526
For activists like Martin Luther King, Jr., the pre-existence of those litigation
strategies and the Court’s decision in Brown raised important questions about the
extent to which, if any, they should consider joining forces with the lawyers who
had relied so heavily on the courts. Dr. King had complicated views about the role
of the courts in civil rights.527 Ideally, nonviolent direct action would achieve the
movement’s objectives, and there would be no need for litigation. However, in the
messy real world of social movements, Dr. King saw that nonviolent direct action
had a very difficult road to hoe.528 Additional strategies, including litigation, could
add power to a movement facing daunting legal and extra-legal opposition.
While Brown did not accompany a social movement, it helped create the
possibility of coordinated multiple strategies that included similar lawsuits. 529
Those lawsuits could use the Brown decision as the central precedent for arguing
that the racially discriminatory laws being challenged were unconstitutional.530
As a result, Dr. King recognized the important role of litigation strategies in
the Civil Rights Movement. At the same time, he expressed great concern about
over-reliance on the courts to address problems of segregation and discrimination.
His seemingly contradictory statements about the courts suggest his ambivalence
about the place of litigation strategies in the Civil Rights Movement.
On the one hand, Dr. King emphasized the usefulness of the courts:
Let us never succumb to the temptation of believing that
legislation and judicial decrees play only minor roles in solving this
problem. Morality cannot be legislated, but behavior can be
regulated. Judicial decrees may not change the heart, but they can
restrain the heartless. . . . The habits, if not the hearts, of people have
been and are being altered every day by legislative acts, judicial
decisions and executive orders. Let us not be misled by those who
argue that segregation cannot be ended by the force of law.531
525

The closest thing to extra-legal activism was a boycott by high school students in rural Prince
Edward County, Virginia, which developed into one of the four cases consolidated in Brown. In April
1951, the students walked out to protest the separate and unequal county schools, and sought
representation by civil rights lawyer Oliver Hill. See KLUGER, supra note 13, at 464–72, 476–80.
526
See KLARMAN, supra note 13, at 378–79; TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 126–27.
527
Dr. King’s views on the appropriate role of litigation strategies evolved over his career. See
discussion infra Section III.A.
528
See KING, supra note 22, at 15–38.
529
See Rabin, supra note 75, at 218; see also BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 142, at 115–23 (examining
coordinated strategies that leveraged Brown in efforts to end segregation in recreational facilities and
public transportation).
530
See discussion infra Section II.B.1. The SCLC also made major efforts to secure federal civil
rights legislation. For more on those efforts, see FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 134–37, 149–53, 178–
79, and GARROW, supra note 2, at 267–69.
531
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Ethical Demands for Integration (Dec. 27, 1962), in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 117, 124
(James M. Washington ed., 1986). For similar statements made elsewhere by Dr. King, see MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., An Address Before the National Press Club (July 19, 1962), in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE, supra, at 99, 100–01 [hereinafter KING, Press Club Address]; MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
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Acknowledging both the value and the limitations of the courts, Dr. King
argued that:
In our nation, under the guidance of the superb legal staff of the
NAACP [LDF], we have been able, through the courts, to remove
the legal basis of segregation. This is by far one of the most
marvelous achievements of our generation. . . . We must not,
however, remain satisfied with a court “victory” over our white
brothers.532
But in light of his deep commitment to nonviolent direct action, it is not
surprising that Dr. King would define his ideal approach as being in the streets and
out of the courts: “Wherever it is possible, we want to avoid court cases in this
integration struggle.”533 When he approved turning to the courts, he did so with
great reluctance.534
Nonviolent direct action required mass participation. Mobilizing rank-and-file
Blacks was a central theme of Dr. King’s movements, and doing so represented a
high form of democracy.535 Court cases risked undermining that thrust: “[W]hen
legal contests were the sole form of activity[,] . . . the ordinary Negro was involved
as a passive spectator[, and] . . . his energies were unemployed.” 536 Using the
courts was an elite strategy that relied on legal expertise and procedures that played
out in a venue that could not engage the masses. Moreover, because of the complex
procedures and technical legal language, movement leaders lost a degree of control
to the lawyers once the process moved into the courts.537
Dr. King also had pragmatic concerns. Courts generally proceeded at a very
slow pace, which delayed progress and provided opportunities for adversaries to
take advantage of the fact that time was on their side.538 Moreover, the slow process

Commencement Address at Lincoln University: The American Dream (June 6, 1961), in A TESTAMENT
OF HOPE, supra, at 208, 213; Martin Luther King, Jr., The Case Against “Tokenism,” N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Aug. 5, 1962, at 11, reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra, at 106, 107.
532
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Give Us the Ballot—We Will Transform the South, Keynote Address
at the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom (May 17, 1957), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 531, at
197, 200.
533
Dr. King made that statement in 1957. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 87 & 645 n.4.
534
See discussion infra Sections II.B.1–2.
535
See, e.g., Gunnar Jahn, Chairman, Nobel Peace Prize Comm., Award Presentation Speech (Dec.
10, 1946), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/press.html (discussing the
Montgomery Bus Boycott and observing that “[d]uring the morning of December 5, as bus after bus
without a single Negro passenger passed his window, [Dr. King] realized that the boycott had proved a
hundred percent effective”); see also ESKEW, supra note 50, at 230–34.
536
MORRIS, supra note 188, at 123. At the same time, filing a case and surviving motions to dismiss
and for summary judgment could help sustain a movement by providing hope and inspiration. It could
also add to the pressure on adversaries to seek a resolution. See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 163;
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 681 & 714 n.107.
537
See, e.g., infra Section II.B.1 (discussing the Montgomery Bus Boycott, where the lawsuit filed
sought broader relief than the activists’ initial demands); cf. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Saul Alinsky and the
Litigation Campaign to Win the Right to Same-Sex Marriage, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 643, 664–69
(2009) (critiquing litigation strategy in the same-sex marriage movement).
538
GARROW, supra note 2, at 91–92; King, supra note 1, at xxii.
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of the courts could sap the energy and enthusiasm of the movement.539 While the
Montgomery Bus Boycott extended for over a year, Dr. King’s movements usually
contemplated months rather than years of direct action. Litigation was more likely
to take years, so there was a high probability of direct action and court processes
being out of sync, time-wise.
Litigation was also costly, and the expenses incurred in carrying out direct
action campaigns often pressed the movements’ fundraising capacities to the
limit.540 Securing resources for litigation would add another burden and financial
strain on the movement.541
However, in his book Why We Can’t Wait, Dr. King suggested a quite
interdependent relationship between court-based strategies and direct action:
Direct action is not a substitute for work in the courts and the
halls of government. . . . [P]leading cases before the courts of the
land[] does not eliminate the necessity for bringing about the mass
dramatization of injustice in front of a city hall. Indeed, direct action
and legal action complement one another; when skillfully employed,
each becomes more effective.542
Dr. King also emphasized the limitations of the courts and the law and
therefore the need for direct-action strategies:
Fortunately, the Negro has been willing to grapple with a
creative and powerful force in his struggle for racial justice, namely,
nonviolent resistance. This does not mean that a new method has
come into being to serve as a substitute for litigation and legislation.
Certainly we must continue to work through the courts and
legislative channels. But those who adhere to the method of
nonviolent direct action recognize that legislation and court orders
tend only to declare rights; they can never thoroughly deliver them.
Only when the people themselves begin to act are rights on paper
given lifeblood. A catalyst is needed to breathe life experience into

539

See generally JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 33 (1978)
(discussing costs that attenuate the likelihood of success in using the legal system to achieve social
change).
540
See discussion infra Section II.A.3.
541
This objection was not so much to the use of the courts as it was to the movement having to bear
the financial burden of doing so. See KING, supra note 22, at 157 (suggesting that the federal
government should take the responsibility for carrying out civil rights litigation, including providing the
required resources).
542
Id. at 33. The idea of joining litigation and nonviolent direct action predated Dr. King’s era by at
least sixty years. The organizers of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), considered boycotting the
trains while they pursued their test case challenging the constitutionality of the Louisiana railroad
segregation statute. See Cheryl I. Harris, The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson: The Death and Resurrection
of Racial Formalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 181, 201–02 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
Louis Martinet, one of the leaders, proposed the joint strategy. See id.
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a judicial decision by the persistent exercise of the rights until they
become usual and ordinary in human contact.543
In short, Dr. King respected the contributions litigators and the courts made
but committed himself and his movements to nonviolent direct action. At the same
time, his recognition of the power of the courts opened his mind to turning to them
as a complementary strategy.
1. The Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955–1957)544
Even before Rosa Parks refused a bus driver’s order to give up her seat to a
white man on December 1, 1955, several of Montgomery’s Black leaders had begun
searching for a plaintiff to launch a “test case” challenging the constitutionality of
the bus segregation laws. 545 The first such effort failed. An appellate judge
dismissed the charge against a teenage girl, Claudette Colvin, for violating the
segregation law when she refused to give up her seat to a white rider. 546
Nevertheless, challenging the constitutionality of bus segregation laws had become
part of the Black community’s tactical arsenal—if only to be held in reserve in case
it was ever necessary to use it.547
A possible opportunity for another constitutional challenge appeared when
Rosa Parks was arrested. She asked Fred Gray, her friend, frequent lunch partner,
and NAACP colleague, to represent her.548 At the urging of long-time local civil
rights activist E.D. Nixon, Rosa Parks agreed to have her case used “to challenge
the constitutionality of [the] bus segregation laws.”549 Nixon viewed this as the
opportunity for which he had been waiting—to combine direct action and litigation

543

KING, Press Club Address, supra note 531, at 102.
This account of the Montgomery Bus Boycott’s use of complementary litigation is drawn largely
from Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, and sources cited there.
545
See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, ROSA PARKS 88, 90 (2000); see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 43–47;
SALMOND, supra note 115, at 173; WILLIAMS, supra note 483, at 63; David J. Garrow, The Origins of
the Montgomery Bus Boycott, S. CHANGES, Oct.–Dec. 1985, at 21, reprinted in THE WALKING CITY:
THE MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT, 1955–1956, at 607, 613 (David J. Garrow ed., 1989).
546
See DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 77 (noting that the appellate judge’s ruling
“prevented the lawyers from using Colvin’s arrest as a test case to challenge the bus segregation laws”).
By some accounts, the circuit solicitor prosecuting the case informed the court that the State was
dropping the charge for violating the city bus segregation ordinance after the appellate judge denied
Claudette Colvin’s motion to dismiss that charge on constitutional grounds, and then set the case for
trial. See, e.g., THORNTON, supra note 27, at 54. The judge upheld Colvin’s conviction for assaulting a
police officer when the officer tried to remove her from the bus. See DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra
note 32, at 77.
547
The Colvin case confirmed that Alabama state courts were not a hospitable place to bring bus
desegregation litigation. Consequently, Fred Gray and Clifford Durr began to consider filing a suit in
federal court, alleging that bus segregation laws violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. GRAY, supra note 7, at 70–71; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 54–55. That possibility
seemed even more promising after NAACP lawyers obtained a Fourth Circuit decision in Flemming v.
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., striking down South Carolina’s bus segregation laws, in July 1955.
See 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956).
548
GRAY, supra note 7, at 31, 50; see also THEOHARIS, supra note 332, at 34, 60–61, 77.
549
DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 9; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 121, 130–31.
544
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to challenge the Jim Crow regime on the buses: “This is the case. We can boycott
the bus lines with this and at the same time go to the Supreme Court.”550
For Fred Gray, Rosa Parks’ arrest provided an early chance to act on his
mission to destroy segregation wherever he found it.551 Gray’s goal was to get the
Supreme Court to extend the principle in Brown to the segregation of transportation
facilities. 552 In light of the possibility of basing Rosa Parks’ defense on the
unconstitutionality of the bus segregation laws, Fred Gray enlisted Thurgood
Marshall and Robert Carter in New York, the most experienced civil rights lawyers
in the country.553 Gray also recruited local lawyers to work on the case.554
As expected, the trial judge rejected the unconstitutionality defense and found
Rosa Parks guilty of violating the bus segregation laws. 555 Gray’s strategy
contemplated appeals through the state courts, which would almost certainly affirm
the trial court and set the stage for an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 556
However, a procedural mishap precluded the state appeal, thus ending the case.557
While Fred Gray was preparing Rosa Parks’ defense, Dr. King accepted the
leadership position at the Montgomery Improvement Association. 558 As the
movement’s leader, his views about the role of litigation became critical.
550

GARROW, supra note 2, at 14. Notwithstanding Nixon’s call for simultaneous implementation of
the two strategies, that did not happen in Montgomery, or in any other movement. See discussion infra
Sections II.B.1–2, III.A.
551
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 51, 74. In fact, matters proceeded in fits and starts, with no
constitutional challenge initiated until the following year. See infra note 578 and accompanying text.
552
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 76–77.
553
See id. at 72–73, 77; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 71, 75; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra
note 34, at 682 & 715 n.113; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031 n.199.
554
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 54, 72; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 714 n.112.
555
Parks was “found guilty of violating Chapter 1, Section 8 of the City Code of Montgomery,
Alabama,” Parks v. City of Montgomery, 92 So. 2d 683, 684 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957), which made a
violation of the state bus segregation statute also a municipal offense. See discussion supra Section
II.A.1.i.
To secure the Supreme Court decision the protesters were seeking, the lower courts needed to reject
the unconstitutionality defense. This approach echoes the lawyers’ strategy more than a half century
earlier with their “test case” in Plessy v. Ferguson, where Homer Plessy’s lawyer challenged the
prosecution as based on an unconstitutional railroad segregation statute. That case made it to the
Supreme Court, and became the first decision to affirm the constitutionality of segregation laws. See
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See generally LOFGREN, supra note 144 (assessing the Plessy
decision in view of its relevant facts and the prevailing doctrines). While Rosa Parks had not planned to
refuse to give up her seat in order to challenge the segregation laws, the case seemed to provide an
opportunity to bring the question before the Court.
556
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 56, 71.
557
See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1047. Parks was charged with violating a municipal ordinance,
not a state law. The Court of Appeals of Alabama said that prosecutions for such violations were only
“quasi criminal” in nature, and were thus governed by the rules that applied to civil, rather than to
criminal, appeals. Parks, 92 So. 2d at 684. And while the criminal appellate rules dispensed with
assignments of error, the civil appellate rules required them. Id. at 684–85. Because no errors were
assigned in Parks’ appeal, the court of appeals concluded there was nothing for it to review, and
affirmed Parks’ conviction. Id. at 685.
At that point, Fred Gray and his associates were willing to put desegregation litigation on the back
burner because they still believed that the city would agree to changes: “Really what happened is when
we talked to the bus company officials and the city officials and they promised that things would be
better, we just let them out talk us.” Interview by Christopher Coleman with Fred Gray in Tuskegee,
Ala. (Aug. 21, 2001).
558
KING, supra note 7, at 41–43; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 52–53.
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The Montgomery Bus Boycott began in the shadow of Brown, a year and a
half after the first decision and just months after Brown II, the remedial decision.559
Early on, Dr. King praised and celebrated the Brown decision, notwithstanding his
consistent philosophical and pragmatic position to never rely exclusively on the
courts.560 Brown was a classic example of that one-dimensional strategy of standalone litigation.561
Dr. King acknowledged several critical benefits of the Court’s school
desegregation decision: providing legitimacy for the Civil Rights Movement;
inspiring Blacks, as well as whites, to join the movement; and making available an
important legal precedent that could be useful in future cases that were part of a
broader social movement.562 In his initial speech before the bus boycott began, Dr.
King invoked the Brown decision, without naming it, to establish the legitimacy of
the movement’s enterprise.563 In seeking the moral and political high ground, he
urged that: “We are not wrong. . . . [I]f we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this
Nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong.”564
Montgomery’s Black community was contemplating collective resistance to the
previously accepted authority of the city and the bus company, so it was critical to
have a way of framing that initiative as right and justified.565 Moreover, the path
Montgomery’s Black community was contemplating was uncharted territory, with
great risks individually and collectively. At least one branch of the federal

559

Brown I was decided in May 1954, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Brown II in May 1955, 349 U.S.
294 (1955) (mandating school desegregation with “all deliberate speed”).
560
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 78, 87, 91–92; KING, supra note 7, at 167–68.
561
See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 686 & 718 nn.143–44; Kennedy, supra note
112, at 1012.
562
See KING, supra note 7, at 50, 168; MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Facing the Challenge of a New
Age, Address Before the First Annual Institute on Non-Violence and Social Change (Dec. 3, 1956), in
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 531, at 135, 137–38; Martin Luther King, Jr., The Burning Truth in
the South, PROGRESSIVE, May 1960, at 8, reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 531, at 94,
95; Martin Luther King, Jr., “Desegregation and the Future,” Address Delivered at the Annual
Luncheon of the National Committee for Rural Schools (Dec. 15, 1956), in 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 471, 472–75; Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Golden
Anniversary Conference of National Urban League 2–3 (Sept. 6, 1960), http://www.thekingcenter.org
/archive/document/address-mlk-golden-anniversary-conference-national-urban-league; Martin Luther
King, Jr., Address to the National Bar Association 3–5 (Aug. 20, 1959), http://www.thekingcenter.org
/archive/document/address-national-bar-association.
563
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 140.
564
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1000.
565
In Dr. King’s account of the Montgomery Bus Boycott in Stride Toward Freedom, published
shortly after the boycott ended, he emphasized the importance of Brown:

For all men of good will May 17, 1954, marked a joyous end to the long night of
enforced segregation. In unequivocal language the Court affirmed that “separate but
equal” facilities are inherently unequal, and that to segregate a child on the basis of his
race is to deny that child equal protection of the law. This decision brought hope to
millions of disinherited Negroes who had formerly dared only to dream of freedom. It
further enhanced the Negro’s sense of dignity and gave him even greater determination to
achieve justice.
KING, supra note 7, at 168.
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government, however, seemed to be on their side, making the effort less treacherous
and success seemingly more possible.566
Notwithstanding the potentially powerful precedent that Brown provided, a
legal challenge to the bus segregation laws moved to the back burner after the denial
of Rosa Parks’ appeal.567 It remained on the back burner for the first two months of
the boycott. 568 Dr. King showed no interest in pursuing a legal strategy. 569 In
addition, there was very little support among Montgomery’s Blacks for an
immediate resort to the courts.570 Despite the well-publicized precedents of Brown
and a Fourth Circuit decision striking down South Carolina’s bus segregation laws,
federal litigation remained an unsure and possibly dangerous tactic.571 Moreover,
going to court would almost certainly have ended any possibility of a successful
negotiation of their grievances with local officials, leaving bus conditions
unchanged while the suit traveled what could be a long and uncertain journey
through the federal courts.572 Worse still, even a favorable Supreme Court ruling
could not guarantee integration on the city’s buses.573
In late January 1956, the City Commission announced that it would no longer
negotiate with the MIA until Black riders returned to the buses.574 That persuaded
566

See GRAY, supra note 7, at 71; KING, supra note 7, at 131–32; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz,
supra note 34, at 682.
567
The scope of the principle articulated by the Court in 1954 was uncertain, because the opinion
referred specifically to the “field of public education,” rather than addressing state-imposed segregation
more generally. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491, 495 (1954); see Kennedy, supra note 112, at
1049–50. But subsequent per curiam decisions showed the Court was prepared to extend the principle
much more broadly. Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 684 & 717 nn.132–33; see also
cases cited infra note 650.
Notwithstanding the risks of uncertainty, Fred Gray and local lawyer Clifford Durr were prepared to
proceed with litigation seeking a declaratory judgment or an injunction against the bus segregation
laws. See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1047–49. However, the movement’s leaders were reluctant to
pursue such judicial relief because they actually believed that the white opposition leaders would
quickly offer a compromise once they realized “the depth of [the protesters’] dissatisfaction with the
situation on the buses.” Id. at 1048. Adding to their reluctance was the then-prominent social perception
associated with using the courts to resolve disputes—King and the MIA knew “that white Alabama
would react to [the filing of a suit] as the social equivalent of atomic warfare.” Id. at 1049.
The prevailing tension was caused in part by white southerners viewing the Court’s decision in
Brown as a threat to the southern “way of life.” See Bayard Rustin, Report on Montgomery, Alabama
(Mar. 21, 1956), in DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 208, 208.
568
See infra notes 575–579 and accompanying text.
569
Dr. King did not seem to discuss the possibility until events on the ground pushed toward
consideration of a lawsuit. See infra notes 574–578, 595 and accompanying text.
570
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 672; see also THORNTON, supra note 27, at 41
(“At a meeting of his Citizens' Coordinating Committee in August [1955], Rufus Lewis sought to
persuade the committee to sponsor a federal court suit to seek the integration of the [city's] parks, but
the majority of the committee voted instead merely to continue efforts to equalize the park facilities
within the framework of segregation.”); Thornton, supra note 112, at 229 (“Montgomery’s Blacks had
not yet developed the faith in the federal court[s] which future years would generate.”).
571
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 672.
572
Id.
573
Id.
574
Id. at 681 & 714 n.106; see also Thornton, supra note 112, at 214 (quoting Montgomery Mayor
William A. “Tacky” Gayle as having declared, “When and if the Negro people desire to end the
boycott, my door is open to them. But until they are ready to end it, there will be no more discussions”).
On January 22, Mayor Gayle announced that he had struck a deal with three leading Black ministers
to end the boycott on the city’s proposed terms. The ministers involved were not part of the MIA. The
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MIA leaders that the City Commissioners would never agree to any substantial
concessions.575 The stalemate was one of several factors that led the organization
to file the constitutional lawsuit a few days later, despite the initial hesitance
towards pursuing litigation. Dr. King cited three reasons for bringing the case: “the
intransigence of the city’s commission, the crudeness of the ‘get tough’ policy
[intense, unfair, and punitive traffic law enforcement], and the viciousness of the
recent bombings.” 576 The MIA Board’s decision was confirmed when racists
bombed Dr. King’s house, causing great fear, substantial damage, but no injuries.577
In early February 1956, Fred Gray filed a class action in federal court on
behalf of five female plaintiffs and the city’s similarly situated Black residents.578
The complaint alleged that the Montgomery city ordinances and Alabama state
statutes requiring segregation on common carriers were unconstitutional under the
equal protection clause.579
As the highly visible lead local counsel, Fred Gray bore the brunt of the severe
backlash against the litigation. Local officials and white citizens embarked on an
intensive, sustained, and varied campaign to oust Fred Gray from the civil rights
picture.580 Presumably, they hoped that doing so would also deter other lawyers
from participating, thus ending the threat of adverse judicial action.
When Gray first filed Browder v. Gayle asking the court to declare the bus
segregation statutes unconstitutional, local officials tried to prevent him from

MIA denounced the city’s actions, and announced that it would continue the boycott. In response,
Mayor Gayle announced that there would be no more negotiations until Black people returned to the
buses. Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 678; see also KING, supra note 7, at 104–107
(“In obvious indignation, the mayor went on television and denounced the boycott. He threatened that
the commission was going to ‘stop pussy-footing around with the boycott.’ The vast majority of white
Montgomerians, he declared, did not care if a Negro ever rode the buses again.”).
575
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 681 & 714 n.106; Thornton, supra note 112, at
214–15. As Ralph Abernathy, an MIA leader, said:

Our first demand was to have more courtesy on the part of the bus drivers, to eliminate
them calling our women names . . . we could not solve the problem because they were not
willing to cooperate . . . all they had to do was change the law and make it permissible for
black people to ride on the buses under those conditions . . . but that was the most
important lesson of the boycott . . . the city leaders were not going to compromise, so
consequently we needed a ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court.
WILLIAMS, supra note 483, at 85.
576
KING, supra note 7, at 131.
577
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 714 n.106; see also ROBINSON MEMOIR, supra
note 139, at 135–36. See generally GRAY, supra note 7, at 67 (discussing the bombing of Dr. King’s
home). Taylor Branch emphasizes instead the strains on the MIA’s car pool system, which transported
thousands of Blacks each day, as a major precipitating factor in filing the lawsuit. BRANCH, supra note
32, at 159.
In addition, Martin Luther King, Jr. had a level of faith in the federal courts that he did not feel about
the state courts. See JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M.
JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 109 (1993); KING, supra note 7, at 131–32,
175–76, 198.
578
See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956);
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 681; see also Thornton, supra note 112, at 215. This
was three days after the bombing of Dr. King’s home. Entin, supra note 128, at 257.
579
See Browder, 142 F. Supp. at 710–12.
580
See infra notes 581–593 and accompanying text.
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pursuing the legal challenge.581 Some officials hinted that if Gray could get his
clients to drop the suit, or if he stalled to prevent an actual ruling, he would “have
all the legal cases [he] could handle,” allowing Gray to build a substantial
practice.582 Although these offers came at a time when Gray “had nothing,” he
wrote that accepting the offers “would have been contrary to my goal of ‘destroying
everything segregated I could find.’ ”583
After he rejected these offers, white officials made Fred Gray a target of
harassment. He had an exemption from the military because he had been a
minister—a “boy preacher”—well before he became a lawyer, and he served as
assistant pastor at a Montgomery church.584 The local draft board reclassified his
exempt draft status and issued an induction order.585 Gray successfully petitioned
the director of the Selective Service System to have the order cancelled, which
happened the night before he was to report for duty.586
A Montgomery County grand jury also charged Gray with barratry, or
maliciously stirring up lawsuits587—an offense that could have cost him his law
license.588 The indictment alleged that Gray fraudulently named Jeanetta Reese as
a plaintiff in Browder v. Gayle because she allegedly had not agreed to be a
plaintiff.589 Reese claimed she had no knowledge of the suit, after she was subjected
to intense pressure from white authorities.590
Gray had fully documented Reese’s agreement to be represented in the case,591
so the charge against him was ultimately dismissed. 592 Gray also faced bomb
threats, harassing letters and telephone calls, and an attempted stabbing.593 While
581

GRAY, supra note 7, at 73 (“Numerous local, county, state, and federal officials in all three
branches of government attempted to prevail upon me not to pursue the case.”).
582
Id. at 73–74.
583
Id. at 74.
584
Id. at 77–78, 271–72.
585
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1028 & n.180; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 77 (pointing out that
his draft status was reclassified from 4-D to 1-A).
586
GRAY, supra note 7, at 78.
587
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1028 & n.181. See generally GRAY, supra note 7, at 81–83
(discussing the “politically motivated criminal prosecution”).
588
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 81 (“The state statute under which I was indicted called for automatic
disbarment upon conviction.”); see also Entin, supra note 128, at 257.
589
GRAY, supra note 7, at 81.
590
Id.; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1028 n.181; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 167 (pointing
out how “visitors of both races trampled a path to [Reese’s] door, urging her to stick to the contrary
assurances she had given them”); DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 128 (observing that Reese
apparently withdrew from the suit after intense pressure from white authorities). Bayard Rustin reported
that Reese told him, “I had to do what I did or I wouldn’t be alive today.” Bayard Rustin, Montgomery
Diary, LIBERATION, Apr. 1956, at 7, 8, reprinted in DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 164,
166. Rustin also reported, “Although the police had provided no protection for King and Nixon after
their houses had been bombed, . . . two squad cars [were] parked before Mrs. Reese’s home[, and] a
policeman was patrolling the area with a machine gun.” Id.
591
GRAY, supra note 7, at 81.
592
Id. at 83. As Gray recounts:

Solicitor William Thetford, at the opening of the hearing in state circuit court, recognized
that he could not secure a conviction so he asked the court to dismiss the indictment on
the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction and that he would refer the matter to
the United States Attorney. I never heard anything else on this matter.
Id.

593

Id. at 77.
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Fred Gray was not deterred by such tactics, he realized that in order to mount a
successful constitutional challenge, they would need help from lawyers with greater
experience and expertise in civil rights cases. NAACP General Counsel Robert
Carter agreed to work with the MIA once they decided to challenge the segregation
laws directly.594
At that point, the litigation strategy moved center stage in the protest. Dr. King
said that “we are now depending on the courts to give the final answer.”595 Later,
he said that the MIA was “waiting and hoping. Our whole strategy is based on the
May 11 trial.”596 With this acknowledgement that the boycott could not achieve the
MIA’s objectives by itself, Dr. King even considered calling off the boycott.597 On
June 5, 1956, in a 2-1 decision, a three-judge district court held the state and local
bus segregation laws unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection.598 Writing for
the majority, Judge Rives concluded that the Brown decision, followed by per
curiam decisions extending it to other public facilities, sounded the death knell for
the “separate but equal” doctrine.599 With the Court having repudiated Plessy, it
stood implicitly overruled, and the district court was no longer bound to follow it.600
Local officials sought review by the Supreme Court. 601 Because of the
increased cooperation between the MIA and the NAACP, Robert Carter prepared
the brief opposing Supreme Court review.602 The Court accepted the case, but did
not schedule oral argument. On November 13, 1956, the Supreme Court affirmed
the three-judge district court in a one line per curiam decision.603 The Court thus

594

TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 302; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 682 & 715
n.115. The original demands had been modest, limited to incremental changes in the segregation
arrangements and better treatment by bus drivers. Id. at 678 & 712 n.81, 681–82.
595
GARROW, supra note 2, at 63.
596
Id. at 76.
597
See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 81. Two considerations seem to have motivated Dr. King’s
decision to continue the boycott. First, there was uncertainty about the outcome of the lawsuit. Second,
Dr. King believed that the Black community was so committed to the boycott that they would not have
gotten back on the buses. Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 681.
598
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala.), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). See
generally Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1050–51 (discussing the district court’s decision).
599
Browder, 142 F. Supp. at 716.
600
The majority concluded that in light of the decision in Brown and the Supreme Court decisions
following it “there is now no rational basis upon which the separate but equal doctrine can be validly
applied to public carrier transportation within the City of Montgomery and its police jurisdiction.” Id. at
717.
Dissenting Judge Lynne argued that the Plessy decision applied precisely to the facts in the case, that
the Supreme Court had not overruled Plessy with respect to intrastate transportation, and that lower
court judges were bound by that decision until the Supreme Court did so. Id. at 718–20 (Lynne, J.,
dissenting).
601
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 683; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1051.
602
TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 304.
603
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (“The motion to affirm is granted and the
judgment is affirmed.” (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Mayor of Baltimore City v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955))). This was one of a
series of per curiam decisions extending Brown’s rationale to other public facilities and laws providing
for the segregation of private facilities and services. Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 717
n.133; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1051–52.
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overruled Plessy and struck down state and local laws mandating segregation on
buses.604
There is substantial evidence of synergy between the litigation and the
boycott.605 That coordinated approach seemed to produce more change on the buses
than either strategy could have produced on its own. It is likely that neither would
have accomplished much on the ground without the other. The boycott faced strong
and unyielding resistance, which only grew more entrenched over time. 606 The
litigation helped to sustain the momentum of the protest, and the three-judge district
court decision gave the MIA hope that the Supreme Court would follow suit.607 The
boycott gave the Black community courage that enabled them to return to the buses
with dignity and confidence when the Supreme Court affirmed the local court’s
decision.608 Absent the litigation, the boycott may well have failed.609 Absent the
boycott, the Court’s decision may have changed little on the ground.610

604

See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 684. The Supreme Court denied the
defendants’ motion for rehearing on December 17, 1956, and the mandate issued on December 20. See
DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 49.
605
See generally Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 675–83 (discussing synergy in
Montgomery Bus Boycott).
606
See id. at 677–80; Martin Luther King, Jr., Address by MLK at 47th NAACP Annual Convention,
KING CTR. 7 (June 27, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/address-mlk-47th-naacpannual-convention.
607
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 70–71; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 682, 683 &
716 n.125.
608
See KING, supra note 7, at 143, 147–51; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 687–88;
Martin Luther King, Jr., Annual Address by MLK for the Montgomery Improvement Association, KING
CTR. 2 (Dec. 3, 1959), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/annual-address-mlkmontgomery-improvement-association; Martin Luther King, Jr., A Realistic Look at Race Relations,
KING CTR. 4, 7 (May 17, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/realistic-look-racerelations.
609
As Dr. King later reflected on the lower court’s decision and the city’s subsequent appeal to the
Supreme Court: “The battle was not yet won. We would have to walk and sacrifice for several more
months, while the city appealed the case. But at least we could walk with new hope. Now it was only a
matter of time.” KING, supra note 7, at 133; see also M.L. King, Jr., Statement by the President of the
Montgomery Improvement Association, KING CTR. 1 (Nov. 14, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org
/archive/document/statement-president-montgomery-improvement-association-1# (“These eleven
months have not at all been easy. . . . Our feet have often been tired and our automobiles worn, but we
have kept going with the faith that in our struggles we had cosmic companionship, and that, at bottom,
the universe is on the side of justice. Just yesterday we experienced a revelation of the eternal validity
of this faith. It was on this day that the Supreme Court of this nation affirmed that segregation is
unconstitutional in public transportation. . . . This decision came to all as a joyous daybreak to end the
long night of enforced segregation in public transportation.”).
610
See Martin Luther King, Jr., We Are Still Walking, LIBERATION, Dec. 1956, at 6–9, reprinted in
3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 445, 445–47; Coleman, Nee &
Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 684–89, 692–94, 697; Martin Luther King, Jr., Address by MLK at 47th
NAACP Annual Convention, KING CTR. 10 (June 27, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive
/document/address-mlk-47th-naacp-annual-convention (“[A]fter the legal battle is won, there is the
great problem of lifting the noble precepts of our Constitution from the dusty files of unimplemented
court decisions. The problem of implementation will be carried out mainly by the Negro’s refusal to
cooperate with segregation.”); M.L. King, Jr., Statement by the President of the Montgomery
Improvement Association, KING CTR. 1 (Nov. 14, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive
/document/statement-president-montgomery-improvement-association-1# (“All of us have a basic
responsibility to seek to impl[e]ment this noble decision. . . . This is Montgomery’s sublime
opportunity; we can now transform our jangling discords into meaningful symphonies of spiritual
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2. The Albany (Georgia) Movement (1961–1962)611
In light of its effectiveness, the Montgomery experience of joining nonviolent
direct action with desegregation litigation seemed to serve as a model for
subsequent movements. Yet the joint strategy remained in limbo for half a decade,
pending an opportunity and a need to try to take advantage of the additional
leverage the courts might provide. In 1962, Martin Luther King, Jr. and activists
faced another intransigent local government and turned again to litigation in the
hope of revitalizing a faltering movement, breaking a stalemate, and achieving a
measure of desegregation.612
This time it was in Albany, the southwestern Georgia city discussed earlier.613
In late 1961, the local leader of the “Albany Movement” invited Dr. King to the
city to help support the floundering effort.614 Nevertheless, faced with continuing
strong and effective resistance and serious internal tensions, the movement
stalled.615 By mid-summer Dr. King and local leaders decided to initiate a broadbased legal challenge to the pervasive segregation of public facilities in the city.616
On July 25, C.B. King of Albany, Donald Hollowell of Atlanta, and Constance
Baker Motley of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund filed Anderson v.
City of Albany in federal district court.617 C.B. King was the only Black lawyer in
southwest Georgia, which included Albany.618 He had been actively involved in the

harmony.”). For a comprehensive discussion of “litigation as a social process,” see TUSHNET, supra
note 521, at 143–166.
611
The years listed represent the movement’s most intense period. Activists continued the struggle
well beyond that time. See CARSON, supra note 27, at 56, 61–62.
612
Useful accounts of the Albany Movement include BRANCH, supra note 32, at 609–13, 616–17,
627–28; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 132–33, 137–39, 141–44, 148–56; GARROW, supra note 2, at 204–
09; KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 98–131; MORRIS, supra note 188, at 247–48; MOTLEY, supra note 13,
at 138–40.
613
See supra Sections II.A.1.a.iv, II.A.2.b.
614
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 180; MORRIS, supra note 188, at 242–44.
615
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 87–91, 100–04; GARROW, supra note 2, at 204–05.
616
GARROW, supra note 2, at 208. On July 20, 1962, Albany Mayor Asa Kelley and city attorney
Grady Rawls secured an injunction from U.S. District Judge J. Robert Elliott to block the mass
demonstrations that Kelley anticipated in the wake of city’s repeated refusals to meet face-to-face with
movement leaders. Id. at 205–06; see also KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 101 (recalling that Judge
Elliott’s “sweeping injunction . . . barred Albany’s Negroes from ‘unlawful picketing, congregating or
marching in the streets, and from any act designed to provoke breaches of the peace’ ”). After Chief
Judge Elbert P. Tuttle of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed to hear a
motion to vacate Judge Elliott’s injunction, the movement’s attorneys drafted the federal lawsuit while
preparing for that hearing. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 208 (“In addition to preparing for the hearing,
[the movement’s lawyers] drafted two complaints challenging Albany’s segregated city facilities and its
policy of arresting peaceful protesters”). William Kunstler described it as “a long overdue federal
lawsuit to desegregate all of Albany’s public facilities.” KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 112. After
attending the hearing before Judge Tuttle in Atlanta, Dr. King returned to Albany and “told newsmen
that henceforth the movement would follow a four-pronged program, with direct action, the new
lawsuits, and the ongoing boycott being joined by a voter registration drive.” GARROW, supra note 2, at
209.
617
Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649, 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1963). Clarence Jones was also part
of the legal team. He, in turn, invited William Kunstler to assist with the Albany litigation. KUNSTLER,
supra note 1, at 93.
618
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 132.
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Albany Movement from the outset.619 When the movement leaders decided to turn
to the courts, C.B. King was the obvious choice as counsel. 620 C.B. King had
worked extensively with leading Atlanta civil rights lawyer Donald Hollowell
before the Albany Movement, so he had enlisted Hollowell’s assistance early in the
movement.621 Hollowell had been serving as LDF’s local counsel in Atlanta and
the Southeast region.622 Both then brought in LDF staff attorney Constance Baker
Motley to work on earlier matters and on the Anderson case.623
The “omnibus” lawsuit sought to enjoin racial discrimination and segregation
in city-owned and regulated facilities, including swimming pools, tennis courts, the
city library, public auditoriums, and transportation facilities. 624 The lawyers
structured the case as a class action on behalf of the named plaintiffs and “all other
Negro citizens of the City of Albany, Georgia similarly situated.”625 They prayed
for injunctive relief from enforcement of racial segregation in public facilities,
certain private businesses, including transportation and places of public
amusement, and the threat of arrest or harassment if a member of the class used
these facilities or businesses.626
On February 14, 1963, District Judge Elliot dismissed the complaint.627 He
found that the named plaintiffs, including Slater King and Dr. Anderson, were not
members of the class they claimed to represent since there was no evidence they
were denied the use of those facilities based on their race, or threatened with
arrest.628 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on
the class action question and reached the merits in a July 26, 1963 opinion. 629
619
MORRIS, supra note 188, at 241; see, e.g., FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 100, 103; GARROW,
supra note 2, at 174, 177–79, 185–86, 196; KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 95–96.
620
For biographical information on C.B. King, see BRANCH, supra note 32, at 524–25; DANIELS,
supra note 41, at 132–33, 137, 141, 154–56; KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 105; see also supra note 142.
621
See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 132–33. Their joint efforts began with Anderson v. Courson,
which desegregated polling places in Albany. See 203 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
Before filing the desegregation case, King and Hollowell had defended several arrested protesters in
the movement. See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 137; see also discussion supra Section II.A.1.i.d.
622
MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 139.
623
When city officials secured a temporary restraining order against the movement’s demonstrations,
King and Hollowell called on Constance Baker Motley for assistance. See DANIELS, supra note 41, at
154. In her autobiography, Motley said that “Chevene Bowers (C.B.) King of Albany, Georgia, and
Donald Hollowell urged me by phone to come down to help with the legal strategy.” MOTLEY, supra
note 13, at 138–39.
624
See Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1964); Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649,
650, 653 (5th Cir. 1963).
625
Anderson v. Kelly, 32 F.R.D. 355, 356 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
626
Id. at 356–57.
627
Id. at 355, 358.
628
See id.
629
See Anderson, 321 F.2d at 653. Judge Tuttle cited a letter city officials wrote to “the Negro
leaders of Albany” to conclude that the plaintiffs in the case “represent the Negro citizenship of the city
of Albany.” Id. at 652 (“[T]here is no factual dispute but that the four plaintiffs were members of a class
whose interests were the basis of demands made by them on the defendants and which the evidence
clearly shows were rejected.”). Judge Tuttle also referred to the fact that the plaintiffs made numerous
demands on the city to end segregation before filing the lawsuit. Id. Moreover, he concluded that
plaintiffs need not be arrested or threatened with arrest to represent “the class of Negro citizens who
were adversely affected by the State’s policy of racial segregation.” Id. at 653. For these reasons, the
court held that it was an error for the trial court to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the plaintiffs
did not represent the class. Id.
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Writing for the 2-1 majority, Judge Elbert Tuttle held that city-mandated
segregation of city facilities and public transportation was unconstitutional, citing
numerous cases stating that enforced segregation in city facilities is
unconstitutional.630 The court rejected the contention that changed conditions, such
as the repeal of all segregation ordinances, rendered the lawsuit moot.631 Instead, it
granted the requested injunctive relief.632
By the time the Fifth Circuit ruled in the summer of 1963, however, Martin
Luther King, Jr. had long since left town, and the movement had lost its visibility.633
Participants and observers alike viewed the Albany experience largely as a failure
from which to learn lessons for later campaigns.634 Those lessons focused on the
need for more carefully planned, aggressive nonviolent direct action tactics. The
campaigns in Birmingham and Selma exemplified the activists’ dramatic changes
in approach.635
III. DEPLOYING THE LAWYERS: THE LATER YEARS (1963–1968)
In the early 1960s, Dr. King and SCLC made significant changes in the
strategies they used to advance their objectives. After the failure of the Albany,
Georgia Movement in 1962, Dr. King and his colleagues took stock, knowing that
they could ill afford another dismal outcome. Since nonviolent direct action
remained their basic strategy, they searched for ways to make it more effective. The
movement’s strategy shifted from “persuasive” nonviolence to “coercive”
nonviolence.636 Dr. King believed “the notion that ethical appeals and persuasion
alone will bring about justice” was fallacious, and although ethical appeals should
Judge Gewin dissented because he felt:

(1) the opinion is contrary to the established law relating to class actions; (2) the
presumption in favor of the findings of fact by the trial court has been disregarded, the
clearly erroneous rule has not been followed, and the majority has made a choice of facts
from a large volume of testimony where the facts are in conflict; (3) the rules of law with
respect to the granting of injunctions have not been followed; and (4) the case is moot.
Id. at 659 (Gewin, J., dissenting). Specifically, he cited case law that said plaintiffs in a class action
need to prove their individual rights have been denied. Id. The district judge found that this was not the
case, and Judge Gewin stated that he wanted to follow this finding, since “findings by a trier of facts
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.” Id. Also, because all the laws had been repealed, Judge
Gewin felt the case was moot. Id. at 661–62.
630
Id. at 654 (majority opinion) (“Since the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit case of
Dawson v. Mayor of the City of Baltimore, 350 U.S. 877, [aff’g] 220 F.2d 386, it has been ‘obvious that
racial segregation in recreational activities can no longer be sustained as a proper exercise of the police
power of the State.’ ”).
631
Id. at 656–57.
632
Id. at 657. In explaining the need for an injunction, the court said, “What has been adopted can be
repealed, and what has been repealed can be re-adopted.” Id. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case “with
directions that an injunction issue consistent with [the court’s] opinion.” Id. at 658.
633
See generally GARROW, supra note 2, at 223–26.
634
See KING, supra note 22, at 34–35, 48; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 156; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note
21, at 106–09; GARROW, supra note 2, at 226–29; MORRIS, supra note 188, at 248–50.
635
See discussion infra Section III.A.
636
On December 5, 1955, Dr. King urged the thousands gathered at Montgomery’s Holt Street
Baptist Church to approach the protest with caution: “We will be guided by the highest principles of
law and order. Our method will be that of persuasion, not coercion.” KING, supra note 7, at 48.
Beginning in the early 1960s, Dr. King’s focus shifted towards coercion. See GARROW, supra note 22,
at 220–21.
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be made, “those appeals must be undergirded by some form of constructive
coercive power.”637 “If the Negro does not add persistent pressure to his patient
plea,” Dr. King added, “he will end up empty-handed.” 638 Marches and
demonstrations became larger, more numerous, more diverse in their participants,
more provocative, and more varied in their distance, duration, and location. 639
Other new forms of escalation included violating an injunction and initiating a rent
strike.640
The strategic changes also meant deploying lawyers in new ways. While
lawyers continued to play some of the same roles they had played earlier, they also
assumed important new responsibilities. Moreover, they had opportunities to
undertake creative initiatives in support of activists’ innovative strategies and
tactics.641 At the same time, Dr. King and his colleagues no longer called on their
lawyers to initiate complementary desegregation litigation. They passed up
opportunities to pursue legal remedies, even when local laws, policies, or practices
were vulnerable to such challenges. The 1963 Birmingham Movement and the
Chicago Freedom Movement three years later exemplified this turn away from the
dual strategy that marked the Montgomery and Albany movements.642
A. The Abandonment of Complementary Desegregation Litigation
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s views about the utility of desegregation litigation
evolved over the course of his career. As with other strategic aspects, the turning
point seemed to be the Birmingham Movement in 1963.643 With the escalation and
increasing effectiveness of nonviolent direct action after Albany, especially in
Birmingham (1963) and in Selma (1965), Dr. King and his colleagues saw little
need to initiate litigation to advance their objectives.644 Moreover, legal strategies
became less appealing as the courts’ limitations in implementing decrees grew more
apparent.645

637

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? 128–29
(1968).
638
Id. at 129.
639
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–iii, III.B.2, III.B.3.i–v.
640
See discussion infra Sections III.B.2, III.B.3.i.
641
See discussion infra Section III.B.
642
See discussion supra Section II.B.
643
See discussion infra Section III.B.
644
See, e.g., RALPH, supra note 62, at 143 (noting that one of Dr. King’s favorite themes was
“nonviolence needs some victories”); see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 54 (“SCLC
leaders were less interested in test-case litigation than in holding effective protest marches in
Birmingham that spring.”).
645
See KLARMAN, supra note 13, at 380 (“Court decisions such as Brown could significantly alter
social practices only if lower courts aggressively implemented them, Congress and the president
enforced them, and local officials could be prevented from nullifying them. Each of these conditions
depended on educating public opinion, which direct action accomplished better than litigation could. As
King stated, ‘Only when the people themselves begin to act are rights on paper given life blood.’ ”). See
generally TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 255–56 (“Winning cases . . . accomplished little, at least in the
short run.”). However, a number of lawyers who had litigated the desegregation cases remained
involved in the “support” mode, because their basic commitment was to the civil rights objectives, not
just the litigation strategy. See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–iii, III.B.3.i–iii, III.B.4.i–ii.
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After the Albany Movement, desegregation lawsuits disappeared from the
strategic arsenal, although they may have remained on the back burner as an option
to consider if necessary. The 1963 Birmingham Movement relied entirely on
nonviolent direct action, providing the first clear indication that the joint strategy
had begun to fade from the movement’s radar. 646 The Birmingham campaign
ignored viable legal claims that would have provided opportunities for
desegregation litigation.647 In fact, many local segregation laws remained on the
books when the Birmingham Movement began. They prohibited Blacks from being
served in the same restaurants as whites, attending the same schools, or using the
same elevators, water fountains, or parks.648 They also outlawed Blacks playing
billiards or baseball with whites, or sitting intermixed in a theatre.649 Even though
recent Supreme Court precedent had shown those types of ordinances highly
vulnerable to being overturned, the activists did not file any constitutional
challenges.650
By 1966, when Dr. King took his movement north to Chicago, he seemed to
have completely abandoned the idea of using legal processes along with direct
action.651 That summer the Chicago Freedom Movement—a joint initiative of a
coalition of local organizations and SCLC—carried out an open housing campaign
to address the extreme segregation and pervasive discrimination in the city’s
neighborhoods.652 While the main focus was on the private housing market, the
movement also demanded desegregation of the city’s public housing program.653
646

See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135. Discussing the Birmingham Movement, LDF lawyer
Constance Baker Motley suggested that Dr. King and his associates “had always undervalued resort to
the courts—an indispensable weapon in the struggle—and preferred nonviolent protest demonstrations
and marches.” Id.
647
See id.
648
See Lee E. Bains, Jr., Birmingham, 1963: Confrontation over Civil Rights, in BIRMINGHAM,
ALABAMA, 1956–1963: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 227, at 150, 165–66.
649
See BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GEN. CODE §§ 359, 597, 939 (1944) (repealed 1963).
650
In the years following Brown, the Court extended the desegregation mandate to many more public
facilities, including beaches and bathhouses (Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(per curiam)), golf courses (Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam)), buses (Gayle
v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam)), parks (New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam)), athletic contests (State Athletics Comm’n v. Dorsey,
359 U.S. 533 (1959) (per curiam)), restaurants (Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per
curiam)), city auditoriums (Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam)), and courtrooms
(Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam)). See generally Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz,
supra note 34, at 682–84.
651
See generally RALPH, supra note 62. Dr. King and his advisers developed a “three-phase battle
plan” for Chicago, which concentrated on educating and organizing, focused demonstrations, and
“massive” protests. Id. at 43–44; see also AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 24–25. Although
seemingly unsuccessful at first, Dr. King’s nonviolent action strategy in Chicago eventually helped
secure the passage of federal fair housing legislation in 1968. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Kathryn
Shelton, Non-Violent Direct Action and the Legislative Process: The Chicago Freedom Movement and
the Federal Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 663, 664 (2008).
652
See generally RALPH, supra note 62, at 92–130.
653
See id. at 152–54; see also ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF
SEGREGATION, HOUSING, AND THE BLACK GHETTO 40 (2006) (“Open housing demands . . . includ[ed]
two for the CHA: (1) halt public housing construction in the ghetto until a substantial number of units
were started elsewhere; and (2) create a program to vastly increase the supply of low-cost housing on a
scattered-site basis.”). See generally ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 62, at 239–40 (listing the
movement’s nine demands).
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Two opportunities for using the legal system presented themselves in the open
housing campaign. First, for racial discrimination in the private housing market,
there was legal recourse available under Chicago’s 1963 Fair Housing Ordinance,
which gave the city’s Human Relations Commission enforcement authority.654 As
Black people encountered discrimination in seeking to buy or rent housing in white
neighborhoods, they could have filed complaints with the Commission.
Second, while the city’s public housing agency, the Chicago Housing
Authority, did not operate under a statute requiring or permitting segregation, its
policies and practices had produced a highly segregated program.655 That pattern
made the program potentially vulnerable to a federal lawsuit challenging racial
discrimination in site selection and tenant assignment under the Equal Protection
Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 656 The Chicago Freedom
Movement did not pursue the potential legal remedies involving either the private
market or the public housing program. 657 Instead, it relied exclusively on a
nonviolent, direct-action strategy.658
654

See CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 198.7-B (1963) (current version at CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL
CODE ch. 5-8 (2015)); see also Chi. Real Estate Bd. v. Chicago, 224 N.E.2d 793, 797 (Ill. 1967);
RALPH, supra note 62, at 142 (discussing Commissioner Edward Marciniak’s frustration with the
Chicago activists who did not first seek redress through the process established by the ordinance).
655
See RALPH, supra note 62, at 152–54.
656
Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race in programs receiving federal funds, such as the
public housing program. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, § 601, 78 Stat. 241,
252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012)).
Independently of the Chicago Freedom Movement’s contemporaneous demands for the
desegregation of public housing, the ACLU filed a federal suit in the summer of 1966 challenging the
Chicago Housing Authority’s site selection and tenant assignment policies and practices as being
racially discriminatory. See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969); see also
POLIKOFF, supra note 653, at 48–49; RALPH, supra note 62, at 228; LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES
E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA
23 (2000). Since there were no explicit segregation policies like those in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), where segregation was written into state constitutions and statutes, and in
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), where the state statute and local ordinances
provided for segregation on buses, the outcome of the ACLU’s lawsuit was much more uncertain than
in the southern situation.
The Chicago Freedom Movement did not have the kind of visible success that the Birmingham and
Selma movements experienced. The decision to avoid legal strategies seems to have resulted more from
the doubts about their efficacy than about the effectiveness of nonviolent direct action making them
unnecessary. See generally, e.g., MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 157 (observing that in Birmingham Dr.
King “consciously steered away from legal claims and instead relied on civil disobedience.”).
It turned out that there was a major timing disconnect, as well. The district court did not grant the
plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion until 1969, long after the Chicago Freedom Movement had
ended. See Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. at 907, 914. Moreover, the remedial process continued well into
the 21st century. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2007) (“This
appeal presents the latest phase of the long-running litigation over racial discrimination in public
housing in Chicago that bears Dorothy Gautreaux’s name.”); see also POLIKOFF, supra note 653, at 312.
657
There is no indication that the Chicago Freedom Movement considered pursuing either of these
legal remedies. See ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 62, at 188–91. See generally GARROW, supra
note 2, at 431–525 (discussing SCLC campaign in Chicago).
658
The activists began with vigils at real estate offices in white neighborhoods where brokers refused
to serve Black home seekers. See RALPH, supra note 62, at 119–20. Then they moved on to a series of
marches into white neighborhoods to protest and dramatize the exclusion of Black families. See id. at
122. Even with police protection, neighborhood residents and their supporters met the marchers with
violence. See id. at 122–23. As Mayor Richard J. Daley witnessed his two major constituencies—
working-class whites and Blacks—confronting each other, he grew increasingly concerned about the
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Two factors seemed to explain Dr. King and his colleagues forgoing
opportunities for deploying a legal strategy, starting in 1963. First, as discussed in
Section B, the need for litigation declined as they turned to more aggressive and
potentially effective nonviolent direct action tactics. 659 Second, they became
increasingly skeptical about the courts’ ability to turn their decisions into progress
on the ground.660 That concern grew out of their own experience with the courts, as
well as the courts’ involvement in civil rights, more generally.661
Dr. King and his associates had never initiated nonviolent direct action and
complementary litigation simultaneously, as a carefully planned two-pronged
strategy.662 Instead, in both Montgomery and Albany, litigation had been a back-up
strategy, resorted to reluctantly when a movement was unable to achieve its
objectives through nonviolent direct action. They encountered growing resistance
and seemingly insurmountable obstacles that made it clear that the original strategy
alone was not going to accomplish their goals.663
In Montgomery, the bus boycott and the litigation challenging the bus
segregation laws reinforced each other, providing more change than either could
have accomplished on its own. While the Gayle v. Browder bus desegregation
decision and the boycott had important synergistic effects, the stars aligned almost
perfectly in that situation. The boycott and the litigation were very much in sync,
time wise. The case took less than a year from filing the complaint to a Supreme
Court decision, an extremely rare occurrence.664 Blacks also sustained the boycott
political fallout from continued demonstrations. See id. at 129–30; see also discussion infra Section
III.B.3.iv.
659
See discussion infra Section III.B. In April 1963, a group of eight white Birmingham ministers
issued “The White Ministers’ Good Friday Statement.” See S. JONATHAN BASS, BLESSED ARE THE
PEACEMAKERS: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., EIGHT WHITE RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND THE “LETTER FROM
BIRMINGHAM JAIL” app. 2 (2001), for a copy of the statement. They strongly criticized the Birmingham
Movement’s use of demonstrations and urged the city’s Black citizens to turn to negotiations and the
courts to assert their rights. See id. at 235–36. At the time, Dr. King was in jail for violating a state
court injunction prohibiting the demonstrations. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 240–46; see also infra
Section III.B.3.i. Dr. King wrote a lengthy response to the clergymen, which came to be known as the
“Letter from Birmingham Jail.” See Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Bishop C.C.J. Carpenter et
al. (Apr. 16, 1963), http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu:5801/transcription/document_images/undecided
/630416-019.pdf. See generally FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 123–24; GARROW, supra note 2, at 246.
The letter set forth a detailed defense of nonviolent direct action, including the use of civil disobedience
as a means of challenging “unjust laws.” See Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Bishop C.C.J.
Carpenter et al., supra. It also responded to the call for negotiations, arguing that their adversaries had
refused to negotiate in good faith, and that the demonstrations were designed to apply pressure to bring
about serious negotiations. Id. The letter did not address the ministers’ call for the protesters to use the
courts to pursue their rights.
660
See, e.g., MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 240 (“Our feeling was that [nonviolent direct
action], more than any other [method], was the best way to raise the problems of the Negro people and
the injustices of our social order before the court of world opinion, and to require action.”).
661
See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 568. See generally Civil Rights Movement, JOHN F. KENNEDY
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Civil-RightsMovement.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
662
The closest they came was the Montgomery movement’s abortive effort to use Rosa Parks’
prosecution as a test case challenging the bus segregation laws. See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra
note 34, at 700.
663
See discussion supra Section II.B.
664
See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 681–84. See generally GREENBERG, supra
note 51, at 271. The chronology of the distinct steps in the litigation:
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for more than a year, much longer than the intense, visible stages of most of the
later campaigns.665 That provided an opportunity for the desegregation litigation to
reach a resolution through the federal courts while the boycott was ongoing.666
Thus, it may have been clear to Dr. King that the Montgomery experience
represented a very tenuous model for the future. A strong, lengthy movement, a
lawsuit that proceeded through the federal courts at an exceptional pace, an often
ineffective adversary, and stunningly fortuitous timing came together in a way that
was not likely to be repeated.667
Several years later, the Albany, Georgia Movement further exposed the dual
strategy’s limitations. Unlike in Montgomery, Dr. King was not involved in
initiating the Albany Movement. Local activists called on him for assistance when
internal tensions and highly effective local resistance caused the movement to falter
badly.668 The intensive stage of the Albany Movement was shorter than the bus
boycott, 669 and the federal desegregation litigation proceeded at a more typical
pace. 670 This temporal disconnect added to the movement’s massive problems.
Unlike in Montgomery, the federal litigation was much too little and much too late
to save the movement from failure. 671 While the most visible phase of the

§ Filing of case: February 1, 1956
§ District court decision: June 5, 1956
§ U.S. Supreme Court ruling: November 13, 1956
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam), aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); GARROW,
supra note 2, at 61. For a discussion of the lack of an oral argument or written opinion, see Coleman,
Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 684 & 717 n.133.
665
See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 669, 688–89 (calling the arrest of Rosa Parks
on December 1, 1955 “the spark that ignited the . . . boycott,” and explaining that the MIA declared the
boycott officially over with the Supreme Court decision on November 13, 1956, but asked the
protesters to remain off the buses until the decision became final and effective on December 21).
Subsequent campaigns generally did not last as long.
666
Moreover, the Supreme Court handed down its decision holding the bus segregation laws
unconstitutional on the very day that a local court issued an injunction against the MIA’s “car pool.”
KING, supra note 7, at 139–40. Dr. King considered that alternative transportation system essential to
the continuation of the boycott. See id. at 57–63. Without the Supreme Court’s extremely speedy and
timely favorable decision, the bus boycott may have been doomed to fail. See supra note 474 and
accompanying text; see also Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 684–85.
667
Montgomery officials: (1) engaged in a counter-productive prosecution of Dr. King under a
boycott statute; (2) approved a resolution based on conversations with ministers not involved in the
MIA; and (3) delayed in striking an injunction against the car pool. See supra notes 354–356, 474, 574
and accompanying text.
668
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 88; GARROW, supra note 2, at 180. The internal tensions even
led to vigorous disagreement about whether to invite Dr. King to Albany. See MORRIS, supra note 188,
at 243; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 181. Moreover, the local police chief treated demonstrators
with a measure of respect as he arrested large numbers of protesters. See GARROW, supra note 2, at
216–17. He refused to be provoked into over-reactions that would increase public support for the
activists’ cause. See id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 188, at 250.
669
The most active part of the Albany Movement lasted approximately nine months, beginning on
November 17, 1961, and ending on August 10, 1962. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 87, 106. The
bus boycott lasted more than a year. See supra note 665 and accompanying text.
670
For the litigation’s procedural history, see Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1964), and
Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963).
671
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 208 (“Some people wondered why civil rights forces had been so
slow to file suit, but now the movement was finally taking the legal initiative.”). See generally CARSON,
supra note 27, at 61–62; MORRIS, supra note 188, at 246–50.
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movement ran from November 1961 to August 1962,672 activists did not file the
desegregation lawsuit until July 25, 1962.673 The failure of the Albany Movement
provided many lessons for later movements, one of which was the serious
limitations of the dual strategy of nonviolent direct action and complementary
desegregation litigation.674 As SCLC moved toward a strategy of relatively short,
intense local campaigns, the time frames of actions on the ground and in the courts
became increasingly disparate. 675 The potential for synergy between the two
seemed to disappear.
The courts’ continued inability to implement their decrees to change
entrenched policies and practice, along with the mixed lessons of the Montgomery
and Albany movements, decreased the attraction of litigation as a complementary
strategy.676 In 1965, Dr. King captured these concerns:
The deliberate nature of our legal process is being abused. Legal
redress for Negroes entails expensive court actions whose victories
are the signal not for the capitulation of segregationists but rather
for further bouts with new delaying tactics. . . . The delays inherent
in test cases, where the U.S. Supreme Court must ultimately rule,
make sadly pertinent the comment of Chief Justice Earl Warren in
the school desegregation cases: “Justice delayed is justice
denied.”677

672
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 87, 106. Though demonstrations continued in Albany
throughout the 1960s, they were always on a much smaller scale. See id. at 106 (describing the
“growing sense of defeat” within the movement after its initial suspension); see also CARSON, supra
note 27, at 61–62 (“Although the Albany Movement remained in existence through the late 1960s and
SNCC continued its activities in Albany for several years, the emotion and sense of hope were never
recaptured.”).
673
See Anderson, 321 F.2d at 653; Kelly v. Page, [1964–1965] 9 Race Rel. L. Rep. (Vanderbilt Univ.
Sch. of Law) 1115–16 (M.D. Ga. June 27, 1963); see also discussion supra Section II.B.2.
674
See discussion supra Part III.
675
See supra note 665.
676
Brown is but one example. The southern states “flagrantly disobeyed” the Supreme Court’s order
to desegregate public schools. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 52 (2d ed. 2008).
The experience using the courts in Birmingham in the years leading up to the Birmingham
Movement also provided grounds for skepticism about the courts’ ability to bring change on the
ground. The Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR), Birmingham’s civil rights
movement led by Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, had been leading the local struggle against segregation
since 1956. ESKEW, supra note 50, at 4. See generally MORRIS, supra note 188, at 68–73. As part of a
larger strategy, they filed lawsuits, starting with a 1957 case against the city to desegregate the buses.
See MCWHORTER, supra note 50, at 135. Arthur Shores, who was later one of Dr. King’s attorneys,
filed the suit. See ESKEW, supra note 50, at 136. The segregationist Police Commissioner Bull Connor
secured a change in the local ordinance to give control to the bus company over seating, which mooted
the case. See MCWHORTER, supra note 50, at 135–36. The bus company did not change its policy, and
ACMHR attempted an unsuccessful boycott soon afterwards. See id. at 136–38. ACMHR later sued the
city to desegregate the city’s public parks, pools, and golf courses. See id. at 247. In 1962, a federal
judge ruled that all the parks must be open to Blacks. Id. Bull Connor immediately closed the parks
rather than integrate them. Id.
677
Martin Luther King, Jr., Civil Right No. 1: The Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 14, 1965,
reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 531, at 182, 186; see also MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY,
supra note 32, at 139 (referring to the “slow court process[es]”).
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A decade after the Supreme Court decided Brown, virtually no desegregation
of schools had taken place in the Deep South.678 In Chicago in 1966, Martin Luther
King, Jr. referred to that fact in rejecting a suggestion that the Chicago Freedom
Movement abandon its open housing marches into white neighborhoods in favor of
using the legal process provided by the Chicago Fair Housing ordinance.679 For Dr.
King, the lack of change in school patterns served as a painful reminder of the
courts’ limited ability to affect deeply entrenched policies and practices.
In August 1966, Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley brought together
representatives of the Chicago Freedom Movement, city officials, and real estate
and business leaders to address the movement’s demands.680 Ironically, one of the
city’s representatives was William Ming, who served on the Chicago Commission
on Human Relations’ board.681 Six years earlier, Ming had been a successful colead defense counsel in Dr. King’s Alabama perjury trial.682 In one of the Summit
meetings, Ming suggested that the Chicago Freedom Movement pursue legal
remedies for discrimination under the city’s 1963 Fair Housing ordinance instead
of continuing its marches and demonstrations.683 But Dr. King strongly resisted
Ming’s suggestion that the ordinance alone could solve Chicago’s deeply
entrenched, pervasive housing discrimination problem:
I hope that people here don’t feel that we are just being recalcitrant,
but we do have a little history of disappointment and broken
promises, and I certainly wouldn’t want to argue with Mr. Ming. Mr.
Ming was my lawyer who saved me in court in Alabama from ten
years in prison and he’s my great counselor, but I would remind him
that ten years ago we got a court decision and a law three years ago
now that says that segregation is illegal and we now have 5.3% of
the children integrated in the South. And Bob Ming is telling me
now that the ordinance will do the job. We see a gulf between the
promise and the fulfillment.684

678

Ten years after Brown was decided, only 1.2% of Black schoolchildren attended desegregated
schools. See ROSENBERG, supra note 676, at 50 tbl.2.1, 99–100; see also MORRIS, supra note 188, at
28–29 (explaining how Congress repeatedly killed bills intended to facilitate school desegregation in
the wake of Brown); ROSENBERG, supra note 676, at 78 (discussing a document known as the
“Southern Manifesto” in which its 101 congressional signatories pledged to reverse Brown); FRANCIS
M. WILHOIT, THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 41–48 (1973) (describing governmental resistance
to Brown).
679
See John McKnight, The Summit Negotiations: Chicago, August 17, 1966—August 26, 1966, in
CHICAGO 1966, supra note 62, at 111, 127.
680
These sessions came to be referred to as “Summit meetings.” See RALPH, supra note 62, at 161.
681
See id. at 158.
682
See supra Section II.A.1.i.b.
683
See McKnight, supra note 679, at 124–25.
684
Id. at 127. Dr. King continued,

We don’t want to fool people any longer; they feel they have been fooled; so we are
asking today that Negroes can buy anywhere. When will that be? Tell us, so that we
won’t fool the people. We need a timetable, something very concrete. We want to know
what your implementation is.
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With the shift away from initiating constitutional litigation to complement
nonviolent direct action, the lawyers were relieved of an assignment they had
carried out in the early days of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s career. At the same time,
they began to play an even greater role in providing support for nonviolent direct
action in both old and new ways.
B. Support for Nonviolent Direct Action
As Martin Luther King, Jr.’s commitment to nonviolent direct action
deepened with greater exposure to the underlying ideas and experience, so did the
breadth of his vision of possible tactics to employ. 685 He and his colleagues
developed more aggressive and innovative tactics, which proved more effective
than the earlier ones. The transition from “nonviolent persuasion” to “coercive
nonviolence” had a number of aspects, 686 including: (1) engaging in
confrontational tactics, including violating a court’s injunction, which elicited
violent responses from public officials and private citizens; (2) increasing the
scale—the numbers and range of participants in events and movements;
(3) extending the duration of marches and demonstrations; and (4) expanding the
sites of activism from local to state and national ones.687

Id. The local ordinance provided for the Human Relations Commission as the venue for relief instead of
the courts. See supra note 654 and accompanying text. Dr. King did not distinguish between the courts
and administrative forums in their inability to fulfill the promises that they made.
Moreover, the Chicago Freedom Movement sought systemic reform rather than the case-by-case
approach to address housing discrimination that the Human Relations Commission offered. See RALPH,
supra note 62, at 158. The activists sought to change the deeply embedded policies and practices of real
estate brokers operating in white neighborhoods. See id. at 114–30.
685
Initially, Dr. King’s commitment to nonviolence was quite limited. For instance, his bodyguards
carried guns. See YOUNGE, supra note 55, at 114–15; Adam Winkler, MLK and His Guns, HUFFINGTON
POST BLOG (Jan. 17, 2011, 11:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/mlk-and-his-guns
_b_810132.html. But with time, nonviolence became fundamental to him, both in principle and for
pragmatic reasons. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 32 (“When he made his debut as president of the MIA
at the initial mass meeting, December 5, he did not mention Gandhi or anything directly relating to
Mahatma’s theory or practice of social change. . . . By Christmas, however, an emerging emphasis on
nonviolence was clear. . . . [T]he conscious desire to combine Gandhian precepts with Christian
principles was growing in both King and the MIA.”); 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
supra note 137, at 14 ("King had unsuccessfully sought gun permits for his bodyguards, but he
eventually decided to get rid of all guns, including his own, after discussing with his wife and others the
inconsistency of leading a nonviolent movement while permitting the use of weapons for protection.");
see also Winkler, supra (“Eventually, King gave up any hope of armed self-defense and embraced
nonviolence more completely.”). See generally KING, supra note 7, at 72–88 (discussing Dr. King’s
“pilgrimage to nonviolence”); Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. RES. & EDUC. INST. (Apr. 16, 1963), http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu:5801/transcription
/document_images/undecided/630416-019.pdf (championing the tenets of a nonviolent campaign).
Bayard Rustin became Dr. King’s mentor on nonviolence after serving as his “Gandhian counselor”
during the Montgomery Bus Boycott. See ANDERSON, supra note 291, at 69, 185–212; see also
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 250; LEVINE, supra note 291, at 93–98, 121–22. Dr. King traveled to India
in February 1959, on the encouragement of Rustin and his other advisors, to deepen his understanding
of Gandhi’s philosophy of nonviolence. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 113–14. See generally BRANCH,
supra note 32, at 87 (“[Dr. King] came to describe [Reinhold] Niebuhr as a prime influence upon his
life, and Gandhian nonviolence as ‘merely a Niebuhrian stratagem of power.’ ”).
686
See GARROW, supra note 22, at 221.
687
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–iii, III.B.2, III.B.3.i–vi.
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In virtually every movement and event from 1963 on, there was at least one
tactic employed that reflected escalation of the nonviolent strategy. 688 With
activists’ new tactics came additional assignments and opportunities for the lawyers
to contribute. They had some new clients to represent and many new tasks to
perform. Their numerous challenges included: (1) appealing Dr. King’s and his
colleagues’ contempt citations for violating a Birmingham injunction;
(2) defending Birmingham school children against school officials’ effort to expel
them for their participation in protests; (3) suing record companies for copyright
infringement; (4) defending Dr. King against contempt charges for leading a brief
march in Selma; and (5) designing blueprints and arrangements to secure courts’
approval of proposed marches in Selma and Memphis. 689 These were daunting
challenges for the lawyers. Many of the legal questions were uncertain. Southern
segregationist judges would decide some of them, at least initially. Moreover, these
matters had very important implications for the movements and events involved.
1. Defending Dr. King, His Organizations, and the Protesters
Local officials continued to use arrests as a resistance strategy to try to defeat
protests. Over time, however, arrests also evolved into a movement tactic. 690
Activists sometimes tried to fill the jails to raise consciousness about the movement,
bring public attention to activists’ grievances, and build support for the changes
they sought.691 The use of arrests as a strategic device required decisions about
when and why to provoke arrests, who should subject themselves to arrests, and
whether to stay in jail or get released on bail. If activists decided on bail rather than
“jail, no bail,” they needed lawyers to make the bail arrangements, which could
also include securing the necessary funds.692 As a result, the lawyers represented
thousands of protesters jailed in the various campaigns.693
Again, Martin Luther King, Jr. described himself as a “frequenter of jails.”694
He averaged more than two stints in jail a year during his career.695 Still, decisions
related to arrests, jail, and bail sometimes posed very difficult dilemmas for Dr.
King, personally. On the one hand, it was symbolically important for him to be on
the same level with the mass protesters, not above them. If his followers risked
exposing themselves to mass arrests, he felt he should do the same. 696 If his
followers chose to stay in jail instead of making bail, he should join them in their

688

See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–iii, III.B.2, III.B.3.i–vi.
See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i, III.B.3.i, III.B.3.iii, III.B.3.v, III.B.4.ii.
690
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 382 (“[T]he time had come for King to submit to intentional arrest
to give the movement a publicity boost.”).
691
See discussion, infra Section III.B.1.iii.
692
See, e.g., BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, supra note 326, at 254–65 (describing lawyer Clarence
Jones’s involvement in raising bail money for the Birmingham movement).
693
See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 381 (noting that LDF lawyers and cooperating lawyers in
Alabama represented more than 3,400 defendants in the Selma protests).
694
King, supra note 1, at xxi.
695
See BENNETT, supra note 7, at 243 (listing Dr. King’s “record of arrests”); FAQs, KING CTR.,
http://www.thekingcenter.org/faqs (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (stating that Dr. King was arrested thirty
times in his career).
696
See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 2, at 241–42.
689
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sacrifice and suffering.697 On the other hand, any time in jail took him away from
other major responsibilities such as strategizing and fundraising.698 Dr. King was
so central to so many campaigns that his time spent in jail could undermine their
overall strategies.699
Mass arrests posed both strategic and financial challenges for the movement.
While filling the local jails often generated broader support for the movement, it
did not always do so. 700 In the meantime, protesters suffered degrading and
humiliating conditions in jail, as well as collateral consequences such as loss of jobs
or, in the case of Birmingham, expulsion from school.701
i. Birmingham: Defending the Children (1963)
For the first time in the Civil Rights Movement, the Birmingham Movement
enlisted school children.702 As the numbers of Black adults willing to demonstrate
declined, leading to the all-important media interest beginning to wane, leaders
searched for ways to reinvigorate the movement.703 SCLC leaders persuaded Dr.
King that a mass influx of youth was what the movement needed.704 Although he
had originally opposed using children, Dr. King approved inviting them to a mass
rally on May 2, 1963.705 Hundreds of youth demonstrated, leading to hundreds of

697

MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 157 (“We chose to serve our time because we feel so
deeply about the plight of more than seven hundred others who have yet to be tried.”).
698
GARROW, supra note 2, at 241; see also MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 157.
699
See discussion infra Section III.B.3.i.
700
See, e.g., supra Section II.A.1.i.d, infra Sections III.B.1.i–ii (discussing campaigns in Albany, St.
Augustine, and Birmingham before the use of children, where filling the jails did not generate broad
support but instead hindered the movement by raising the cost of participation).
701
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 54; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 158–59; DAN R. WARREN, IF IT
TAKES ALL SUMMER: MARTIN LUTHER KING, THE KKK, AND STATES’ RIGHTS IN ST. AUGUSTINE, 1964,
at 116 (2008); discussion infra Section III.B.1.i.
702
See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 310.
703
See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 189.
704
See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 752–55. Dr. King’s colleague James Bevel argued that any child
who could become a church member (as young as six) should be allowed to demonstrate. Id. at 755. If
children were “old enough to decide their eternal destiny,” they were old enough “to march against
segregation.” See id. At an earlier meeting, when youth who had been attending workshops volunteered
for jail, Dr. King repeatedly refused them, saying that jail is no place for a child. See id. at 750–51.
Some Birmingham movement leaders worried that “school records and lifetime hopes” could be
affected, and young lives scarred by what happened in jail. Id. at 752–53. Dr. King was also concerned
about possible charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. See id. at 753.
However, Dr. King also realized that the new life the youth could bring was crucial to the movement.
See MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 206 (“If our drive was to be successful, we must involve
the students of the community. Even though we realized that involving teenagers and high school
students would bring down upon us a heavy fire of criticism, we felt that we needed this dramatic new
dimension.”).
705
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 247. During the rally, Dr. King remained at his hotel, pondering
whether to use the children in any marches. Id. at 248–49. Other SCLC leaders made the decision
without him. See id. at 248.
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arrests, and new life for the movement.706 The success of the march convinced Dr.
King to continue using schoolchildren.707
As the movement escalated by enlisting children in demonstrations, local
officials ratcheted up their resistance tactics, attacking the demonstrators with fire
hoses and police dogs,708 and using both the jails and the schools to fight back.709
As a result, the use of children triggered significant additional responsibilities for
the lawyers.710 Not only did they have larger numbers of demonstrators to defend;
they also had to protect their clients’ futures.711
The need to protect the students took an unexpected twist when local officials
convinced the school board to expel 1,100 students who allegedly had participated
in a march.712 The expulsions took place one week before graduation for the middle
school and high school students, and before promotion for the others. 713 The
students’ parents voiced their deep concerns about this situation to Dr. King and his
colleagues. 714 The leaders turned to LDF lawyers Constance Baker Motley and
Leroy Clark with a desperate plea for assistance in preventing the school board
from carrying out its expulsion plan.715
With little time to act, Motley and her colleagues sought to enjoin the
expulsion order.716 They appeared before Federal District Court Judge Clarence W.
Allgood, a segregationist Kennedy appointee. 717 The judge denied the lawyers’
request for a preliminary injunction, after giving them a lecture in chambers about
using children in demonstrations.718
Judge Elbert Tuttle, chief judge of the Fifth Circuit, agreed to hear their appeal
in Atlanta on an extremely expedited basis—later that day.719 Motley argued that
706

See id. at 248–49; cf. THORNTON, supra note 27, at 311 (stating that thousands of “black
youngsters . . . committed to the crusade” were “taken into custody”). Estimates of the number of
arrests vary, ranging from 600 according to MCWHORTER, supra note 50, at 368, to “more than five
hundred,” GARROW, supra note 2, at 249, and only 274 according to the warden’s arrest records,
ESKEW, supra note 50, at 296.
707
ESKEW, supra note 50, at 265; see also KING, supra note 22, at 102 (“Looking back, it is clear
that the introduction of Birmingham’s children into the campaign was one of the wisest moves we
made. It brought a new impact to the crusade, and the impetus that we needed to win the struggle.”).
708
THORNTON, supra note 27, at 311. Sheriff Bull Connor’s antics appeared on national television
and had a significant impact on public opinion. Id.; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 360. As a
result, the Birmingham movement contributed to the passage of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964.
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 363.
709
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 248–49; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135.
710
See discussion infra Section III.B.4.i.
711
Those were the issues that made Dr. King reluctant to permit children to participate in the first
place. See supra note 704 and sources cited. All protesters faced such risks; but Dr. King felt especially
protective of the children.
712
MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135. For other accounts of this episode, see ESKEW, supra note 50, at
308–09, and MCWHORTER, supra note 50, at 448–51.
713
MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135.
714
Id.
715
See id. at 135–36.
716
Id. at 136. In addition to LDF colleague Leroy Clark, four local lawyers joined her—Arthur
Shores, Peter Hall, Orzell Billingsley, and Oscar Adams. Id.
717
Id.; see also Kennedy-Appointed Judges Stall Negroes’ Court Fights, JET, Nov. 14, 1963, at 6, 6–
7.
718
See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 136.
719
Id. Presumably, Judge Tuttle was willing to proceed so quickly because the end of the school year
was rapidly approaching. The lawyers could not get to the court until the evening, but Judge Tuttle
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the school board had denied the students due process because it expelled them
without notice or hearing.720 The judge issued the requested injunction, pending
appeal.721 Motley viewed Judge Tuttle’s decision as a critical turning point in the
Birmingham movement: “I think it is fair to say that this was the most critical point
in what we now call the Birmingham campaign. If Judge Tuttle had not held this
extraordinary court session, Martin Luther King, Jr. might have gone down in
Birmingham. Instead, Tuttle’s injunction revitalized King’s efforts[,]”722 allowing
him to leave Birmingham in a good position to move on to other movements.
ii. St. Augustine (1963–1964)
Organized demonstrations began in St. Augustine, Florida during the summer
of 1963. Blacks wanted SCLC’s help in order to deal with an extremely segregated
city government.723 Dr. King hoped that demonstrations in St. Augustine would win
support for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was stalled in a congressional
filibuster. 724 SCLC discovered St. Augustine’s publicity value during an Easter
protest on March 28, 1964, which included the arrest of Mrs. Malcolm Peabody,
the mother of the Massachusetts governor.725 During Easter week, Mrs. Peabody
was one of nearly 300 demonstrators who were arrested. 726 Her arrest received
front-page news in the New York Times.727
Dr. King made his first visit to St. Augustine on May 18, stating that “he and
SCLC’s ‘nonviolent army’ were committed to demonstrations in their ‘small
Birmingham.’ ”728 They would march in the town square where slaves were once
bought and sold to remind bystanders of the connection between slavery and
contemporary segregation, as well as a way to interrupt tourist traffic vital to the
city’s economy. 729 To this end, SCLC planned for a regular schedule of night
marches until early June, at which point demonstrations would grow until the “big

agreed to hear the emergency matter at 7:00 p.m. Id. Motley, Clark, and Atlanta local counsel Donald
Hollowell drew up the papers and appeared before Judge Tuttle. Id.
720
Id. at 137.
721
Id. Judge Tuttle also lectured the school board’s lawyers about the importance of school
authorities’ efforts to keep children in school. Id.
722
Id.
723
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 180. Dr. King’s autobiography states that “SCLC came to St.
Augustine at the request of the local unit which was seeking”: (1) a biracial committee to address
segregation in the city; (2) “desegregation of public accommodations”; (3) “hiring of [Black]
policemen, firemen, and office workers in municipal jobs”; and (4) “dropping of charges against
persons peacefully protesting for their constitutional rights.” MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at
240.
724
See WARREN, supra note 701, at 76–78.
725
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 181. C.T. Vivian and Hosea Williams had organized a week of
demonstrations that included the Massachusetts Christian Leadership Conference, and Mrs. Peabody
was part of sixty volunteers who were sent to get arrested and stay in jail for at least three days. Id.
726
See id.
727
Id.; see Mother of Massachusetts Governor Jailed in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 1964), http://
www.nytimes.com/1964/04/01/mother-of-massachusetts-governor-jailed-in-florida.html.
728
GARROW, supra note 2, at 325.
729
See id. at 325–26; see also Memorandum from Wyatt Tee Walker to Dr. King, Suggested
Approach and Chronology for St. Augustine (n.d.), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document
/suggested-approach-and-chronology-st-augustine.
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push” around June 14.730 Marching in St. Augustine’s darkness through mazes of
narrow streets, the marchers would be at their most vulnerable to attacks.731
Before Dr. King even arrived in St. Augustine, attorneys for SCLC had begun
defending demonstrators who were arrested during protests. 732 After the Easter
protest, Tobias Simon, John M. Pratt, and William Kunstler filed petitions for writs
of habeas corpus in the federal district court in Jacksonville for release of those
arrested. 733 They also sought removal of the cases to federal court. 734 Federal
District Court Judge Bryan Simpson declined to take jurisdiction of the cases.735
He ordered the police to accept appearance bonds rather than the cash bonds they
had demanded. 736 Requiring the full cash amount of the bond was a way of
deterring demonstrators, and Judge Simpson’s order allowed them to pay state court
bail bonds that only required 10% face value of the bond to be paid.737
On June 11, Dr. King chose to intensify the campaign by appearing at the
whites-only restaurant of Monson Motor Lodge and seeking service.738 When Dr.
King was asked to leave, he refused, and the police arrested him. 739 Dr. King
declined to post bail and was incarcerated on charges of trespassing with malice,
conspiracy, and intent to breach the peace.740
On July 20, Dr. King’s attorneys returned to the federal district court in
Jacksonville to file a lawsuit on behalf of those arrested during the demonstrations
in St. Augustine.741 They asked the court to exercise jurisdiction over the several
hundred cases still pending before Judge Charles Mathis Jr. in St. Johns County
730

GARROW, supra note 2, at 326.
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 184–85. These attacks would demonstrate the true nature of the
police and the “inadequacy of local law enforcement.” Id. at 185.
732
See WARREN, supra note 701, at 66.
733
Id.
734
KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 273. According to William Kunstler, the attorneys sought removal to
federal court based on what they had learned from earlier cases:
731

[W]e had learned during the summer of 1963 that orders remanding removed civil rights
cases back to state court might be appealable. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit, which included
Florida, had already granted a stay of such remand orders in a Louisiana case . . . five
months earlier. It was reasonable to expect that we would get the same treatment in the
St. Augustine cases.
Id. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (2012) (permitting civil actions and criminal prosecutions involving
civil rights to be removed to federal court); id. § 1447(d) (excepting remands in civil rights cases from
bar to appellate review of district court orders remanding removed cases to state court). Kunstler also
recounts that Chief Judge Bryan Simpson was intrigued by the removal proceedings the attorneys had
instituted, telling Kunstler that this would be the first time he had encountered them, and that he
“look[ed] forward to hearing [their] arguments as to why [he] should retain jurisdiction of all these state
prosecutions.” KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 273.
735
WARREN, supra note 701, at 67.
736
Id.
737
Id. The lawyers appealed Judge Simpson’s decision against removal of the case to federal court to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans. Id. On April 5, 1964, Federal Appellate Court Judge
Elbert Tuttle “ordered local prosecutions postponed until the appeals court could hear the case.” Id.
738
GARROW, supra note 2, at 330. Dr. King was accompanied by Ralph Abernathy, Bernard Lee, and
seven others. Id.
739
Id. at 330–31.
740
WARREN, supra note 701, at 76. Dr. King was initially “locked up in the crowded St. Johns
County Jail,” id., but was later moved to the Duvall County Jail in Jacksonville for safety reasons.
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 186. He left jail on June 13 to receive an honorary degree from Yale. Id.
741
WARREN, supra note 701, at 166–67.
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Court.742 Shortly thereafter, Judge Simpson issued a protective order that kept civil
rights protesters from being prosecuted in state court, which effectively removed
all of the protesters’ pending cases to federal court. 743 Later, Judge Simpson
dismissed the charges against 400 demonstrators.744
iii. Poor People’s Campaign (1968)
In the mid-1960s, Martin Luther King, Jr. began to shift his focus from racial
segregation to addressing economic inequality and widespread poverty. 745 After
Marian Wright Edelman conveyed to Dr. King then-Senator Robert Kennedy’s
suggestion to “bring the poor to Washington” to educate the public about the
widespread existence of poverty, Dr. King embraced this as his major initiative for
1968.746 In November 1967, Dr. King announced his plan to SCLC staff members
and called it the “Poor People’s Campaign.”747
Campaign organizers envisioned thousands of poor people from urban and
rural areas and from different regions of the country going to Washington and
setting up a tent city on the mall—which came to be called “Resurrection City.”748
The protest would be racially and ethnically inclusive, with both poor people of
color and poor whites going to Washington.749 As always, the movement would be

742
Id. at 167. Since refusing the attorneys’ request to exercise jurisdiction over the cases of those
arrested during the Easter protest, Judge Simpson “appeared to have changed his opinion on the quality
of justice available to the demonstrators in state courts.” Id. at 98.
743
Id. at 167.
744
DAVID R. COLBURN, RACIAL CHANGE AND COMMUNITY CRISIS: ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA, 1877–
1980, at 134 (1985). Civil rights demonstrators also raised the issue of prison conditions. See id. at 126.
Prisoners were placed in hot, confined spaces, and demonstrators alleged that police officers had
“threatened and mistreated” the prisoners. Id. at 126–27. After a hearing, Judge Simpson ordered that
officers cease placing prisoners in small, confined areas during high temperatures. Id. at 127.
745
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 200; see also MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 4.
746
EDELMAN, supra note 177, at 109; see also HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FAYER, VOICES OF
FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980S
453–54 (1991). The idea was that a visible expression of the concern for the poor might be effective in
gaining White House and congressional support for addressing poverty. See GARROW, supra note 2, at
573–74. His close advisor Stanley Levison proposed modeling the 1932 protest of the Bonus Army of
veterans who built shanties on the mall to dramatize the plight of the unemployed during the Great
Depression. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463; MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 112.
In 1932, several thousand World War I veterans went to Washington to demand early payment of
their war bonuses. President Hoover and the Senate rejected their claims, so they “set[] up nine camps
across the city to lobby the government.” GORDON K. MANTLER, POWER TO THE POOR: BLACK-BROWN
COALITION AND THE FIGHT FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE, 1960–1974, at 94 (2013). Within weeks, 20,000
veterans and family members occupied the camps. See id. A month later, “federal troops . . . tear-gassed
and burned down the camps . . . .” Id. The veterans did not receive their bonuses for three years; but
Levison thought that it was a good model for SCLC to use. See id.
747
King’s Last March, AM. RADIOWORKS, http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/king
/b1.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2016); Poor People’s Campaign, KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://
kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_poor_peoples_campaign/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2016).
748
See MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 112.
749
See id. at 83; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 359; GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463.
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committed to nonviolence. 750 The goal was to pressure Congress and federal
agencies to commit far greater resources to address the problem of poverty.751
In mid-March 1968, Dr. King called on LDF Chief Counsel Jack Greenberg
to come to Atlanta with some of his colleagues to help plan the campaign.752 He
wanted LDF’s help on two fronts: (1) to defend the protesters against “harassment,
arrest, prosecution, and other hostile legal action”; and (2) to get permits for
meetings and parades.753 At Dr. King’s request, LDF agreed to represent SCLC in
the Poor People’s Campaign.754
During the six-week campaign, there were 567 arrests, 755 including arrests
related to protests and Resurrection City residents’ illegal activity.756 Organizers
expected mass arrests for the protest activities, 757 and SCLC’s Legal Services
Committee provided instructions for protesters about arrests. If arrested, they
should record information about witnesses and arresting officers. 758 The
750
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 359; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463; MCKNIGHT,
supra note 67, at 112.
751
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 466; see also MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 83–84.
752
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463. Leroy Clark, Chuck Jones, Lou Pollak, and Mel Zarr
accompanied Greenberg. Id.
753
Id. Greenberg made clear that if the protesters engaged in civil disobedience, they would be
committing a crime. Id. at 464. It could be impossible to defend them successfully in that case. Id. Dr.
King was prepared, as in the past, to plead guilty and serve a sentence if he decided to engage in civil
disobedience. See id.
Greenberg indicated that LDF could play a role in case of refusal of bail, bail set at excessive levels,
appropriateness of charges, and sentencing. Id. By April 2, LDF staff lawyers Leroy Clark and Jim
Finney had developed a plan to coordinate LDF staff and volunteer lawyers on possible projects for the
campaign. Id. at 465.
754
Id. at 465. Just before Dr. King’s death, with LDF overseeing all legal aspects of the PPC, they
formed the “Legal Services Committee.” Amy Nathan Wright, Civil Rights “Unfinished Business”:
Poverty, Race, and the 1968 Poor People’s Campaign 353 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Texas at Austin) (on file with University of Texas Libraries). In addition to dealing with
arrests and permissions, the group served as legal counsel for the PPC committees. Id. It provided two
to three lawyers for each committee. Id. Local lawyers served as counsel. Id. Frank D. Reeves,
Professor of Law at Howard Law School, chaired the committee. Id. at 354. LDF’s Leroy Clark served
as chief counsel. Id. Marion Wright Edelman headed the Legislative Research Committee and assisted
the other committees. Id. Law students assisted in legal efforts and participated in daily protests “to
advise participants of their legal rights,” if needed. Id.
After Dr. King was assassinated, Ralph Abernathy, his successor, announced that SCLC would
proceed with the Poor People’s Campaign, and that he wanted LDF to represent it. GREENBERG, supra
note 51, at 465.
In addition to the responsibilities Dr. King charged LDF with, LDF played a role in shaping SCLC’s
positions and demands. Marian Wright Edelman was in Washington, having worked the previous year
for LDF in Mississippi. See HAMPTON & FAYER, supra note 746, at 451–53, 478. When the protest
began, she realized that position papers were needed that would identify what the movement wanted
Congress and the President to do. See id. at 478. She gave herself the job of writing those papers. Id.
Later in the movement, Marian Wright Edelman worked behind the scenes with government lawyers
to reshape the movement’s broad and vague demands into a coherent set of priorities. MCKNIGHT,
supra note 67, at 127; see also Wright, supra, at 434.
755
MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 130. The majority of the arrests took place during the final week,
when Resurrection City was a dangerous place, with intensified violence in the form of beatings and
robberies. See id.
756
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 466; see also MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 130.
757
See CHARLES FAGER, UNCERTAIN RESURRECTION: THE POOR PEOPLE’S WASHINGTON CAMPAIGN
88 (1969).
758
Wright, supra note 754, at 430.
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instructions informed them of their rights, and assured them that legal counsel
would be available to represent them.759 Volunteer lawyers represented them, under
LDF supervision.760 Frank Reeves, who headed the committee, told demonstrators
that the official policy was “jail, no bail.”761 He indicated that penalties could be
ninety-day sentences and $250 fines.762
2. Other Defense Work: Chicago Evictions (1965–1966)
A decade after the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Martin Luther King, Jr. took his
movement to Chicago—his first major initiative outside the South. 763 He had
concluded that systemic racism was not confined to the Deep South, and that his
nonviolent philosophy was relevant to the nation as a whole.764 What came to be
called the Chicago Freedom Movement (CFM) joined SCLC with a coalition of
local organizations addressing racial discrimination.765 CFM had two major goals.
The first and foremost was a fair housing effort that sought to make housing
opportunities available for Blacks in white neighborhoods by marching Black and
white protesters into white working-class neighborhoods “to dramatize the depth of
housing discrimination.”766
CFM’s second goal involved an “end the slums” campaign focused on the
decaying buildings in low-income Black neighborhoods. 767 It drew upon an
emerging national strategy of organizing Black families in low-income
neighborhoods into tenant unions.768 The goal was to put pressure on landlords to
repair and maintain their apartment buildings.769 The tenant unions carried out rent
strikes, putting their rent money in escrow accounts to use the money to repair the
buildings until landlords made the repairs necessary to make their apartments

759

Id. The final instruction was to sing on the way to jail, to build camaraderie. Id.
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 466.
761
FAGER, supra note 757, at 89; see also Memorandum from Leroy D. Clark, Chief Counsel,
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. to Participants, Poor People’s Campaign 2 (June 1968) (on file
with author).
762
FAGER, supra note 757, at 89. Some demonstrators objected to the “jail, no bail” strategy. See id.
763
See discussion supra Section III.A, infra Section III.B.3.iv.
764
AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 23; RALPH, supra note 62, at 29–30.
765
The leadership of the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO) invited Dr.
King to come to Chicago. AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 24. CCCO had focused primarily on the
inequality in the Chicago public schools. RALPH, supra note 62, at 43, 65–66.
766
RALPH, supra note 62, at 92; see also discussion infra Section III.B.3.iv. Chicago was the most
racially segregated big city in the United States. AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 25; RALPH, supra
note 62, at 39.
767
Conditions included lack of hot water, leaking roofs, lack of heat in winter, rotting stairs and
windows, the absence of locks, and infestation of rats and vermin. AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at
26. To draw attention to these conditions, Dr. King moved into a tenement apartment in the Lawndale
neighborhood, called “Slumdale” by its residents. Id. at 27; RALPH, supra note 62, at 55.
768
RALPH, supra note 62, at 58. The CFM used emerging models of tenant union organizing in New
York City. Interview with Gil Cornfield & Gil Feldman, Founding Partners, Cornfield & Feldman LLP,
in Chi., Ill. (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter Cornfield & Feldman Interview].
769
See Cornfield Remarks, supra note 92, at 669–71; see also ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note
62, at 190–91; AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 25–26; RALPH, supra note 62, at 58; Cornfield &
Feldman Interview, supra note 768.
760
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habitable.770 This tactic put the tenants at immediate risk of eviction. In Chicago’s
Landlord/Tenant court, there was no defense to non-payment of rent. 771
Traditionally, eviction cases involved a brief pro forma ritual.772 The judge asked
the tenants whether they had paid their rent. If they had not, the judge automatically
granted the landlord the requested relief.773
Pro bono lawyers, led by law firm partners Gil Cornfield and Gil Feldman,
began to defend the tenants. 774 Their tactic was to turn the brief pro forma
procedure into a much more complicated one, with mountains of documentation
designed to prevent mass evictions and bring the eviction machinery to a
standstill.775 Defending tenants in eviction court became a massive undertaking.
There were so many cases that the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
agreed to set up a Chicago office to enlist additional lawyers to take the cases.776
Having disrupted the eviction process, Cornfield and Feldman turned to
another innovative tactic.777 As union lawyers, they borrowed from the labor law
context the model of the collective bargaining agreement. 778 They negotiated a
number of agreements with landlords providing for payment of rent in return for
commitments to make the repairs required to bring the buildings up to code.779

770

ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 62, at 191; AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 25–26;
Cornfield & Feldman Interview, supra note 768.
771
In the one case they lost, the lawyers challenged the common law principle of no defense for nonpayment of rent as outmoded. See Cornfield Remarks, supra note 92, at 674. Ultimately, the Illinois
Supreme Court adopted the “warranty of habitability” as an implicit provision in the lease that provided
an affirmative defense for non-payment of rent. See Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (Ill.
1972). The development of this implicit provision of habitability grew out of the Chicago Freedom
Movement. Richard H. Chused, The Roots of Jack Spring v. Little, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 395, 398–
99 (2007).
772
The eviction court judge granted eviction orders nearly instantaneously, taking “about five
seconds.” See Cornfield Remarks, supra note 92, at 671. A half century later, Chicago’s eviction court
still produced rapid evictions unless lawyers were available to represent the tenants. Lizzie Rosenthal:
My Work Matters, LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUND. (Dec. 27, 2013), https://lafchicago.wordpress.com/2013
/12/27/my-work-matters-23/ (“I work at LAF because low-income tenants get evicted after a ‘trial’ that
lasts three minutes if they don’t have an attorney.”).
773
See Cornfield & Feldman Interview, supra note 768.
774
See Cornfield Remarks, supra note 92, at 672.
775
See Id. The lawyers “would have people streaming out into the halls [outside the courtroom] for
every eviction. The whole process of eviction then and the court proceedings became so jammed, it was
impossible to proceed.” Id. The lawyers characterized the process as “creative [social] disruption.” Id.;
see also Morris, supra note 221, at 629.
776
See Bernadine Dohrn, Founder & Former Dir., Children & Family Justice Ctr., Bluhm Legal
Clinic, Nw. Law, Remarks at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual
Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington to
Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 667, 674–75 (2016). This process went on
every day for months, for most of the time that Dr. King was in Chicago. See id. at 673.
777
Since they were union lawyers with no experience in landlord-tenant law, they consulted with a
landlord-tenant lawyer. See Cornfield Remarks, supra note 92, at 673–74.
778
See id. at 674.
779
See id. Just as opponents tried to undermine attorney Fred Gray’s participation in the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, city officials put pressure on the unions that Cornfield and Feldman
represented to get them to cease their participation. There was even an abortive attempt to disbar
Cornfield because of his activities in eviction court. Id. at 676.
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3. Permissions and Injunctions
By the time of the Birmingham Movement, Dr. King had become fully aware
of the threat that injunctions posed:
The injunction method has now become the leading instrument of
the South to block the direct-action civil-rights drive and to prevent
Negro citizens and their white allies from engaging in peaceable
assembly, a right guaranteed by the First Amendment. You initiate
a nonviolent demonstration. The power structure secures an
injunction against you. It can conceivably take two or three years
before any disposition of the case is made. The Alabama courts are
notorious for “sitting on” cases of this nature. This has been a
maliciously effective, pseudo-legal way of breaking the back of
legitimate moral protest.780
In the later years of the Civil Rights Movement, with SCLC’s escalation of its
nonviolent direct action, the injunction scenarios became more complicated. When
opponents secured injunctions, non-compliance became an option to consider
seriously. In Birmingham, non-compliance was the chosen path. 781 In other
situations, SCLC sought major modifications that permitted planned activities to
proceed. 782 In still others, SCLC acted proactively and initiated injunction
proceedings to remove public or private obstacles to protests.783
i. Birmingham: Permission and Injunction (1963)
Where local permitting ordinances were available, city officials often used
their discretion under them to deny permits, thus thwarting marches and other kinds
of demonstrations. The 1963 Birmingham Movement provides a dramatic example
of this kind of resistance strategy.784 Movement organizers and lawyers applied to
the appropriate local official, Commissioner Bull Connor, for a permit to march.785
780

KING, supra note 22, at 68–69; see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 74–75.
See discussion infra Section III.B.3.i.
782
See discussion infra Sections III.B.3.iii, III.B.3.v.
783
See discussion infra Section III.B.3.ii.
784
See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 65–71.
785
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 65–66. Section 1159
of the Birmingham City Code required a permit for public demonstrations, which could be obtained by
written application to the city commission stating the demonstration’s purpose, expected size, and
location:
781

It shall be unlawful to organize or hold, or to assist in organizing or holding, or to
take part or participate in, any parade or procession or other public demonstration on the
streets or other public ways of the city, unless a permit therefor has been secured from the
commission.
To secure such permit, written application shall be made to the commission,
setting forth the probable number of persons, vehicles and animals which will be engaged
in such parade, procession or other public demonstration, the purpose for which it is to be
held or had, and the streets or other public ways over, along or in which it is desired to
have or hold such parade, procession or other public demonstration. The commission
shall grant a written permit for such parade, procession or other public demonstration,
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Connor was a rabid segregationist who ordered extremely aggressive and violent
resistance to the protesters.786 In response to the activists’ application for a permit,
Connor replied that they would have to apply to the entire city commission,787 a
requirement that had never been enforced.788 He also made clear that he would
strenuously oppose a permit for any civil rights activity.789 The permit rejection laid
the groundwork for a subsequent injunction prohibiting planned demonstrations.790
In response, Martin Luther King, Jr. decided to violate the injunction.791 In late
1962 and early 1963, LDF staff and other lawyers met with Dr. King in preparation
for the Birmingham Movement.792 They discussed the state of the law with respect
to violations of injunctions.793 The lawyers concluded that disobeying a state court
injunction which prohibited planned demonstrations would likely result in a
conviction for contempt of court. 794 They further concluded that it was highly
unlikely they would be able to raise the constitutionality of the ordinance on which
the injunction was based in the state courts.795
Those discussions provided Dr. King with a sense of the legal options. But
other factors remained to consider in contemplating violating an injunction,
including the likelihood that Birmingham officials would turn to the state courts
rather than the federal courts for an injunction.796 It was common knowledge that
the local judges were staunch segregationists, which could build public support for
the activists and increase the chances of U.S. Supreme Court receptivity to their
plight.797

prescribing the streets or other public ways which may be used therefor, unless in its
judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or
convenience require that it be refused. It shall be unlawful to use for such purposes any
other streets or public ways than those set out in said permit.
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 309 n.1 (1967) (quoting BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GEN. CODE
§ 1159).
786
See ESKEW, supra note 50, at 266–68; see also supra note 708 and accompanying text (discussing
Bull Connor’s tactics).
787
ESKEW, supra note 50, at 224; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361; WESTIN & MAHONEY,
supra note 136, at 66.
788
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361, 363; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 106.
789
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 66.
790
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361; see also infra notes 803–806 and accompanying text.
791
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361–62; see also discussion supra Section III.B.3.
792
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 59.
793
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361. The Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in In re Green provided
hope that protesters who violated an injunction that deprived them of their First Amendment rights
could ultimately be vindicated by the Court. In re Green involved an attorney seeking review of the
denial of requested habeas corpus relief by the Ohio Supreme Court. See 369 U.S. 689 (1962). It was in
a proceeding that challenged the jurisdiction of the state court that tried to punish him for advising
union leaders that the restraining order was invalid and that they should continue picketing. Id. at 689–
90. The Court reversed and granted the relief. See id. at 693.
794
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 59.
795
Id. But the lawyers suggested that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Green might
possibly allow this course of action. Id.; see 369 U.S. 689 (1962).
796
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 60. Birmingham officials would probably have wanted
to avoid U.S. District Judge Frank Johnson, of the Middle District of Alabama (including Birmingham),
who was generally supportive of civil rights claims. See id. at 170.
797
Id. at 59.
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On the other hand, violating court orders—even from state judges—would
create tension with the Department of Justice. The Justice Department used
injunctions extensively to seek compliance with federal civil rights court decisions
and laws.798 The agency strongly supported obedience to court orders. 799 While
aware of the risks involved, Dr. King remained committed to violating the court’s
injunction heading into the critical Birmingham movement.
On April 3, 1963, the Birmingham protest began with sit-ins at lunch counters
in downtown department stores. 800 Protest organizers planned large-scale
demonstrations for Good Friday and Easter Sunday, April 12 and 14, 1963.801 They
selected those dates strategically, with an eye on the symbolic meaning of
protesting racial segregation on those holy days. 802 On Wednesday, April 10,
attorneys for the city applied to the state circuit court ex parte for a temporary
restraining order prohibiting those demonstrations.803 The complaint alleged that
the respondents, including Dr. King and his associates (including Wyatt T. Walker,
Ralph Abernathy, and A.D. King) had engaged in various demonstrations over the
previous week, all of which were “calculated to provoke breaches of the peace in
the city.”804 That evening the judge signed a broad order prohibiting the activities
planned for later that week.805 The order was based on a local ordinance that gave
the city commission virtually complete discretion on whether to issue a parade
permit.806
After discussing the order’s implications on the movement, Dr. King and his
colleagues concluded that complying with it would be disastrous.807 SCLC aide
Wyatt Walker reflected the consensus view of the situation:
One option we eliminated was going to court to try to get the
injunction dissolved [the traditional legal procedure]. We knew this
would tie us up in court at least ten days to two weeks, and even then
we might not get it dissolved. We would have a lengthy lawsuit to
appeal but no Birmingham campaign. All of our planning and
organizing, a year’s effort, would have been in vain, and that was
exactly what the city was trying to accomplish by going to court.808

798

Id. at 60.
Id. at 60–61.
800
Id. at 63–64. The leaders also issued a “Birmingham Manifesto” with three demands:
(1) desegregation of facilities such as lunch counters and fitting rooms at department stores;
(2) businesses agreeing to employ Blacks on a non-discriminatory basis; and (3) establishing a bi-racial
committee to work out a plan for the desegregation of other areas of social life in the city.
Demonstrations would continue until local officials and business leaders met these demands. Id. at 64.
801
See id. at 68; see also ESKEW, supra note 50, at 237.
802
See KING, supra note 22, at 69–70.
803
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 69.
804
Id.
805
Id. at 71.
806
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361, 363; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 74.
807
Their lawyers argued that the way the ordinance was administered was probably a violation of the
First Amendment. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 73–74.
808
Id. at 76.
799
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Protest leaders recognized that they faced a complex and critical legal
situation, and they turned to the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund for
assistance. 809 Constance Baker Motley, LDF’s Associate Counsel, answered the
leaders’ call for help by sending Norman Amaker, who had been working with
movement groups in the South since the early 1960s.810 In Amaker’s discussions
with local attorneys Orzell Billingsley and Arthur Shores, and with LDF head Jack
Greenberg, they took as a given the movement’s decision to disobey the court order
and go ahead with the Good Friday march.811 The attorneys focused instead on a
parallel strategy—challenging the anticipated contempt citation. 812 They
anticipated losing initially, but hoped to successfully challenge the constitutionality
of the injunction on appeal.813
Before the march on Good Friday, Amaker briefed Dr. King and his associates
on the legal situation. Amaker explained that if they marched, they would probably
be in violation of the injunction and could be convicted of either civil or criminal
contempt. 814 But since the ordinance, as implemented, was probably
unconstitutional, the injunction was probably invalid. Amaker committed himself
and his colleagues to doing whatever they could to support the activists in court.815
The Good Friday march proceeded.816 The police arrested Dr. King and the
other leaders. 817 Their legal defense team included Arthur Shores and Orzell
Billingsley, the two Black Birmingham attorneys who had been involved since the
movement’s planning stage.818 The LDF contingent started with Norman Amaker,
with staffer Leroy Clark joining him shortly, and top attorneys Jack Greenberg and
Constance Baker Motley coming later.819
On the Monday after Easter, the lawyers filed their application to dissolve the
injunction as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments, being
809

Id. at 77.
Id.
811
Amaker and his colleagues were sensitive to the leaders’ skepticism about lawyers: “I knew how
a lot of them viewed lawyers as people who were very conservative; who generally tried to hold them
back, who would say that they couldn’t do anything.” Id. at 80.
812
Id. at 80–81.
813
Id. at 81.
814
Id. A criminal contempt conviction carried a maximum sentence of five days, while the civil
contempt laws provided for much more severe penalties, and allowed a judge to “jail defendants
indefinitely until they ‘purged’ themselves by apology and recantation.” BRANCH, supra note 32, at
751–52. After the briefing, Dr. King remarked that “he surely didn’t want to spend the rest of his life in
jail, but that he would not repudiate what he had announced and call off the march.” WESTIN &
MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 82.
Empty coffers complicated the situation. SCLC did not have enough money for bail. Dr. King faced
a dilemma. If he led the march, he would go to jail and his fundraising talents would not be available to
secure the needed funds. Still, he decided to march, having faith that they would somehow find the
money they needed. BRANCH, supra note 32, at 728–29; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 122;
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 82.
815
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 81. In hindsight, Amaker thought that it might have
helped with the expected appeal to file a motion to dissolve or modify the injunction before the march,
but there was not enough time to prepare the motion. Id. at 81–82.
816
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 121–22.
817
Id. at 122.
818
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 80, 86.
819
Id. at 89–90.
810
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unconstitutionally vague, and enforcing racial segregation. 820 Judge William A.
Jenkins limited the issues at trial to the questions of whether the defendants had
violated the injunction, and had done so “knowingly.” 821 He held that the
defendants’ conduct, in blatantly violating the order, was punishable as criminal
contempt.822 Since the parade permit ordinance was not invalid on its face, the only
permissible means for the defendants to challenge a denial of a permit was through
a motion to dissolve the injunction.823 Judge Jenkins fined each of them fifty dollars
and sentenced them to five days in jail—the maximum punishment permitted for
criminal contempt.824
The Alabama Supreme Court agreed to take the case directly, skipping the
intermediate appellate court.825 LDF attorneys had no expectation that the Alabama
Supreme Court would reverse the trial court, given the state high court’s record of
hostility to civil rights cases.826 When the Alabama high court did indeed reject the
activists’ claims, the defendants’ lawyers petitioned for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court.827 After the Court accepted this dramatic, high profile case, LDF
staff lawyer James Nabrit and consultant Professor Anthony Amsterdam prepared
the brief.828 By a 5-4 vote, in Walker v. City of Birmingham, the Court upheld the
Alabama Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Stewart.829
Stewart emphasized the decision was limited to the specific facts of the case—
the state’s rule of law was long established; the defendants had not made an effort
to challenge the validity of the injunction in court before violating it; and they had
820

Id. at 90; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 362. As supporting documents, they included the
city ordinances requiring segregation in various public and private facilities, and affidavits about the
arrest of Black patrons for seeking service on a desegregated basis. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note
136, at 91. As the case worked its way up to the Supreme Court, the movement’s lawyers built on these
basic documents, arguments, and evidence. Id.
821
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 97.
822
Id. at 141. While the city had charged the defendants with civil contempt as well, Judge Jenkins
dismissed that charge without stating his reasons for doing so. Id. Some suggest the practical reason for
Judge Jenkins’ ruling was that Birmingham’s business leaders did not want Dr. King “languishing
indefinitely in a Birmingham jail, while a national campaign to free him created terrible publicity for
the city.” Id.
823
Id.; see Walker v. City of Birmingham, 181 So. 2d 493, 500 (Ala. 1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 307
(1967). In such a proceeding, the court could determine whether the defendants had attempted to
comply with the ordinance and whether officials had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the
permit. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 141–42.
As the Alabama Supreme Court pointed out, however, the lawyers’ motions came too late:

It is to be remembered that petitioners are charged with violating a temporary
injunction. We are not reviewing a denial of a motion to dissolve or discharge a
temporary injunction. Petitioners did not file any motion to vacate the temporary
injunction until after the Friday and Sunday parades. Instead, petitioners deliberately
defied the order of the court and did engage in and incite others to engage in mass street
parades without a permit.
Walker, 181 So. 2d at 500.
824
Walker, 181 So. 2d at 498–99; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 142. He permitted their
release on bond pending appeal. See id.
825
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 150, 157.
826
Id. at 157–58.
827
Id. at 183, 186.
828
See id. at 219.
829
See 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
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provided no explanation for that failure.830 And for these reasons, the high court
affirmed Alabama’s contempt conviction of Dr. King.

830

See id. at 318–21. In three lengthy dissents, Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice
Douglas attacked the majority’s opinion. Chief Justice Warren emphasized the majority’s failure to
acknowledge that the injunction incorporated a municipal parade ordinance that vested “totally
unfettered discretion” in city officials, thereby making it “patently unconstitutional.” Id. at 328–29
(Warren, C.J., dissenting). He further emphasized that the precedent upon which the majority opinion
relied, Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922), had been substantially modified by the Court’s later
decision in In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962), which reversed a conviction for contempt of a state
injunction because the petitioner was not allowed to present evidence challenging the injunction’s
validity. Walker, 388 U.S. at 331–32 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice maintained that
neither Howat nor United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), cited by the majority,
supported its holding, and he concluded that “[w]hatever the scope of [the Court’s existing] doctrine, it
plainly was not intended to give a State the power to nullify the United States Constitution by the
simple process of incorporating its unconstitutional criminal statutes into judicial decrees.” Walker,
388 U.S. at 333–34 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas’s dissent focused on the record evidence which clearly established that Judge
Jenkins’ broad injunction “flouted the First Amendment,” and on the state court’s lack of jurisdiction to
issue the injunction. Id. at 334–38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“In the present case the collision between
this state court decree and the First Amendment is so obvious that no hearing is needed to determine the
issue.”). He maintained that a state court decree “is ‘state’ action in the constitutional sense” and argued
that the Alabama circuit court lacked jurisdiction to abridge the petitioners’ First Amendment rights
“peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” by issuing an
unconstitutional injunction: “An ordinance—unconstitutional on its face or patently unconstitutional as
applied—is not made sacred by an unconstitutional injunction that enforces it.” Id. at 335, 337–38.
Justice Brennan began his dissent with the harshest criticism of all the other minority opinions:

Under cover of exhortation that the Negro exercise “respect for judicial process,”
the Court empties the Supremacy Clause of its primacy by elevating a state rule of
judicial administration above the right of free expression guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution. And the Court does so by letting loose a devastatingly destructive weapon
for suppression of cherished freedoms heretofore believed indispensable to maintenance
of our free society. I cannot believe that this distortion in the hierarchy of values upon
which our society has been and must be ordered can have any significance beyond its
function as a vehicle to affirm these contempt convictions.
Id. at 338 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While Brennan acknowledged the majority’s presumption that
states “are free to adopt rules of judicial administration designed to require respect for their courts’
orders,” he argued that “a valid state interest must give way when it infringes on rights guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution.” Id. at 343–44. Brennan noted that, to ensure that freedoms guaranteed under
the First Amendment have the necessary “breathing space to survive,” id. at 344 (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)), the Court had formulated rules to give individuals the ability to
express themselves “in the face of such restraints, armed with the ability to challenge those restraints if
the State seeks to penalize that expression.” Id. at 345. “Yet by some inscrutable legerdemain,” he
continued, “these constitutionally secured rights to challenge prior restraints invalid on their face are
lost if the State takes the precaution to have some judge append his signature to an ex parte order which
recites the words of the invalid statute.” Id. at 346.
Brennan concluded by discussing the practical effect of the majority’s holding that the petitioners
“should have sought to dissolve the injunction before conducting their processions.” Id. at 348. He
pointed out that requiring even a brief cessation of the protesters’ marches could have dealt “a crippling
blow” to the petitioners’ efforts “to arouse community support for [their] assault on segregation [in
Birmingham].” Id. at 348–49. Recognizing that the petitioners had strategically scheduled their protests
for Good Friday and Easter Sunday, and that it was impossible to know how long it might take to have
the injunction dissolved, Brennan argued that “[t]o preach ‘respect’ for judicial process in this context
is to deny the right to speak at all.” Id. at 349.
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ii. St. Augustine: Injunction (1963–1964)
In St. Augustine, SCLC attorneys sought to enjoin public officials from
interfering with the demonstrations. After a night march on May 28, 1964, was met
with white resistance, demonstrators gathered at a church, where police advised
against additional night marches due to insufficient police protection.831 Still, the
next night hundreds marched again.832 Police told marchers to disperse, and forbade
them from marching downtown on any evening in the future.833
SCLC leader Andrew Young brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of
himself and all other Blacks in St. Augustine, seeking a temporary restraining order
or injunction against local law enforcement leaders and the mayor.834 Plaintiffs
argued that the defendants’ orders during the night marches of May 28 and May 29
were unlawful prior restraints on demonstrators’ fundamental rights of speech and
assembly.835 The defendants had the heavy burden of proving that these rights were
lawfully restrained based on a “clear and present danger.”836
Federal District Judge Bryan Simpson found that the May 28 and May 29
night marches caused some disorder but did not rise to a clear and present danger.837
Thus, the defendants’ interference with the marches was an unlawful restraint on
the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights, and Judge Simpson granted a preliminary
injunction.838 “Law enforcement officials would have to protect, not obstruct, the
marchers whenever they conducted such protests in the future.”839
Despite Judge Simpson’s order to not obstruct the marches, police continued
to interfere. On June 24, a group of Klansmen gathered in the park awaiting the
demonstrators who were ready to march a few blocks away. 840 The Klansmen
attacked the demonstrators, and when police moved to protect the marchers, the
831
Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 58, at 11–12; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 327.
The Chief of Police was heard saying: “We are declaring martial law. You had no permit for the earlier
marches and no permits will be given for other marches.” Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note
58, at 13.
832
See Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 58, at 12–13.
833
Id. at 13.
834
Id. at 2–3. The named defendants were L.O. Davis, as Sheriff of St. Johns County, Florida; Virgil
Stuart, as Chief of Police of the City of St. Augustine; and Joseph A. Shelley, as Mayor of the City of
St. Augustine. Id. at 3.
835
Id. at 16.
836
See id. at 16.
837
Id. at 12.
838
Id. at 19.
839
GARROW, supra note 2, at 330. SCLC attorneys sought further injunctive relief when the City
Commission adopted two ordinances that imposed a curfew and prohibited parking on certain streets
between certain hours. See Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 58, at 13–14. The first
ordinance “impose[d] a restriction from 9:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M. curfew on all persons under the age of
18.” Id. at 13; see St. Augustine, Fla., Ordinance 185-A (June 1, 1964) (repealed June 5, 1964). The
second ordinance prohibited parking automobiles between 9:00 P.M. and 5:00 A.M. on forty-two
streets in or leading to downtown St. Augustine. Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 58, at 13;
see St. Augustine, Fla., Ordinance 186-A (June 1, 1964) (repealed June 5, 1964).
Plaintiffs’ counsel informed the court that they intended to file an amended complaint seeking
injunctive relief against the enforcement of these ordinances because they violated First Amendment
rights. Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 58, at 13–14. The City Commission repealed these
ordinances, thereby mooting the injunction request. Id. at 15.
840
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 334.
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Klansmen attacked the police as well. 841 The police then began directing the
marchers “back toward the Black residential area,” rather than allowing them to
continue on their designated route. 842 By that time, Florida Governor C. Farris
Bryant had issued a county-wide proclamation prohibiting peaceful demonstrations
and marches in St. Augustine’s public places after 8:30 p.m. 843 Pursuant to the
governor’s proclamation, the police ordered the protesters to disband and go
home.844
Police also appeared to have offered insufficient protection for marchers
during demonstrations. For example, when demonstrators “swam at the public
beaches in St. Johns County,” they were attacked by white mobs, and the police did
not offer aid or assistance.845 Attorneys Tobias Simon and Earl Johnson filed a
petition for rule to show cause in the federal district court in Jacksonville against
the county sheriff and St. Augustine’s police chief and mayor. 846 The lawyers
contended the lack of police protection, the police interference with marches, and
the governor’s proclamation violated their constitutional rights, and were a direct
and willful disobedience of the court’s previous order.847 Judge Simpson quickly
instructed Governor Bryant and the police to show cause why they should not be
held in contempt of court.848
While witnesses such as Florida Attorney General James Kynes testified about
the inherent danger of night marches through narrow streets, Simon countered that
Blacks had experienced more violence on the beaches in bright daylight. 849
Attorney General Kynes had no answer for this logical inconsistency.850

841

Id.
Id. at 335.
843
See Petition for Rule to Show Cause at 4, Young v. Davis, No. 64-133-Civ-J (M.D. Fla. June 22,
1964), http://civilrights.flagler.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16000coll4/id/1183/rec/8.
844
See id.
845
Id. at 3.
846
See id. at 1, 5; WARREN, supra note 701, at 128.
847
Petition for Rule to Show Cause, supra note 843, at 4.
848
WARREN, supra note 701, at 128. During the hearing, an officer testified on behalf of the State to
support the governor’s contention that his night march ban was “necessary to maintain law and order,”
and that the demonstrators had presented police with sufficient “clear and present danger” to suspend
First Amendment rights. Id. at 134. The officer averred to the court that his shirt had been torn during
an encounter with a demonstrator, and such evidence—if true—would seriously undermine Dr. King’s
claim that the demonstrations were peaceful and protected under the First Amendment. Id.
Judge Simpson promptly ordered the officer to produce the torn short. Id. at 135. When the witness
claimed that he had sent the shirt to his wife in Tampa for repair, Judge Simpson ordered the court
marshals “to proceed immediately to Tampa and retrieve the torn shirt,” without giving the officer’s
wife any notice of their impending arrival. Id. In response, the State asked Judge Simpson to allow
them to confer privately with the officer. Id. Tobias Simon, who was representing Dr. King in the
hearing, did not object, and Judge Simpson consented. Id.
After conferring with the witness, the State alerted Simon and the court that the officer had lied
about the shirt. Id. Judge Simpson indicated that he intended to hold the witness in criminal contempt
for testifying untruthfully in his court. Id. But Tobias Simon “made an impassioned plea on King’s
behalf that the young man not be punished,” which Judge Simpson ultimately accepted. Id.
849
Partial Transcript of Hearing at 40–41, Young v. Davis, Nos. 64-133-CIV-J, 64-152-CIV-J (M.D.
Fla. June 27, 1964), http://civilrights.flagler.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16000coll4/id/1189/rec/20.
850
Id. at 41.
842
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To avoid contempt charges, Governor Bryant agreed that he would “enforce
the law more vigorously.”851 Judge Simpson in turn chose not to hold the governor
in contempt, but “set aside his ban on evening” marches. 852 Tobias Simon
subsequently moved to quash his petition seeking to hold Governor Bryant in
contempt after he “appointed a four-man ‘emergency bi-racial committee’ ” to
restore interracial communication in St. Augustine.853 After the formation of the
committee, Dr. King announced he would be ceasing demonstrations for two
weeks, as the purpose of their direct action was to bring the case “out in the open”
and create dialogue, which had now been achieved.854
Despite the creation of a biracial committee, violence persisted in St.
Augustine, particularly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title II of
the Act prohibited racial discrimination by “public accommodations,” such as
restaurants, theaters, and hotels.855 Klan members used picketing and violence to
intimidate businesses that might comply with the Act. 856 William M. Kunstler,
Tobias Simon, Jack Greenberg, Leroy D. Clark, Charles S. Ralston, and Ronald
Goldfarb filed suit against more than twenty St. Augustine businesses, seeking to
enjoin them from further violating the Civil Rights Act by refusing service “solely
on the ground of race or color.”857 Judge Simpson granted the injunction.858
The same plaintiffs also asked the federal district court in Jacksonville to
enjoin the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the Ancient City Gun Club from “using
pickets and threats of violence” to prevent St. Augustine businesses from
complying with the Civil Rights Act.859 Judge Simpson enjoined the defendants
from otherwise threatening St. Augustine businesses with the purpose of limiting
or preventing them from offering service to Blacks.860
851

COLBURN, supra note 744, at 125.
Id. at 126. Judge Simpson was also likely influenced by the fact he and Governor Bryant had
known each other for a while and were on friendly terms, as well as the fact that Governor Bryant had
informed Judge Simpson he would “try to establish a biracial committee in St. Augustine.” See id.
853
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 188; see WARREN, supra note 701, at 153–54.
854
WARREN, supra note 701, at 153.
855
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. II, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243–44 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012)).
856
WARREN, supra note 701, at 162. These picket brigades sometimes led to violence against
property, and the Motor Lodge was firebombed and suffered significant damage. Id. at 164; see also
supra note 738 and accompanying text. Gangs of whites began roaming the streets, stalking and
attacking Blacks. WARREN, supra note 701, at 162.
857
Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1965); see also WARREN, supra note 701, at 167–
68.
858
See Plummer, 353 F.2d at 587; WARREN, supra note 701, at 168.
859
WARREN, supra note 701, at 166–67.
860
See Plummer, 353 F.2d at 587–88. After Judge Simpson’s rulings, several Black customers could
not register at a motel where the manager was a fervent segregationist. See id. at 588–89. SCLC
lawyers charged the manager with “violating the equal access provision” of the Civil Rights Act in
Judge Simpson’s court. COLBURN, supra note 744, at 128. An affidavit also swore that Charles Lance
Jr., a “volunteer, unsalaried, deputy sheriff” who had followed the Black customers away from the
motel upon receiving a “signal” from the motel manager’s wife, was a member of the Ancient City
Hunting Club, which subjected him to Judge Simpson’s prior injunction. Plummer, 353 F.2d at 588–89.
Judge Simpson held Lance in contempt, and further requested that Lance resign from the sheriff’s force.
Id. at 590; see also COLBURN, supra note 744, at 129–30. The decision was upheld on appeal, except
that Lance was not prohibited from being deputy sheriff so long as he began complying with the court
orders. See Plummer, 353 F.2d at 592; COLBURN, supra note 744, at 130–31.
852

606

Vol. 10:3]

Leonard S. Rubinowitz
iii. Selma: Injunction (1965)

In early 1965, civil rights leaders focused on building public support for
federal voting rights legislation. 861 As a prime example of extreme
disenfranchisement of Black residents, Selma, Alabama became the focal point for
this effort.862 On March 7, 1965, some 600 marchers began the fifty-five-mile trek
from Selma to the state capitol in Montgomery to call on Governor Wallace and the
Alabama legislature to enforce voting rights.863 Governor Wallace had issued an
order forbidding the march and authorized the head of the state troopers to stop the
march, using “whatever measures . . . necessary.”864 As the marchers attempted to
cross the Edmund Pettus Bridge leading to the highway to Montgomery, state
troopers attacked them with clubs, bullwhips, tear gas, and nausea gas.865 Dozens
of Black people required hospital treatment for their injuries.866 Once again, the
brutality received national media coverage and produced widespread support for
the marchers.867 Dr. King was in Atlanta and had missed the march.868 In response
to the violent resistance, he announced that he would lead a march from Selma to
Montgomery within two days.869
The next day, SCLC’s lawyers went to federal court to get an injunction
restraining the governor and other officials from interfering with the planned
peaceful march. 870 They chose federal rather than state court in the hopes of
receiving a sympathetic hearing from Judge Frank Johnson, a frequent ally of civil
rights activists.871 However, Judge Johnson denied the request for an immediate
restraining order because some of the defendants had not received notice of the

861

See GARROW, supra note 22, at 31–34.
Selma was also attractive as a protest site because the Justice Department was in the process of
filing suits against local registrars’ offices for their complicity in denying Blacks the franchise. See id.
at 31. The Justice Department had ample evidence of discrimination: in 1961, out of 15,000 voting age
Blacks in Selma, only 156 were registered, and only fourteen of these voters had been registered since
1954. Id. The Justice Department had been unsuccessful, however, in challenging the entrenched white
power structure. See id. at 34.
863
See GARROW, supra note 22, at 68, 73; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 487; WESTIN & MAHONEY,
supra note 136, at 176. See generally Selma to Montgomery March (1965), supra note 59.
864
ABERNATHY, supra note 290, at 327; see also GARROW, supra note 22, at 72.
865
GARROW, supra note 22, at 74–76.
866
See id. at 76.
867
See id. at 78–82. The day after the attack, speakers from Congress “offered harsh condemnations
of the tactics and weapons used by the Alabama lawmen, with several aiming their sharpest barbs at
Governor Wallace.” Id. at 81.
868
See id. at 73. While there is some debate surrounding Dr. King’s reasons for remaining in Atlanta
during the march, he maintained that he stayed in Atlanta because he had to keep his “preaching
commitments.” Id.
869
Id. at 76, 78.
870
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 383. Norman Amaker and Steve Ralston prepared the
complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order, and then flew to Montgomery, where Fred
Gray and Solomon Seay Jr. presented it in federal court. See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100,
102 (M.D. Ala. 1965); GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 383; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 216 & n.26.
Birmingham lawyers Peter Hall, Oscar Adams Jr., and Demetrius Newton, and LDF (New York)
lawyers Jack Greenberg, Charles Jones Jr., and James Nabrit III (in addition to Amaker and Ralston)
also represented the plaintiffs. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 102; GRAY, supra note 7, at 216 n.26.
871
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 381–82.
862
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application.872 He scheduled a full hearing for several days later and enjoined any
further demonstrations until after the hearing.873
The injunction posed a dilemma for Dr. King. He had announced a march for
a date before the scheduled hearing.874 The Black community was outraged by the
brutality and was determined to act. Sympathetic supporters from around the
country were coming to Selma to join in the march.875 Dr. King felt compelled to
lead the march—to put his body on the line as his followers were prepared to do,
especially since he had missed the first march. 876 But the federal courts had
continued to play an important role in the Civil Rights Movement’s progress.877
Judge Johnson had a record of strong support for civil rights, and violating the
injunction could diminish his support.878
President Johnson also made a private and public request for Dr. King to
postpone the march until after the hearing.879 The Justice Department made the
same request, since the agency was committed to the enforcement of federal court
orders regardless of the parties involved.880 DOJ officials expressed confidence that
the hearing would lead to an order permitting the march to proceed under
reasonable guidelines. 881 In the face of Dr. King’s insistence on proceeding
notwithstanding the injunction, a Justice Department intermediary negotiated an
arrangement whereby the march would cross the Edmund Pettus Bridge and turn
back, and state troopers would not block them unless they tried to go beyond the
bridge.882
By the time the march got underway, it included 2,000 Black and white people
from around the country.883 Dr. King led them across the bridge to the barricade
protected by state troopers and deputies.884 He announced that the marchers were
872

See Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 103; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 383. Judge Johnson
also ruled that the plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm if forced to wait for a full hearing on the
matters involved. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 383. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1).
873
See GARROW, supra note 22, at 83–84. The hearing date was two days after the planned march.
Id. at 84; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 385. According to Jack Greenberg, Judge Johnson
prohibited the scheduled march “apparently to stabilize the situation and cool things off.” GREENBERG,
supra note 51, at 383. Fred Gray also reported that Judge Johnson had warned he would “put Martin
Luther King under the jail if he disobeyed the order.” Id.
874
See GARROW, supra note 2, at 400–01.
875
See id. at 399–400 (calling clergy and activists to participate).
876
See id. at 400–01.
877
In addition to the many federal court decisions requiring desegregation, the Supreme Court had
overturned a $500,000 libel judgment against four Black ministers and the New York Times in favor of
a Montgomery city commissioner a year earlier. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
If the Court had sustained the judgment, it could have bankrupted SCLC. See discussion supra Section
II.A.1.ii.
878
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 381–82.
879
GARROW, supra note 2, at 400–01; see also GARROW, supra note 22, at 85–86.
880
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 172.
881
Id. The initial effectiveness of the Justice Department’s suits against Selma’s various registrar’s
offices is debatable, given the ability of the southern segregationists to stymie the legal process. Judge
James Hare managed to prolong the Justice Department’s actions by forcing them to file multiple suits
and allowing the state solicitor general to thwart federal policy. See generally GARROW, supra note 22,
at 33–34.
882
See GARROW, supra note 22, at 86.
883
Id.; see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 174.
884
GARROW, supra note 22, at 86.
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turning back and returning to the church where they had started.885 The marchers
were confused by that turn of events, but Dr. King proclaimed it a successful
demonstration because they had crossed the bridge, as promised.886
Dr. King’s lawyers, including Harry Wachtel and the LDF’s Jack Greenberg,
began preparing a defense for the contempt charges that they anticipated.887 Even
this very limited march could violate Judge Johnson’s prohibition on
demonstrations before the hearing. Overturning such a conviction would be very
difficult in light of Supreme Court precedent.888 The hearings before Judge Johnson
on SCLC’s suit seeking to enjoin Governor Wallace from blocking the march to
Montgomery included four and one-half days of testimony from “numerous
witnesses.” 889 Judge Johnson had to decide whether in this instance First
Amendment rights to protest trumped the state’s interest in safety on the
highway. 890 The hearings also considered whether Dr. King had committed
contempt even though he had stopped short of the highway to Montgomery. 891
When Dr. King acknowledged to the court the existence of an implicit agreement
that he would go no further than the bridge, it was sufficient to free him from the
contempt charge.892
The lawyers for the movement presented a detailed plan for the next march.893
It would be a five-day peaceful march to Montgomery, with elaborate arrangements
for avoiding interference with traffic and for feeding, bathroom facilities, sleeping,
and cleaning up.894 Limiting the number of marchers in the narrowest sections of
the route could provide further protection for the state’s interests without
significantly impeding the movement’s ability to achieve its objectives.895
Arguably, the lawyers’ careful plan made it easier for the court to find that
protecting the activists’ First Amendment interests was compatible with protecting
traffic flow and safety on the highway. Judge Johnson authorized the march, giving
great deference to the movement’s First Amendment right “to protest peacefully
and petition one’s government for redress of grievance.”896 The order limited the
number of marchers to 300 once they reached the two-lane portion of the
highway.897 It also directed Governor Wallace and other state officials to protect
the marchers, and recognized the President’s power to use federal troops for

885

See id. at 86–87.
See ABERNATHY, supra note 290, at 337–43.
887
See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 173.
888
See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947) (holding that parties may be
guilty of contempt for violating a properly issued injunction while the question of its validity is pending
in court, even if it is ultimately deemed invalid).
889
Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 103 (M.D. Ala. 1965); see also GARROW, supra note 22,
at 111–12 (discussing the injunction SCLC sought against Governor Wallace and Sheriff Clark).
890
See Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 105–06; see also GARROW, supra note 22, at 112.
891
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 385–87; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 175.
892
See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 175–76.
893
GARROW, supra note 22, at 112.
894
Id.; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 176.
895
See GARROW, supra note 22, at 112.
896
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 176.
897
See id. at 177; see also GARROW, supra note 22, at 112. When they arrived outside Montgomery,
20,000 marchers assembled for the entry into the city. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 177.
886
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additional protection. 898 Meanwhile, President Johnson had announced that he
would provide whatever federal presence was necessary to protect the marchers if
the district court permitted the march to proceed.899 In accordance with the court
order, the march culminated with a 25,000-person demonstration on the steps of the
state capitol.900 In this case, appealing the injunction was a success, but it would
not always be Dr. King’s chosen path.
iv. Chicago: Injunction (1965–1966)
The next year, in Chicago, Dr. King once again encountered an injunction
restricting the direct action strategies and tactics. This time, on advice of counsel,
he decided not to violate the injunction. 901 The scenario in Chicago was quite
different from the southern movements. As the protesters marched into white
neighborhoods to challenge housing discrimination and strive toward an “open
city,” neighborhood residents and their supporters attacked them with rocks,
bottles, and threats.902 Rather than also attacking the protesters, as they had done in
cities like Birmingham, the police tried to protect them from private citizens.903
Mayor Richard J. Daley saw these confrontations between protesters and
residents as a threat to his tight control of the city. 904 They also came with a
significant cost to him politically. His two main constituencies—working-class
whites and Blacks—were doing battle with each other, and neither was satisfied
with his response.905 As a result, Daley pressed hard for negotiations—to take the
issue out of the streets and into the meeting rooms. 906 The negotiations led to
“summit meetings” to work out agreements to address the problem of housing
discrimination.907 When Mayor Daley asked the activists to stop the marches while
they negotiated an agreement, Dr. King and other leaders refused.908
898

WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 176.
Id. at 175; see also GARROW, supra note 22, at 112, 114–15.
900
GARROW, supra note 22, at 117; see also Roy Reed, 25,000 Go to Alabama’s Capitol; Wallace
Rebuffs Petitioners; White Rights Worker Is Slain, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 1965), http://www.nytimes
.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0325.html.
901
However, there was considerable debate within the Chicago Freedom Movement about whether to
violate the injunction. Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra note 651, at 683; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note
21, at 302; RALPH, supra note 62, at 178–79; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 193–94.
902
See ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 62, at 223–24; RALPH, supra note 62, at 120–21, 123–
24.
903
RALPH, supra note 62, at 129, 132–33, 188.
904
Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra note 651, at 680–81.
905
Whites objected to Mayor Daley’s letting the demonstrations take place and to having the police
protect the marchers. See ROGER BILES, RICHARD J. DALEY: POLITICS, RACE, AND THE GOVERNING OF
CHICAGO 128 (1995). The activists viewed the protection as inadequate. For example, during one
march, Dr. King was hit in the head with a rock and knocked to the ground. AYERS & DOHRN, supra
note 117, at 33. In another march, white demonstrators pushed protesters’ cars into a nearby lagoon.
Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra note 651, at 679 & n.141.
906
See Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra note 651, at 679–82.
907
See id. at 681–82.
908
See BILES, supra note 905, at 129–32. Throughout the protests, Mayor Daley was concerned with
the negative media attention and worked behind the scenes for a compromise that would end the
marches. See id. at 128–29. See generally RALPH, supra note 62, at 131–32, 141–42. Daley met with the
realtors who insisted on following their clients’ wishes, even if that meant discriminating against Black
home seekers. See id. at 154–55. After the realtors stated that they were unwilling to change their
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As the negotiations continued without reaching an agreement, Mayor Daley
obtained an ex parte injunction in Cook County Circuit Court.909 The court imposed
a series of restrictions on the marches: no more than one demonstration per day, no
marches between 7:30 a.m. and 9 a.m., 4:30 p.m. and 6 p.m., or at night, and no
more than 500 marchers at a time.910 The court also required movement leaders to
give the police twenty-four hours written notice of the time and place of each
demonstration. 911 The leadership of the Chicago Freedom Movement viewed
Daley’s actions as a betrayal of trust—seeking court intervention at a time when
the parties were supposed to be bargaining in good faith for a resolution of the
matter.912 The order significantly reduced the pressure CFM could put on the city
through their direct action tactics.913
Without indicating whether he would obey the court order, Dr. King issued a
press release deeming the city’s action “unjust, illegal, and unconstitutional.”914 He
then consulted with his lawyers, including James Nabrit and Norman Amaker, two
LDF staffers.915 They advised Dr. King that the injunction was much less sweeping
than the one in Birmingham and was not clearly unconstitutional.916 As a result,
there would be less justification for disobeying it than in Birmingham (the fate of
which remained uncertain at that point).917 Instead, they suggested that the better
route would be to contest it in court and seek modifications that would remove some
of the most severe restrictions.918 Dr. King agreed with this approach, so Nabrit and
the other lawyers began preparing a motion to dissolve or modify the injunction.919
Although Dr. King agreed to comply with the injunction, he still wanted to
maximize his leverage to secure an acceptable agreement. 920 He announced on
Sunday, August 21, 1966, his plans to lead a “massive march” the following Sunday
into the all-white, notoriously racist western suburb of Cicero.921 In the 1950s, a
practices, Daley attempted to meet with and placate Dr. King and the other Chicago Freedom
Movement leaders. See id. at 156–58; see also BILES, supra note 905, at 129.
909
See RALPH, supra note 62, at 160; see also City of Chicago v. King, 230 N.E.2d 41, 42 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1967). For a copy of the city’s complaint and motion for an injunction, see J.H. JACKSON, UNHOLY
SHADOWS AND FREEDOM’S HOLY LIGHT app. e (1967). Mayor Daley had considerable control of the
composition of the local courts through the slating process for judicial elections. See generally ADAM
COHEN & ELIZABETH TAYLOR, AMERICAN PHARAOH: MAYOR RICHARD J. DALEY 104–05, 290 (2000).
910
See JACKSON, supra note 909, at 261–62.
911
King, 230 N.E.2d at 42; see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 193.
912
RALPH, supra note 62, at 161.
913
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 193. Before this restriction, protesters marched in large
numbers, sometimes over a thousand, through white-only blue-collar neighborhoods where Blacks were
particularly unwelcome and encountered violent resistance that made for horrific images in the national
media. While white neighborhood residents were still angry, the restrictions limited the impact of the
protests. It was easier for police to protect the protesters and more difficult for the movement to garner
national attention as victims of white violence. See generally BILES, supra note 905, at 124–29, 132–
33; Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra note 651, at 679–80.
914
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 193.
915
Id. at 194. At the time, Nabrit and Amaker had just recently finished working on the certiorari
petition in Walker v. City of Birmingham. Id.; see 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
916
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 194.
917
Id.
918
Id.
919
See id.
920
See id.
921
Id.
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white mob had burned down an apartment building when a Black family moved
into the community.922 Since the injunction applied only to the city of Chicago, the
planned march would not violate it.923 The prospect of the Cicero march right on
the city’s border, with the likelihood of major violence against the demonstrators,
provided the mayor with additional incentive to push through an agreement quickly.
On August 26, the parties reached what was called the “Summit Agreement,” which
identified policies and programs designed to address housing discrimination in the
city.924
With the agreement in hand, King called off the Cicero march and began
winding down his operation in Chicago.925 CFM’s critics argued that the agreement
lacked specifics and enforcement provisions. 926 Since the “Summit Agreement”
ended the direct action phase of the movement, there is no way of knowing whether
an appeal to dissolve or modify the injunction would have succeeded.
v. Memphis: Injunction (1968)
In Memphis, Dr. King’s lawyers succeeded in securing a court order
permitting a much-needed march to proceed. It was based on the innovative Selma
order from three years earlier.927 In early 1968, Dr. King accepted an invitation to
go to Memphis to support striking sanitation workers, just as he had done in so
many other cities.928 He did not view this as a major initiative or investment of time
for himself or SCLC, and the sanitation workers’ demand for better wages fit with
Dr. King’s increasing focus on class issues.929 Addressing economic inequality was
the goal of his planned major effort for that year—the Poor People’s Campaign.930
Poor people from various racial and ethnic groups and from different parts of the
country would come to Washington, set up a tent city, and lobby Congress to
address the problem of poverty in a much more significant way.931
When Dr. King agreed to lead a march in downtown Memphis, he did not
realize that there were divisions within the movement. 932 Most importantly, an
organization of young Blacks called the “Invaders” rejected the idea of
nonviolence, arguing that the only way to get whites’ attention on racial issues was
through violence. 933 The march turned into a debacle as some of the young
922

See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, Crimes Without Punishment: White Neighbors’
Resistance to Black Entry, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 392–93 (2002) (reviewing STEPHEN
GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON’T MOVE NEXT DOOR: SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (2000)).
923
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 194.
924
Id. at 194–95.
925
Id. at 194. That made moot the lawyers’ preparations for seeking to dissolve or modify the
injunction. See id.; see also RALPH, supra note 62, at 170.
926
See RALPH, supra note 62, at 196.
927
See discussion supra Section III.B.3.iii.
928
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 369–71.
929
Id. at 371; see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 262.
930
See discussion supra Section III.B.1.iii; see also BEIFUSS, supra note 65, at 15–16, 59, 191.
931
See discussion supra Section III.B.1.iii.
932
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 374–75 (quoting Dr. King as having reported to the press: “[O]ur
intelligence was absolutely nil.”); see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 263.
933
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 262–63.

612

Vol. 10:3]

Leonard S. Rubinowitz

demonstrators broke windows and looted dozens of stores.934 Dr. King concluded
that he had to return to Memphis and show that he could lead a nonviolent march.935
His credibility was at stake, particularly with respect to ensuring a peaceful Poor
People’s Campaign in Washington later in April.936
As Dr. King anticipated, Memphis Mayor Henry Loeb instructed his city
attorney to file for a temporary restraining order in federal district court, reasoning
that any such march would be “a threat to public safety.”937 The proposed order
would prohibit “ ‘non-residents of the city acting in concert’ from organizing or
participating in a street demonstration.”938 Dr. King’s lawyers anticipated correctly
that Judge Bailey Brown would issue the temporary restraining order after the
proceeding on April 3, 1968.939
Dr. King expressed his commitment to proceed with the march even if his
lawyers were unable to gain permission for it.940 He said both privately and publicly
that he viewed the federal court order as a violation of his First Amendment rights,
and he was prepared to violate it, if necessary, to carry out the planned march on
the following Monday.941 Dr. King was represented in the injunction proceedings
by cooperating attorneys for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Lucius
Burch, a respected white local lawyer, led the legal team as a pro bono attorney
seeking to protect Dr. King’s constitutional rights.942 As an initial step, Dr. King’s
lawyers met with the city attorneys in an attempt to negotiate terms under which
the march could proceed. 943 The city’s representatives rejected those overtures,
since the city opposed the march under any conditions.944
On April 4, Judge Brown held a hearing on Dr. King’s motion to dissolve or
modify the injunction.945 The city argued that the Black community’s anger was so
high that a march could result in a riot worse than the deadly protests in Watts (Los
Angeles) and Detroit.946 City officials also feared for Dr. King’s life, which a march
would put in danger.947

934

See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 373.
Id. at 375; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 702.
936
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 375.
937
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 264–65; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 702. They
asserted federal jurisdiction primarily under diversity of citizenship and secondarily under federal
question jurisdiction. Transcript of Hearing at 3, 10, City of Memphis v. King, No. C-68-80 (W.D.
Tenn. Apr. 3, 1968) [hereinafter Memphis TRO Hearing].
938
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 265.
939
Id.
940
Cody, supra note 118, at 703.
941
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 265–66, 268; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 703.
942
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 265; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 703.
943
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 265.
944
Id.
945
Cody, supra note 118, at 703, 707; see also Opinion & Temporary Injunction at 1, City of
Memphis v. King, No. C-68-80 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 5, 1968), http://catalog.archives.gov/id/641661.
Chauncey Eskridge, a Black lawyer from Chicago who was one of Dr. King’s personal advisors and
SCLC’s General Counsel, joined the legal team for the hearing. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136,
at 269.
946
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 269.
947
Id.; see also Memphis TRO Hearing, supra note 937, at 9, 55, 58, 60–61; Cody, supra note 118,
at 702, 707.
935
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In cross-examining police witnesses, Lucius Burch emphasized the duty of the
police to protect peaceful demonstrators and to apprehend those attempting to
engage in violence.948 Allowing threats of violence to justify a ban on marches
would undermine First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly.949 Burch
also focused on the fact that city officials’ proposed injunction named only nonresidents as defendants. 950 Local residents, including those who had turned to
violence in the previous march, would not be affected by the injunction.951 Burch
argued to the court and to attorneys for the city that the city would be better off with
the march being led by Dr. King, who was committed to nonviolence, than by local
residents who did not necessarily share that philosophy.952
Dr. King’s lawyers’ arguments carried the day. Judge Brown decided that the
march could proceed as scheduled, respecting the First Amendment rights at
issue.953 The lawyers for Dr. King then proposed terms for the judge’s order that
were designed to ensure that the march would remain nonviolent, including
designating the route, the maximum number of marchers abreast, the number and
location of parade marshals, and a ban on marchers carrying anything that could be
used for destructive purposes.954 Thus, rather than violating the original injunction,
Dr. King had his lawyers move to dissolve or modify it—the process the Supreme
Court majority envisioned in Birmingham’s Walker case.955 In this instance, the
court issued the order in such a timely manner that the march could proceed as
planned.
On the evening of the hearing, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated.956
Judge Brown issued his modified order the next day, with conditions for a peaceful
march on April 8.957 Coretta Scott King stood in for her husband in the memorial
march that day.958
948

WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 269.
Id. at 269–70. Burch also called Rev. James Lawson and Rev. Andrew Young, two of Dr. King’s
key aides, as his own witnesses. Id. at 270. They made forceful presentations about the crucial role of
peaceful demonstrations for the Black community. Id. Burch recalled them focusing on peaceful
demonstrations as “a means of communicating information to people who don’t read the newspapers, as
a way of getting people together for civil action, and to be a community. It was a magnificent
philosophical presentation.” Id.
950
See, e.g., Memphis TRO Hearing, supra note 937, at 84–85. Judge Brown noted none of the
named defendants were residents of the state. Id. at 3. Presumably, city officials had named only nonresidents to support their argument for diversity jurisdiction. See id.; id. at 20.
951
See id. at 20–22.
952
See, e.g., id. at 94–95 (“Now, if it is a fact there is going to be a march, I am going to ask you
wouldn’t you rather have Dr. Martin Luther King lead that march than a great many other people who
might come in and replace him in his absence?”). Lawyers for the city argued that they did not want
any march to take place. See id. at 59–62. Ultimately, they recognized that their proposed injunction
could not ensure that result and that a march led by Dr. King had a better chance of remaining peaceful.
See Cody Remarks, supra note 274, at 685.
953
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 270; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 707.
954
Cody Remarks, supra note 274, at 685; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 707. Dr. King’s lawyers
borrowed from the court order in the Selma to Montgomery march in formulating the conditions they
proposed to the court. See Cody Remarks, supra note 274, at 685.
955
See 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
956
Cody, supra note 118, at 708. A single shot mortally wounded Dr. King as he stood on the
balcony of the Lorraine Motel. See ABERNATHY, supra note 290, at 440.
957
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 271.
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Id.
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vi. Poor People’s Campaign: Permission (1968)

Up until almost the very end of his life, Dr. King sought the assistance of his
lawyers in an effort to secure required approvals that would enable him to proceed
with planned protests. In still another escalation of nonviolent direct action, the
Poor People’s Campaign was an ambitious and complex movement that would
require many levels of permissions from the White House down. 959 There was
significant opposition to the protest in the White House and Congress. President
Johnson opposed the idea of a tent city in the shadow of the Washington Monument
both because it offended him personally and out of fear of a disaster in his racially
tense city. 960 Attorney General Ramsey Clark persuaded the President that the
protesters had the law on their side—the First Amendment—and that denying them
legal options would probably result in greater disruption.961 Segregationists and
other conservatives in Congress were also unable to block the protest from
proceeding.962
For this extraordinary movement, Dr. King needed new initiatives from his
lawyers. A few weeks before his death, Martin Luther King, Jr. called on Jack
Greenberg to come to Atlanta with some of his LDF colleagues to participate in the
planning process for the Poor People’s Campaign.963 Greenberg and Louis Pollak
met with Dr. King to discuss the purposes and the logistics of the movement,
including the kinds of approvals that would be necessary to build and maintain the
proposed “Resurrection City.”964
When SCLC moved forward after Dr. King’s death, it continued to rely on
LDF to secure permissions and agreements to proceed. Staffer Leroy Clark played
a central role. He served as the “chief liaison” between SCLC and the Justice
Department. 965 “Attorney General Clark waived the requirement[] of march
permits for demonstrations [on] Capitol Hill,” on the condition that “they were
orderly and did not interfere with traffic.”966 Leroy Clark also led a team of LDF
staff lawyers that met with the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel to make
arrangements.967 Moreover, he negotiated a lease with the National Park Service
for a site on the mall for Resurrection City.968 A permit from the National Park
Service made the space available through the end of June.969
959

See, e.g., MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 110–11.
Id. at 110.
961
See id. at 110–11.
962
See id. at 110.
963
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463.
964
Id. at 464.
965
MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 117.
966
Id. Attorney General Clark also declared some areas off limits because he wanted to avoid
possible confrontations between the protesters and concentrations of District of Columbia police. Id. at
118.
967
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 465.
968
Id. Clark also recruited volunteer lawyers to represent protesters and arranged for Howard Law
School professors to train them. Id.
969
Id. When the government was preparing to shut down Resurrection City in late June, negotiations
were required to reduce tensions and the risk of violence. Federal officials met with campaign
representatives, including legal counsel Christine Clark, to work out an effective plan. MCKNIGHT,
supra note 67, at 136. As a result, the closure of Resurrection City proceeded peacefully. See id. at 137.
LDF’s final task involved responding to a bill from the federal government for more than $70,000 for
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4. Fundraising
Nearly empty coffers were a recurring reality for SCLC. As mentioned earlier,
lawyers’ founded the Gandhi Society in an effort to secure funding on a systematic
basis.970 However, the organization quickly fell on hard times. In part because of
federal inaction in processing the society’s application for tax-exempt status that
hindered fundraising, Clarence Jones had to secure a $6,000 loan in early 1964 to
cover an overdrawn bank account. 971 Dr. King helped replenish the coffers by
donating $25,000 of his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize. 972 The Treasury Department
granted tax-exempt status in 1965, but financial woes persisted.973
The lawyers’ involvement in fund-raising then became ad hoc. In addition to
ongoing financial needs, discrete crises and opportunities arose. The year 1963 had
an example of each of those situations. Inner circle member Clarence Jones was
involved on both occasions.974 Making bail for protesters required resources that
stretched SCLC’s capacities. For example, Birmingham officials ratcheted up the
bail to put even greater strains on the movement’s budgets,975 and the lawyers had
to find the funds and make arrangements to bail out large numbers of protesters.976
i. Birmingham
In 1963, the Birmingham movement enlisted young students to march and
swell the ranks of the demonstrators.977 As anticipated, Chief of Police Bull Connor
carried out mass arrests of protesters, including hundreds of young students. 978
“use of equipment, damage to trees, razing the shanties, and so forth.” GREENBERG, supra note 51, at
466. LDF consulting lawyer Frank Reeves negotiated it down to $2,197. Id.
970
See discussion supra Section II.A.3.
971
Gandhi Society for Human Rights, supra note 518.
972
Id.; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 368, 698 n.26.
973
Gandhi Society for Human Rights, supra note 518; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 98
(noting that when the Gandhi Society finally gained tax-exempt status in 1965, the organization was
renamed the American Foundation on Nonviolence); GARROW, supra note 2, at 542, 562 (discussing
SCLC’s financial difficulties); Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Leslie Dunbar, Exec. Dir.,
Marshall Field Found. 1 (Aug. 22, 1966), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/letter-mlkleslie-dunbar# (“I note in your letter of June 21, 1966 that there was some concern regarding SCLC
seeking tax exempt status in order that it could administer the funds to [the Citizenship Education
Program] granted by the Marshall Field Foundation. . . . SCLC does have a tax exempt wing, namely,
the American Foundation on Nonviolence (AFON). . . . Regarding our financial assets, the total cash in
banks at this time comes to $8,968.23.”).
974
See discussion infra Sections III.B.4.i–ii.
975
See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 196 n.5 (“The city, in its effort to deter the
Birmingham campaign, quadrupled the cost of bail, effectively using economic terrorism to prevent the
SCLC from honoring its commitments [to bail out protesters].”). St. Augustine officials had pursued
similar tactics, raising bail from $100 to $1000 for each person arrested. See St. Augustine Movement,
supra note 57.
976
See discussion infra Section III.B.4.i.
977
See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 124–25; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 67–76, 196;
discussion supra Section III.B.1.i.
978
KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 189–90. In doing so, Connor again played into the hands of the
movement. Massive arrests of young people for engaging in nonviolent protest against racial
segregation helped build public support for the movement. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 124–27;
see also BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, supra note 326, at 259–65; GARROW, supra note 22, at 139–
41.
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Those arrests posed a significant problem for movement leaders. They had assured
the students’ parents that they would provide the bail money necessary to get them
out of jail so they could return to school.979 However, as the numbers of students
arrested increased and local officials raised the bond requirements, it became clear
that the funds available were far short of what was required to get the students out
of jail.980 The movement found itself in serious danger of reneging on its promise
to the parents—a potential crucial breach of faith.981
Dr. King’s lawyer Clarence Jones enlisted Harry Belafonte, a celebrated
singer, actor, civil rights activist, and loyal supporter of Dr. King, to address this
critical situation.982 Belafonte used his contacts in the office of Governor Nelson
Rockefeller of New York to set up a meeting between Jones and a member of the
Governor’s staff, which led to a meeting with the Governor at one of the
Rockefeller family’s banks in New York.983 The movement was about to become
the beneficiary of the Rockefeller’s philanthropy. Since the money—$100,000—
came from a bank, it came in the form of a promissory note.984 Jones was reluctant
to sign the note, however, since neither he nor SCLC had the funds to repay it.985
The Governor insisted that he sign the note, assuring him that it would not be a
problem.986 When the note arrived, it was stamped “Paid in full,” thus turning it
into a contribution to the movement. 987 That enabled the organizers to get the
students released on bail and to meet their commitments to the parents whose sons
and daughters had taken the risk of joining the protest.988
ii. March on Washington
Later that year, at the March on Washington, Clarence Jones pursued another
creative tactic that brought significant funds to the SCLC. Just before the event, he
copyrighted what became the “I Have a Dream” speech. 989 He had seen others
exploit Dr. King’s words in the past, and he hoped to prevent that from happening
again.990 As staffers were making copies of the speech for delivery to the media, he

979

See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 67.
Id. at 67–68.
981
Id. at 70.
982
See BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, supra note 326, at 257–65; see also JONES & CONNELLY,
supra note 53, at 72.
983
JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 73–76.
984
Id. at 74–75.
985
Id. at 75–76. It was especially problematic because it was a “demand note,” which meant that the
bank could call in the note at any time. See Clayborne Carson, Martin Luther King, Jr. Centennial
Professor of History; Founding Dir., Martin Luther King, Jr. Research & Educ. Inst., Stanford Univ.,
Remarks at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin
Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014),
in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 688, 697 (2016).
986
JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 75.
987
See BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, supra note 326, at 264–65; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note
53, at 76.
988
See BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, supra note 326, at 264; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53,
at 70, 76.
989
JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 91–92.
990
Id. at 92.
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had them place the common law copyright symbol of the “c” in a circle on every
page of every copy that they distributed.991
Shortly after the march, Jones filed the paperwork to secure formal copyright
protection.992 He also noticed that record stores in Harlem were blaring recordings
of the speech out on to the sidewalks. 993 Two companies were selling large
quantities of the recording, arguably in violation of the copyright.994 Jones filed suit
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking compensation
based on a claim of copyright infringement.995 While the defendants claimed that
Dr. King’s giving the speech to 200,000 people meant that it had entered the public
domain, the district court found otherwise.996 Giving a speech did not render the
copyright invalid, so the court ordered the defendants to pay damages for the
infringement.997 The money recovered through this litigation provided important
resources for SCLC.998
CONCLUSION
Leading Martin Luther King, Jr. scholar Professor Clayborne Carson has
observed:
[I]t’s also the case that in studying Martin Luther King, one of the
things that becomes very clear is that Martin Luther King really
needed lawyers. . . .
During his career, as a leader, not only did he need lawyers for
incidents of civil disobedience and basically movement activity, he
needed lawyers because often, the courts are used as a pretext to stop
leaders, using other kinds of laws that have nothing to do with civil
rights protest.999
The need for lawyers became clear the day Rosa Parks refused to give up her
seat on a Montgomery bus in December 1955 and continued until the day of Dr.
King’s death in April 1968.1000 The need grew and changed with the evolution of
the nonviolent direct action strategy, but the lawyers’ remained a constant presence
throughout.
991

Id. at 94.
Id. at 131–34.
993
Id. at 138.
994
Id. at 139.
995
See King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see also JONES &
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Several themes stand out about those lawyers. Perhaps most strikingly, Dr.
King was able to implement his preference for Black lawyers.1001 While Blacks
represented a miniscule percentage of the legal profession at mid-century, almost
half of the lawyers involved in the movements and events discussed within the
Article were Black. 1002 They played central roles in many of the most critical
challenges that Dr. King and the movements faced. It was Dr. King’s fond hope
that Black professionals would take their share of responsibility in attacking the
profound racial problems of the time.1003 Black lawyers answered the call.
Overall, the lawyers represented a mix of local practitioners and those coming
from the North. 1004 Because so much of Dr. King’s work was in Alabama—
Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma—several Alabama lawyers served a number
of movements.1005 Others, such as some of the lawyers in Georgia, and the lawyers
in Chicago and in Memphis, served in a single movement.1006 As a result, many of
the lawyers who represented Dr. King did not know each other.1007
In analyzing the deployment of those lawyers, the main focus centers on the
ways in which the lawyers’ roles tracked the strategic choices that Dr. King and his
colleagues made at different times. Since nonviolent direct action was center stage,
the lawyers always had a key role to play in supporting that activism—helping to
ensure that the marches, demonstrations, and protests could proceed as planned. In
the early years, the activists also asked their lawyers to file federal lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of state and federal segregation laws.1008 During
this period, Dr. King and his colleagues operated on the assumption that educating
their opponents could persuade them to begin to break down the entrenched system
of segregation.1009
With the failure of the Albany Movement in 1962, movement leaders
reexamined their assumptions and put aside “persuasive nonviolence” strategies in
favor of “coercive nonviolence” strategies. As tactics became more aggressive, the
movement’s lawyers had new and different tasks. Whatever their own strategic
preferences may have been, they saw their role as deferring to their clients’ choices
in both the early years and the later years of the Civil Rights Movement.1010 When
Dr. King decided to violate an injunction in Birmingham, the lawyers challenged
the contempt citation up to the Supreme Court. 1011 When young Birmingham
students faced expulsion for participating in the demonstrations there, the lawyers
challenged the school board’s actions in court. 1012 When the Chicago Freedom
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Movement decided to engage in a rent strike to pressure landlords to repair their
substandard buildings, the lawyers fought the building owners’ attempts to evict
their tenants.1013
Dr. King needed lawyers to do what would help support and advance the
changing strategies he pursued. That is what they did, for which Martin Luther
King, Jr. was extremely grateful.
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Abram, Morris
Amaker, Norman
Amsterdam, Anthony G.
Aronson, Henry
Arrington, Henry
Augustine, Israel M., Jr.
Bailey, Walter
Billingsey, Orzell
Brainin, David N.
Bronstein, Alvin J.
Burch, Lucius E., Jr.
Carter, Robert
Caywood, David
Chestnut, J. L., Jr.
Clark, Christine
Clark, Leroy
Clayton, Charles M.
Cody, W.J. Michael
Conley, Charles S.
Cornfield, Gilbert
Cotton, Eugene
Crawford, Vernon
Delany, Hubert
Durr, Clifford
Edelman, Marian Wright
Eskridge, Chauncey
Feldman, Gil
Finney, James
Goldfarb, Ronald
Gray, Fred
Greenberg, Jack
Hall, Peter
Harris, Raymond S.
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W
B
W
W
B
B
B
B
W
W
W
B
W
B
B
B
B
W
B
W
W
B
B
W
B
B
W
B
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B
W
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M
M
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M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
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L
N
N
N
L
L
L
L
N
N
L
N
L
L
N
N
L
L
L
L/N
N
L
N
L
N
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L/N
N
L
L
N
L
N

Local/
Northern

MIA/LDF - Cooperating Attorney
LDF - Staff
Law firm/LDF - Cooperating Attorney

Law firm
Law firm
Law firm
Law firm
LDF - Cooperating Attorney
Law firm
Law firm
LDF - Staff
Law firm/SCLC
Law firm
LDF - Staff

LDF - Staff

Law firm
LDF - Staff
LDF - Consultant
LDF - Staff
SCLC
SCLC
Law firm
Law firm/LDF - Cooperating Attorney
Law firm
Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee
Law firm
NAACP
Law firm
LDF - Cooperating Attorney

Affiliation
Georgia incarceration
Recurring
Birmingham
Mississippi matters
Selma
Part-time general counsel
Memphis
Alabama matters
Libel litigation
Selma
Memphis
Montgomery
Memphis
Selma
Poor People's Campaign
Recurring
Georgia incarceration
Memphis
Libel litigation
Chicago Freedom Movement
Libel litigation
Libel litigation
Alabama perjury trial
Montgomery
Poor People's Campaign
Recurring
Chicago Freedom Movement
Poor People's Campaign
St. Augustine
Alabama matters
Recurring
Alabama matters
Libel litigation
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Hollowell, Donald
Holt, Leo
Jelin, Stephen J.
Johnson, Earl
Jones, Chuck
Jones, Clarence
Kheel, Theodore
King, C.B.
Kinoy, Arthur
Kunstler, William M.
Langford, Charles
Levison, Stanley
Lubell, David G.
Lucas, Louis
Markham, Charles B.
Marshall, Thurgood
Ming, William Robert
Moore, Howard, Jr.
Morgan, Charles
Motley, Constance Baker
Nabrit, James M., III
Newman, Charles
Pierce, Samuel R., Jr.
Pollak, Louis
Pratt, John (Jack)
Ralston, Charles Stephen
Rachlin, Carl
Reeves, Frank D.
Rogers, William P.
Russell, Joseph B.
Seay, S.S., Jr.
Shores, Arthur
Simon, Tobias
Spiegel, Benjamin
Wachtel, Harry
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Law firm
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LDF - Cooperating Attorney
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Inner Circle
Law firm
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Law firm
Law firm/ACLU
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Inner Circle
Law firm
Law firm
Law firm
LDF - Staff
Law firm
Law firm
ACLU
LDF - Staff
LDF - Staff
Law firm
Law firm
LDF - Consultant
National Council of Churches
LDF - Staff
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Howard University School of Law
Law firm
Law firm
LDF - Cooperating Attorney
Law firm/LDF - Cooperating Attorney
LDF - Cooperating Attorney
Law firm
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Georgia incarceration; Albany
Chicago Freedom Movement
Libel litigation
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Selma
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Gandhi Society; Birmingham
Albany
Montgomery
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Alabama matters
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Libel litigation
Memphis
Libel litigation
Montgomery
Alabama perjury trial
Albany
Memphis
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Birmingham; Selma
Memphis
Libel litigation
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St. Augustine
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Recurring
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Total Lawyers: 74
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Black: 35
White: 36
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Male: 71
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